


**A literature review on the effectiveness of policy networks in alleviating  
implementation failure: the need for public-civic social capital**



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## DEDICATION

To my mother Gobonwamang Rankoe

## DECLARATION

I declare that this is my own work and it has been independently researched

Signed by: *Tebogo E. Rankoe* *Rankoe*  
Date: *07 May 2004*

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## ABSTRACT

A literature review has carried out in this thesis in order to find arguments in support of the notion that the public sector cannot effectively act alone in the execution of public policy. This is essentially a reaction to the idea expressed by Pressman and Wildavsky (1973) that implementation of policy can only be managed effectively and efficiently when carried out by a central organization. They claim that decentralisation to non-governmental actors could increase the number and diversity of actors and thus delay processes by complicating them.

The thesis proposed in this project is that policy implementation as well as its management involves a wide array of interdependent actors who come to join policy networks to promote their interests. The literature reviewed shows that implementation can only be effectively carried out through the management of processes based on network approaches. Public-civic social capital is seen in the project to carry the potential for increasing the sustainability of policy management forms. This can be achieved it is argued by deliberately creating environments that will seek to enable the formation and use of social capital. It is argued further that the creation of public-civic social capital for purposes of development can serve to combine both formal and informal means of accountability and thereby produce systems that are flexible enough to deal with complex issues, numerous and diverse actors and to deal with the ever changing needs of society.

Public-civic cooperation is seen as promising to circumvent the problems of collective action by building an environment of trust, reciprocity, mutual respect and an adherence to democratic principles in the management of public policy.

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## **General introduction**

This research project examines some of the organizational problems associated with the implementation of public policy. This examination looks at the extent to which public sectors can, for purposes of effectiveness, be complemented by civic organizations in the execution of policy plans. However, it is assumed that an examination of policy implementation theory could not be comprehensive and coherent without a review of literature in areas of both public policy and public management in terms of how the problems of implementation have been analysed and conceptualised. This refers specifically to the ways in which public-civic interactions have been conceptualised in terms of the characteristics of the different actors involved, and how policymaking impacts on the proliferation of actors. Secondly it is assumed that specifying a role for civil society in the execution of policy may imply certain recognised capabilities within the sector concerning the implementation of public policy and the overall management of the process. Acknowledgement of the importance of the “plurality of actors and values” (Klijn and Koppenjan, 2000) as a source of democratic legitimacy in the policy making-process has been seen according to Klijn and Koppenjan to be recently gaining enormous prominence within circles of scholars in areas of public administration and public management.

This project seeks to examine the effectiveness of norms and co-operative engagements between public and civic organizations in the management of implementation. The central assumption in this thesis is that effective implementation of public policy is only likely to occur under network conditions defined by norms of trust, mutual exchange of resources and respect, and acknowledgement of interdependencies between elements in civil society and elements in the state. It should be stated though, that while this is a primary assumption of this project, a societal approach would still caution against a perspective that failed to consider some of the main characteristics of social-political interactions. The project is carried through a literature review of various work produced by scholars of public policy on approaches to policy implementation and implementation management. The aim is to find out if implementation failure can necessarily result from network arrangements put in place for the management of policy implementation.

The literature reviewed will show that not only is policy making becoming increasingly (in some parts of the world) a joint effort between public and other actors — private or civic) but that the management of these network arrangements is also crucial for the management of the process, as in South Africa for example. It will also be shown in this literature that mutual trust, and reciprocity can serve as essential ingredients for the effectiveness of collectively managed processes where individual organizational jurisdictions are blurred by common purpose and interdependency. Social capital is conceived in this project as mutual expectations that can be held by contracting actors (Coleman, 1988) the “moral resources” (Putnam, 1993) that bind cooperating actors together via particular collectively acknowledged norms (trust and reciprocity), and networks of civic engagement defining mutually constructive engagement between policy actors. It may be important to note that although Putnam focuses primarily on engagements between civic actors, this is extended in the thesis to cover cooperative arrangements (policy networks) across public-civic divides and across the different levels (or departments) of government). This is not to underestimate its importance as a conceptual tool (Coleman, 1988) meant to conceptualise the nature of the resources that are deliberately brought into being for attaining collective problem resolution.

Bringing into analysis all those that participate in the policy process could provide insight into their diversity. Kooiman’s (1999) suggestion that governance necessarily involves differentiation and integration is understood in this project to mean that while decentralisation remains an important policy management strategy for effective differentiation and the institutionalisation of diversity, the decentralised processes may still require more centralised management strategies. This could understandably lead to further complexity and possibly require extra resources in the management of the additional complexity.

The different approaches that have been constructed to explain effective implementation management have been seen to be top-down and legal rationalistic with little or no serious attention to issues of street-level bureaucratic discretion in the management of policy implementation, the relevance of context and the political colouration of that context (Parsons, 1995). Both these problems are discussed in this thesis. The aim is to create a definitional basis with regard to what is meant about



“top-down” and “legal-rational styles” in management of policy implementation and also seek to suggest a movement away from these styles of management to management styles that are more meaningfully participatory and inclusive than is the case with these forms of management practice and philosophy.

The project at hand is based on the following broad themes:

That government has a role to play in development and that certain distinct features define its role. Street-level bureaucrats have a certain amount of discretion regarding how policy needs to be implemented, and their behaviour has in large measures mutual influences with the socio-political environment they operate in.

That these bureaucrats may carry into the policy process particular interests and values reflective of the various networks they are associated with.

That policy implementation processes are reflective of interdependencies beyond public-civic boundaries.

That social capital between the public sector and civil society can be created for the sustainable management of public policy.

On the whole the project attempts to fashion, through a literature review, some ways of understanding sustainable public-civic co-operation in terms of the nature of resources required for sustainability of co-operative forms of governance. These resources could be of a moral nature, as Putnam seems to argue (1993), where these could be created or strengthened to facilitate in public civic networks of engagement. The focus as can be realised is on the organizational aspect of the management of implementation. In other words the issues raised in this project pertain mainly to the extent to which norms described as social capital can be created to strengthen the *esprit de corps* between groups and individuals interacting for implementing public policy.

It may be noted that while norms and expectations are likely to be reciprocated between members of a particular network, they may not necessarily be replicated beyond the immediate network. I may venture to argue that the creation of forms of social capital that transcend parochial boundaries of kinship and friendship, or other such relations, is a serious task if the management of policy needs also to be based on the management, and perhaps the gradual eradication of parochially used norms. This

raises questions about the willingness and the commitment, among target groups, to support change of this kind. This may, therefore, imply that any attempt to link programme success with the broadening of participation, could be a threat to network cohesion, as a result of the increased fluidity of the network. It becomes, thus, important that the creation of networks between government and civil society is balanced against a commitment to the concept of organizational and in this case network independence. Thus while “scaling up,” as a means of transcending parochial interests, remains an important indicator of the extent of bridge-building between interdependent actors (Evans, 1996), it cannot guarantee social, economic and political progress.

Additional measures may have to be contrived to ensure effective monitoring of network activity, or individual organizational activity. An ability to impartially act on transgressions of various agreements struck between parties in a network is a likely institutional requirement. This may imply that institutions of oversight may have to be created to deal with problems of collective action. Institutions of oversight could deal not only with matters of conflict resolution, but also those of negotiation and bargaining for developmental purposes. According to Kaul (2000) the institutions of oversight can serve a number of purposes. ( )

Governance and managing public policy face a variety of problems both practical and conceptual (Minogue, Poladino and Hulme, 2000). The conceptual problems are said to be a result of the inability of conceptual models to maintain analytical coherence in explaining the modern state’s institutional development. This potential for analytical incoherence is according to Minogue et al a product of the state of flux that characterises the conceptualisation of government reform and also a consequence of the complexity deriving from the diversity of the “set of real governmental systems and economies.” This may be especially so given that there has yet to be a model with universal application in the policymaking and implementation arena. Problems relating to practice may have on the other hand been characterised by a lack of various capacities. This includes: a lack of commitment and will among decision-makers and policy managers to work accountably, responsively, professionally and efficiently within existing capacity grids. Some scholars such as Hilderbrand and Grindle (1997) make reference to the point that there may be instances where

organizational culture places particular impediments in the path of policy execution. The nature of organizational culture may be exclusionary such that meaningful and open participation between governments and their citizens is limited only to a few, a matter equally acknowledged by Mackintosh (1999). Such may be just a minute sample of the extent of the policy problematic faced by scholars and practitioners today, but may to some extent cue one into identifying areas of investigation for policy improvement and policy analysis.

Analysis of the management of policy has in recent times seen a turn around with regard to who participates as what, what the capacities commonly owned by certain individual participants are, and what their respective roles may be in expressing those capacities. In connection with the latter point, it may become essential during processes of analysis to find out what means are more effective in identifying required additional capacities regarding individual participants and the collective (whether policy networks or partnerships). However it is the premise of this thesis that not much research has been conducted in order to conceptualise the nature of resources that serve to produce enduring relationships between policy actors, and this is seen as severely characteristic of most policy research.

The project presented here attempts in essence to point out the importance of these resources for effective policy implementation. This is carried out via a literature review on arguments made by scholars of policy on the organizational aspects of implementation. This also includes some suggestions concerning the weaknesses of “top-down” models of implementation. Selected for the most initial review in this project is the approach by Pressman and Wildavsky’s (1973) on the reasons for the failure of implementation in Oakland (USA) in the 1960s, which appear to be largely focused on the organizational aspects of policy failure. The entirety of the project will attempt to focus on the organizational resources required for effective policy implementation and will suggest that social capital is one of the most important elements in the set of resources required for this purpose. Thus, while it might be important to understand the technical and financial and /or other resource requirements of the implementation process space constraints allow for only such a restricted focus.

Putting resources aside for their use by institutions to which implementation is to be transferred may be essential. This remains a crucial requirement especially in the light of an understanding that policy management, including the decentralisation of structures and personnel is neither the only solution to problems of governing, nor has it often been accompanied by an adequate transfer of resources (Hulme and Turner, 1997). The concept of decentralisation is of course further explained below. The purpose of the exercise is to give an impression that decentralising public authority brings its own complexity with it and that the complexity may require management styles that are based on facilitating co-operation between elements brought together for the purpose of policy implementation such that the uncertainty that may emanate from the extent of complexity is diminished. The elements that are brought together may comprise of organizations, associations, and individuals in civil society, organised business and actors from the state.

The proposition examined in the project relates to the extent to which the norms of mutual trust, respect and reciprocity and cooperative engagement characteristic of vibrant civil society (Putnam, 1993) can be utilised to produce synergy between government and civil society in ways that facilitate effective management of policy implementation efforts (Evans, 1996 and White and Robinson, 1999). In other words can these factors be seen as to be the “glue” to horizontal ties of interdependence between these sectors and within sectors? In the context of this thesis, this refers to the interdependencies and interactions between the public and the non-public.

The case for finding cooperative platforms, among the widest range of policy practitioners and scholars, for purposes of policy-making and implementation, has been gaining enormous momentum over the past twenty years (Kooiman, 1993; Parsons, 1995; Hulme and Turner, 1997; Kickert, Klijn and Koppenjan, 1997; Kooiman, 1999; Kooiman and Van Vliet, 1999; White and Robinson, 1999; Klijn and Koppenjan, 2000). These scholars have, besides calling for collaborative action among elements in civil society and public sector elements, helped to refocus research attention and policy-making in the direction of improving relations between civil society and government. This has coincided with trends towards significant amounts of decentralisation and devolution of authority and service provision to actors hitherto not formally included in the policy-making fold.



In a context where governance processes and institutions have effectively been devolved, as gestures of democratic consolidation or transition toward consolidation formal and informal forms of co-operative governance have been made to develop (Hulme and Turner, 1997). It is disturbing to note that very little research has gone into examining the policy uses of what Putnam has termed “moral resources”. Other scholars of public policy have found the effectiveness of management institutions to rest on the flexibility of networks created between parts of government and elements in civil society as a viable means towards effective of policy making.

Some scholars have come to see a necessarily positive relationship between democracy and institutional performance although some clear distinctions are made between certain types of democracy (for example between substantive/ direct democracy and instrumental democracy). Substantive democracy allows for greater citizen participation and encourages activity and responsibility (Klijn and Koppenjan, 2000). Klijn and Koppenjan mention that instrumental democracy on the other hand is based on principles of representative democracy where emphasis is on “formal procedures through which representatives are elected who translate citizen’s preferences into policy”. This system of governance is seen to deviate from the notion that excessive reliance on rules and procedures can lead to a lack of flexibility, and unduly complicated requirements that actually stand in the way of accomplishing tasks (Hildebrand and Grindle, 1997).

In Hildebrand and Grindle’s examination of issues of capacity of the public sectors of developing countries, they are led to conclude that a strict reliance on rules and procedure might negatively affect effective institutional performance. They say that although rules, regulations and procedures could ensure that things are done and are done right including their potential for staving off longer-term development challenges, their overall impact could be suspect. It has already been mentioned that they may obstruct flexibility and unduly create complications regarding requirements for the accomplishment of task. This point is discussed implicitly through reflections on the virtues of combining both formal and informal relations between policy actors as can be seen in policy networks.

We also propose that networks of engagement situated within the public sector, and illustrative of the relations between policy actors in general (in and outside of government) may be a product of two factors, one linked to relations embedded within the broader social political and structural context (White and Robinson, 2000; Kooiman and Van Vliet, 1999 and Kooiman 1993). The other can be seen as linked to attempts “to bridge the gap between citizens and local governments” (Klijn and Koppenjan, 2000). In fact it may be posited in this thesis that the scholars referred to above do not express views completely exclusive of one another, but seem to converge on the importance of public-civic civic-market public-market forms of collaboration based on particular common objectives and mutual trust. They also propose possibilities for combinations of both hierarchical and horizontal forms of communication and accountability for purposes of effective policy implementation and co-ordination. We begin to discuss these issues through a presentation of Bresser and O’Toole’s (1998) argument on policy networks, Peterson’s (1997) views on task networks within the public sector (both in chapter 3), and Ryan’s (2001) paper on the leadership role of government in collaborative policy making (chapter 2).

The legislation supporting the establishment of co-operative arrangements between the actors in the public domain could thus also be construed to encourage the development of embedded relations between public policy actors. This is discussed as part of creating an enabling environment for the building of public-civic social capital and complementarity (chapter 8). The embedded institutions can similarly be seen to contribute in the determination and application of (in-) semi-formal rules and norms in order to govern behaviour within the networks of engagement. This issue is discussed first, as part of the general assumptions held by Peterson (1997) on task networks within the public sector, and through a presentation of both Evans’s (1996) and White and Robinson’s (1999) views on synergy between the public sector and civil society (chapters 6 and 8). It may also be noticed that emphasis on rules may not be as productive as an enabled action environment, (Hilderbrand and Grindle, 1997) writing on the building of capacity in the public sector.

The proposition can thus be seen to imply that networks of engagement and the norms and rules that constrain actor behaviour in informal social arrangements can as well be used to strengthen relationships between the state and civil society. The

decentralisation that may mark institutional redesign within the public sector may therefore provide opportunities for the spread of norms of trust, reciprocity, mutual respect and co-operative engagement (social capital) where it promotes meaningful engagement. It is however the purpose of this thesis to show the extent to which this embeddedness, construed as an expression of social capital, can be constructed to produce synergy necessary, not only for improving effectiveness, responsiveness, and accountability for policy-making, but may significantly improve co-operative arrangements between the public and the civic. In turn this may produce effective implementation especially if collaborative practice can also lead to organizational improvement and increased “reflexivity”.

So, whether decentralisation works, or does not, depends according to the thesis proposed, on the extent to which such synergistic relations are created and sustained through it. It is assumed that synergy also promotes representativity on a sufficiently large scale, entrenches local accountability, responsiveness to popularly expressed needs of society, sustainability, and overall efficiency and effectiveness of service delivery.

The thesis begins by presenting some of the aims of public policy, and the problems associated with policy implementation. It may be noted however that the problems outlined are mainly those associated with decentralised policy implementation. This is carried out primarily through a presentation of assumptions made by Pressman and Wildavsky (1973) on the failures of implementation when the process has been decentralised to involve a multiplicity of actors inside and outside government (Chapter1).

## **Chapter1: The policy process**

### **1.1Purpose of public policy**

In attempting to answer questions concerning the overall purpose of public policy one may find several answers and these answers could be reflective of the variety of approaches to the study of public policy. It may reflect the degree to which public policy thinking and practice is driven by values and norms; some may approach the matter from a particular understanding of the social political and structural realities of the settings they study. Values, it might be posited, could be geared in the direction of the resolution of gender, class, human rights, environmental rights and a host of other issues. It can however be noted that even though this may be the case, public policy is generally aimed at changing behaviour conceived by policy makers to be either inappropriate in relation to overall values dominant in society, or in relation to particular government objectives. Those on the side of social political structural approaches would focus on the nature of interaction in the policy sphere and how these interactions influence the implementation of policy. The purpose of public policy is often not clearly explained by scholars of public policy. This section attempts, however, to present some view of what policy aims to achieve when it is finally made. Anderson (1984) provides a means of understanding the broad purpose of public policy. This is followed by an overview of what the policy process is usually thought to entail.

#### **Anderson (1984 p 213-270)**

The aim and role of public policy has primarily to do with the shaping of human behaviour. He points out the general objective of public policy is “to control behaviour (or secure compliance) and not to punish violators except as a last resort”, (p 254). He mentions before that, that public policy has a certain element of control (presumably on behaviour).

That is by one means or another, overtly or subtly, they [policies] are designed to cause people to do things, refrain from doing things, or continue doing things that they otherwise would not do (p. 245).

In this way policies can be seen as factors to be used for constraint against or opportunities for particular types of (un)desirable behaviour. Anderson mentions that



efforts aimed at changing behaviour are based on particular government rules or goals. They may be obeyed primarily on the basis of their legitimacy, which means that compliance may be a function of the legitimacy of the policy (p. 259).

Anderson, following a process model to policy, states that implementation occurs in the aftermath of the decision stage, that is, ““what happens after a bill becomes law.”” In terms of who implements policy, he points out that a variety of actors are involved. These include organizations (inside and outside government) individuals, and the groups targeted by policy. It is understood to consist of not only these actors, but also procedures and techniques. Those at the top of policy implementation apparatus may be seen to have power in determining the character of implementation strategies, more than officials at the street level, for example.

Thus according to Anderson, approaches to implementation could either be seen to be top-down or bottom up. The questions asked have to do with extent to which decision making power is, or should be distributed across the various departments and levels of government in relation to a particular policy problem. Anderson mentions that top-down approaches “focus on the actions of top level officials, the factors affecting their behaviour, whether policy goals were attained, and whether policy was reformulated on the basis of experience” (pp. 215-216). These would be “top-down” approaches, while bottom-up approaches concentrate on the relevance, of street-level officials or even actors outside of the public sector, in the implementation of policy and how they interact with their clients (as I show through a review of Parsons’s (1995) overview of approaches to policy implementation — presented in this chapter). According to Anderson policy implementation is affected mainly by the local economic conditions; attitudes of local officials and the actions of clients; politics; policy-making patterns; administrative structures and implementation techniques.

Actors in the policy implementation environment include the legislature, the courts, pressure-groups administration and community structures. Bureaucracies (administrative structures) are seen to be the most involved participants in policy implementation due to their extensive interactions with citizens and service delivery programmes, even though they may not necessarily possess the most of the decision making power. Their limited involvement in official policy formulation and decision-

making, however, implies not that they do not have discretion concerning implementation. In fact, due to the ambiguity of statutory mandates and the scope (usually broad) of decisions made, they seem to enjoy a lot of 'discretion to decide what should or should not be done on some matter and that affords them relatively bigger leverage over citizens and clients. It is the leverage they possess by way of discretionary power, which places them at the frontline of citizen action, and/or brings out their political inclinations.

[The] statutory mandates are essentially directives to the agencies involved to go out and make some policy. Moreover, because they possess discretion, they become the political targets of pressure groups and other seeking to influence decisions. Consequently, agencies become embroiled in politics (p. 217).

Administration-level officials, though empowered in this way, are said to remain within a fold controlled by legislative bodies. The legislature is capacitated with the power to invoke particular laws in order to curb such administrative leverage. Legislation can be made specific in a way that denies implementers the opportunity to do as they see fit, as it were.

The more detailed the legislation that Congress passes, the less discretion agencies usually will have. Specific limitations on the use of funds may be written into statutes, or deadlines may be specified for some actions (p. 278).

Similarly, appointments to certain top-level positions in the administration could be controlled by legislative power. Legislatures are not the only organizational forms that influence implementation and administrative function, but courts; pressure groups and community based organizations could also be seen to possess the potential to influence implementation processes, although in varying forms and to varying degrees. The extent of influence of groups outside the public sector may have on the implementation of policy is discussed as part of Parsons's an expose on the different approaches to implementation.

Pressure groups and community organizations find themselves favourably or unfavourably predisposed relative to the structures just discussed, given their existence outside of the state, separation of powers between judiciary, legislative, and executive powers notwithstanding. It may be noted that officials may, with or without discretion, still fall victim to persecution by groups outside government making them targets of citizens' action (in this case, pressure groups and community-based

organizations). It is possible for a group that can successfully influence agency action, to impact more visibly on the policy content of governments.

Anderson points out that the intensity of cooperation between pressure groups and administrative structures, can at times be seen to imply that the administration has been “captured,” and has become ‘too responsive’ to external influence. Pressure groups also have a tendency to serve as watchdogs against administrative wrongdoings. For example, “they believe a statute is not being implemented in accordance with the intent’ of the legislature” (p. 221). These groups may also participate in implementation processes that call for a more plural participatory arrangement. Community-based organizations and associations, as a part of these pressure groups, also play a role in the administration of policy when through ‘participatory democracy’ their inputs are sought and promoted. Their role may be to implement programmes at a grassroots level and to promote support for such programmes. Parsons below discusses this aspect of the implementation process in more detail. In the discussions that follow it will be shown that the extent to which policy implementation can be successful, may to a large extent, depend on the quality of interactions between the state and elements in civil society. The assumption here is that in a plural society where citizen participation has been institutionalised through various means, respect for their contributions remains paramount.

Administrative organization may have a number of implications for policy, especially given that the nature of such organisation could impact on resource allocation, inclusiveness and legitimacy of government. The following represent some of the implications identified by Anderson. The interests challenging for control and influence over the implementation of a policy may be interested in the organizational arm to be tasked with such a responsibility, and the extent to which their interests will be promoted. The administrative organization could also be made to propagate certain claims for action on an issue, or be used to facilitate particular action. It can be made to achieve certain action. Administrative organisation remains an option that could be used to control the power of the president (and perhaps other executive members of government).

Relocating programmes and functions for purposes of integration and consolidation from a particular administrative structure to another, or placing it in a different jurisdiction may cause dissatisfaction from particular interests used to dealing with that particular structure (or personnel). Those who feel dissatisfied with the way a particular administrative structure handles an issue can influence organisation of policy administration.

Dye (1992), Kingdon (1984), Hulme and Turner (1997), and Howlett and Ramesh (1997) all point to various phases through which policy travels. Howlett and Ramesh actually understand these phases to be constitutive of a cycle, thus giving policy a cyclical dimension, although they make a significant qualification, that is that 'most policies did not have a definite life cycle – moving from birth to death – but rather seemed to recur, in slightly different guises, as one policy succeeded another with only minor modification (Howlett and Ramesh, 1997, 11). Howlett and Ramesh's and Dye's arguments are presented below to give an idea about the policy cycle and a critique of the cycle (process) model.

### **Dye (1992)**

The policy process, Dye mentions, can be understood 'as a series of political activities – problem identification, formulation, legitimation, implementation and evaluation (p. 24). A brief explication of these activities may be in order. Problem identification involves primarily the expression of demands for government action. Agenda setting forms part of the policy formulation stage. Legitimizing policies includes the selection of proposals, building political support for the nominated alternatives and the enactment of these as law. This is followed by the organisation of tasks and responsibilities for the execution of the enacted laws, both in terms of financial transfers and delivery of services. This is finally followed by evaluation of the effectiveness of policies in terms of social outbursts and how government programmes affect target groups and whether the changes made have any popular support.

Dye is of the opinion that such a model could only explain how decisions are made and perhaps how they should be made, but may fail to reveal what the content of



policy is in so far as it should be. The model neither enlightens analysis on the extent of resource endowments necessary for policy making, nor does it explain what the characteristics of the policy system and the overall linkages between policies are. These weaknesses also include failure, on the part of theory, to explain the extent of resource distribution, and other system qualities.

It may turn out that social, economic, or technical constraints on policy makers are so great that it makes little difference in the content of policy whether the process of policy making is open or closed, competitive or non-competitive, pluralist or elitist, or whatever (p. 25).

The risk of emphasising process relative to content or even institutional makeup and the capabilities inherent in that make up may or may not raise issues of content, such that pertinent questions remain unresolved. The linkages between content and process remain therefore crucial.

### **Howlett and Ramesh (1997)**

These authors describe the policy process in a similar way to Dye except that their understanding of the process does not mention anything about the legitimization of policies in terms of soliciting support for selected alternatives. The advantages of understanding policy as a process and also as expressed in a cycle affords analysis two benefits, the first being the ability of such conceptualisation to facilitate an understanding of public policy making by “breaking the complexity of the process into a limited number of stages and sub-stages, each of which can be investigated alone or in terms of its relationships to any or all the other stages of the cycle” (p. 12). The second draws attention to the role of all actors and institutions responsible for a policy, going beyond the government structure charged with the task.

There is a number disadvantages associated with this model, which includes the tendency among its proponents to explain the policy process as systematic and linear, while it can be noted that in fact policy makers sometimes ‘simply react to circumstances and do so in terms of their interests and preset ideological dispositions’ (p 12). The stages may also not necessarily follow each other with the same logic presented in the policy cycle.

In practice the stages are often compressed or skipped, or followed in an order unlike that specified by the logic of applied problem solving. Thus the cycle may not be a single iterative loop, but rather a series of smaller loops in which for example the results of the past implementation decisions have a major

impact on future policy formulation.

Finally the process model lacks any hint of causation, including explanations about the actors and other elements driving the process from stage to stage. Parsons (1995) who reviews policy implementation approaches (below), states for example, that policy implementers have particular relationships with the world outside of the public sector that affect implementation. Accordingly a model may have to be designed to illuminate on the actors involved, institutions they represent, the resources and instruments they may use to effect actions expressive of the stages represented by their actions as well the environment within which they are made to act. In this thesis we concentrate on the organizational factors necessary for effective implementation of policy. The factors focused on in this thesis are perceived to be located in the public-civic realm of policy action and may determine the extent to which public-civic interaction endures in the face of upheavals that may result in the redesign and transformation of the public sector.

## **1.2 Obstacles to effective policy implementation**

In this chapter detailed reference is made to Pressman and Wildavsky's work on implementation due to the vast importance that has been accorded this work. It remains one of the most initial in-depth analyses of implementation. It also creates an impression that networks should be discarded as important vehicles for effective policy implementation, while in this project much relevance is accorded to the network approach to implementation. The project begins therefore by examining implementation failure as an approach to policy implementation studies. Pressman and Wildavsky study particular causal factors leading to implementation failure. These include: problems relating to the specification of actors and the timing of their recruitment into the policy process. Related to this issue are questions about where actors are drawn from and the amount of delays they may potentially cause given the number of decision points they may represent. They look at the commitment of resources relative to the "intensity of preferences" each individual actor (organization) may have for a particular policy alternative and the degree to which this may cause delays in the implementation process.

These are some of the problems noted by Pressman and Wildavsky. Problems with the extent to which policy design, including policy objectives, were separated from policy implementation process are pointed out as significant factors affecting the effectiveness of implementation strategy. Implementation would suffer, they argue, if implementation were not tied to goals set. These initial conditions need to be met before implementation could be carried out successfully: a clear specification of goals; commitment of resources; specification of personnel to manage disbursed resources; and the creation of clear and less crowded channels of communication are all conditions associated with successful implementation. It will be shown in the next section that as Parsons (1995) believes rigidly sticking to pre-designed outcomes (goals) could have disastrous consequences for administrations of varying organizations.

Discussing these problems nevertheless demands attention to perspectives that attempt to go beyond the legal-rational and top-down dimensions espoused by scholars such as Pressman and Wildavsky. Parsons's (1995) study of implementation literature (in this chapter) produces some insight into the discourse on, and variations of implementation practices, institutional frameworks, and organizational design. In some way Parsons attempts to draw scholarly attention away from these legal rational approaches, which are discussed immediately below in terms of what they entail. First, the *legal model*: involves adherence to the law for the resolution of public problems. Bekkers (2000) who studies the extent to which information technology has come to diminish the boundaries between organizations, argues that functions of the law can be seen to relate to allocation of competences tasks and responsibilities among government organizations as well as the jurisdictions of the specified actors concerning the competences, responsibilities and tasks identified. In terms of the characteristics of the model that have to do with allocation of tasks responsibilities, and competencies, Bekkers mentions:

First there are the contents of the legal task and competence. Secondly, there is the territorial and/ or functional domain of the competency. Thirdly, there is the degree of discretion a government organization has in fulfilling its tasks. Does the law describe in detail how a task should be executed, what is the degree of formalization, and the extent to which the organization is free in the execution of its tasks? (Bekkers, 2000, 259-260)

He argues with regard to the latter that it is the “degree of the formalisation of the content of tasks and the territorial and / or functional domain which define the extent of the legal boundaries of government organizations (p. 260)

The *rational model* is defined by the assumption that it is a set of means and people together with a variety of goals that make up an organization (Bekkers, 2000, 260). Rationally ordering the means and the people is the only way toward effective and efficient policy execution. Boundaries are here again defined on the basis of the law. Goals in this model are said to be decisive and adherence to them is the most important means to the achievement of effectiveness and efficiency. Goals are said to be important also in so far as they define organizational jurisdiction. The objective of institutionalisation has to do with reducing uncertainty, variety, and subjectivity (Bekkers, 2000, 260). These legal-rational aspects of governing will be seen to form a large part of Pressman and Wildavsky’s work and thus a major component of the criticisms directed at them.

An examination of approaches to policy implementation may serve a number of purposes. One could be that the nature of existing practices is understood, and some of the obstacles to implementation could be better understood and explained. Understanding existing practices could lead to a better understanding of the theoretical origins of particular practices. This is notwithstanding the extent to which practice could deviate from theory. Suggestions pertaining to how policy could be effectively carried out may, among other factors, rest on how one understands the nature of theoretical influence to action. On the other hand, Kooiman (1993) and Kooiman and Van Vliet (1999) suggest other aspects of policy interaction that need to be considered in analysis. First, there needs to be a clear understanding of the diversity of interests in policy processes. Diversity according to Kooiman and Van Vliet, for example, refers to the complexity of issues involved and the dynamics that define organizational behaviour and the policy context is seen as undeniably essential. For example, Hampson and Hart (1995) argue with reference to multi-party negotiations, that multi-party negotiation produce complexity and uncertainty. These they suggest derive from the large number of parties to the negotiation process and the issues on the table”, whereas uncertainty is increased by “difficulties of



communicating preferences and exchanging information among a large number of participants” (Hampson and Hart, 1995, 23).

The aim of the review therefore is not to provide the alternative arguments as critique to this work by Pressman and Wildavsky, but to show the extent to which both practice and analysis have been made to adapt to diversity, complexity and dynamics. This evolution of actions or non-actions and re-conceptualisation of practices, organizational capacities, evaluation standards, organizational and institutional design and management styles could have evolved especially as a result of the new readings of issues of context.

Analysis of contextual matters could be characterised by in-depth examinations of issues of power differentials between social political and business organizations and the extent to which these differences in the allocation of power reflect themselves within the policy process. Issues involved could pertain to how much exclusionary or inclusive the implementation process can be when participation is based on the amount of power an actor may have relative to others involved in that process.

The Taiwanese case of irrigation management and governance by Lam (1996) discussed in chapters below is an example of how legal-rational and top-down systems of communication and instruction can be combined with more informal and horizontal systems of communication and instruction to effectively carry out policy objectives. This idea is also supported by Hampson and Hart cited above, who propose that “new institutional devices are needed in order to combine both the hierarchical structure of many issue-areas with a need for wider participation” in multilateral negotiations (Hampson and Hart, 1995). These authors argue that since horizontal decision-making, communication, and co-ordination allows for flexibility in collaborative practice, it should in turn enable issue exchanges and linkage, thus enabling the environment for implementation. It should be noticed, however, that the opinions advanced by Pressman and Wildavsky do not express how this dynamic needs to be approached for implementation to be effective. It is such analytical gaps which, together with other weaknesses, complicate process analysis. The section below delves into arguments by Pressman and Wildavsky on why implementation fails.

### **Pressman and Wildavsky (1973)**

Policy can be understood 'as a hypothesis containing initial conditions and predicted consequences' which in some sense differs from Dye's (1992) definition, which regards policy not as intent but the actual carrying out of the intention. It is programmes that are found to be 'the conversion of a hypothesis into governmental action.' Thus what government does according to Pressman and Wildavsky's definition is not meant to be policy by programmes. The interaction between policy and programme is then to be defined as implementation.

The degree to which predicted consequences (The 'New' stages) take place we will call implementation. Implementation may be viewed as a process of interaction between the setting of goals and actions geared to achieving them (p. xv).

Implementation is based on an initial preparation of conditions, which may include the specification of goals, selection of actors, and the transfer of funds to the relevant actors charged with implementation. It is thus 'the ability to forge subsequent links in the causal chain so as to obtain the desired results' (p. xv). A crucial qualification is however made concerning the extent to which connection chains between actions and goals are maintained, for 'in the midst of action the distinction between the initial conditions and the subsequent chain of causality begins to erode' (p. xv).

These authors examine the nature and consequences of the implementation of public policy when a wide array of participants (governmental and private) are involved. They target, as a case study, the work of the Economic Development Administration, which was charged (by the U.S. Congress) with the task of "providing permanent jobs to minorities through economic development". The city of Oakland was identified as an experimental city for this project. The task itself was carried out in response to the demands of the Public Works and Economic Development Act of 1965.

This legislation was a successor to the Area Redevelopment Act of 1961, which had established a program to aid the depressed areas of the United States. These were areas that had suffered the loss of a major supportive industry, either through the depletion of natural resources (such as gold) or as the result of a shift in the structure of the economy favouring one resource at the expense of another (such as oil or coal). (p.8-9).

The authors propose that the Act was actually a culmination of other legal pronouncements of redevelopment, including programs geared toward development.

Among other resources, the Act encouraged the commitment of “financial assistance including grants for public works and individuals in areas needing development” (p.9). The resources devoted to carrying out objectives of the Act also included ‘technological assistance for planning, research, and demonstration projects’. The Act also allows for the specification of cities in need of development aid by ensuring that only cities with an unemployment rate of 6% for the most recent calendar year qualified. The authors mention additional criteria as well, not dealt with here. These analysts are thus made to assume that resource transfers were made equal to the resource demands of the process. As they show however, institutionalisation of processes and the adequacy of resource transfers cannot be the only criteria by which potential policy success can be measured. Policy implementation can be derailed from its objectives by various other factors, which will be discussed here under.

The problems of Oakland, although relatively clearly identified by public authorities, were not easy to deal with. This is essentially so, because the Oakland Economic Development Administration was faced with not one, but two tasks, one of these being construction of public works, and the other, job creation for the hard-core unemployed. The obstacles faced by elected officials, the authors propose, included “fragmentation of governmental authority”, because the redevelopment agency, housing authority, school board, and court commission existed outside their field of control. The other problem concerns uneven distribution of resources between elected officials and appointed officials.

Although the council-manager model assumes that “policy” will direct administration, the relationship between policy administrations of Oakland has been strongly affected by the resources available to the politicians on the one hand, and the administration on the other. The advantages of administrators are considerable (p. 17)

In addition, the disparities between the two are further exacerbated by inequalities in the staff and informational resources available to the council and the manager. The city manager has at his/her disposal “manpower and information resources of all city departments under his control”, whereas the council as a whole is served “by just one

secretary who answers the phone, arranges appointments, types letters, and administers the Christmas program of the Municipal employee's choir" (pg 17). The elected officials seem thus to be extremely disadvantaged in dealing with both political and development problems. This is worsened by the lack of political input on the part of political interest groups and party activity, meaning that the political leadership of the city had been deprived of a source of both information about, and support for public policies they might wish to propose.

In their work the authors argue that although the necessary steps can be taken towards implementation, such as securing broad consensus, public support and the commitment of funds, there can be other factors that incapacitate effective implementation. Ineffective implementation in Oakland however, can be attributed mostly to problems that may derive from the sheer plurality of participants (governmental and non-governmental). These problems include contradictory perspectives and conflicting preferences, and the differences in the participants' sense of urgency concerning particular matters to be attended to. They also ascribe some of these problems to mismatches between what participants understood to be the means and what they thought constituted the outcomes. The authors in essence, examine the extent to which implementation can be complicated rather than simplified by the amount of clearances that come with plurality of participants, expectations that do not correspond with available resources, as well as an artificial separation between policy design and implementation. These observations are summarised below.

First, the participants were too numerous and there was no effective cohesion. The lack of cohesion was brought about by, among other factors:

Some of these participants (such as the Department of Labour and Health, Education, and Welfare) become involved because they possess jurisdictional authority over important parts of the project; others (like the Navy) entered the process when they felt their interests being impinged on; and still others (such as Black people in Oakland) were intentionally brought into the program by the EDA in order to build local support for the project (p. 94).

The authors argue that because of these differing backgrounds and perspectives in terms of why people participated, different views concerning what was urgent and what was not came up. The authors lead us to bear in mind however, that among the initial conditions satisfied was broad agreement on the objectives of the program. The

problem in this regard lay not there, but concerned the fact that it is about the sequence of events that participants differed, and in a sense conflicted.

To a particular extent, the authors suggest that some of these problems stemmed from the initial processes, for example, the specification of actors. According to them, the participants were specified too early with the aim of resolving future differences in advance, including initiating bargaining too well in advance.

Something has to be left to the unfolding of events. Then, as latent conflicts become manifest, the original agreements have to be renegotiated, and a new and possibly more antagonistic situation emerges (p. 92).

Failure of the program in this regard was caused when original agreements began to erode, delays becoming more common, and when original aims and understanding give way, as people, organisations, and circumstances change (p. 92).

Second, tied to the problems emanating from participant plurality is the issue of the number of clearances needed for decisions and thus resource commitment tied to the clearing decision. The clearances, when too numerous, can cause serious delays of implementation. In their attempt to show how delays in implementation occurred, the authors also look at the impact of the number of decision points in processes of approving proposals. They focus primarily “on those major decision points that determine the course of the program, or that had to be passed in order for the program to continue” (p. 102).

The diversity of clearance points, the multiplicity of goals and the plurality of participants reduced the probabilities of the programme achieving its goals. (pg 110). When analysing the nature of the decision points, and thus their ability to stall processes, these authors conclude that “it was not merely the direction of decisions, but the time orientation of the participants — fast or slow, urgent or indolent — that determine the prospects of completion”. This, according to them, was the result of “their differing perspectives and senses of urgency” because such differences complicated the processes of translating broad substantive agreement into effective policy implementation (p. 113).

They also highlight the point that most of the decision points encountered during the time of implementation had not been foreseen, and that in fact a very large number of



decision points were brought about during the unfolding of events becoming blockages that also needed to be cleared. This would bear too negatively on the progress of the programme. The analysis of delay not only introduces the dimension of clearance (decision points), the number of participants at each point, but also issues concerning the intensity of preferences. Preferences can be looked at, they suggest, in terms of a participant's support for a program (direction), the intensity of those preferences, and also with regard to the resources that can be committed by a participant toward the fulfilment of program objectives. All these three dimensions can be detected in the analysis of delay.

Commitment of resources toward influencing chances for effective program implementation is, according to these authors, a very important indicator of preference intensity. Committing resources is said to be a direct function of the intensity of preference for the project as whole or some part of the project. A participant could like a programme, but if the intensity of the preference for it is low, only a minor delay could result. A moderate delay could be a result of a participant's attempts to achieve approval through bargaining with superiors "over peripheral aspects of the program: "Maximal delay occurs when the participant is negative and feels strongly about his opinion" (pg 117). If the participant is powerful in terms of resources at his/her disposal, the participant "will try to block the program unless basic concessions are made". Another participant could block the program permanently.

The Oakland experiment is considered a failure due to its inability to teach and therefore impart experimental knowledge about how implementation at urban levels should be carried out for developmental purposes. Secondly, the incidence of circumventing the bureaucracy in favour of more flexible and mixed organisation is also identified as a possible cause for the failure of the Oakland development and employment programme. The aim of placing responsibility for programme implementation outside of the bureaucracy pertained to a search for organisational freedom, the authors mention, given the rigidity of the bureaucracy and the imposition of conformity to its way of doing business. They add that the consequences of independence from bureaucratic practice may not be preferred by the organization intending to be autonomous from external influences (insulation).

The price for this sort of independence usually includes a plural form of executive, which is an open invitation for a diversity of interested parties to determine representation. The result may be watering down of the original ideas, internal conflicts, and worst of all, the very delays that independents sought to avoid (p. 129).

Thirdly, concerning the experiment, the authors argue that organisations (it may be presumed this pertains largely to the public sector) dealing with the collective efforts gain their effectiveness primarily from being able “to test the environment so as to correct error and reinforce truth”. Their “inability to learn” they suggest “is fatal”. However, learning proves to be arduous due to the collective nature of the responsibilities in pluralised implementation. In terms of their view concerning the Economic Development Administration as an organization and its capability to learn at the time of the project, possibilities for learning were closed off. Such inability could have foreclosed the universalisation of the program in terms of applying it elsewhere, because not much was learned from it. What is there to be learned? What are the initial conditions for learning?

In answering these questions, one is first made to understand the importance of knowledge concerning how to implement an experimental programme. They say that “without knowing how, would seem to us frail reeds on which to learn”, although it may not necessarily be easy to acquire knowledge.

Should lack of knowledge be admitted, and the program emerges as a so-called experiment like to think that the activities must be so arranged that the people who run them can learn from their errors. But learning from experience is not easy. Experimental design requires a high level of sophistication and attention to detail, factors often in short supply. One would have to know what the world would have been like without the intervention and one would need to gauge its pre-use impact on the world apart from other multitudinous influences working at the same moment (p. 126).

One of the major contributions to failure of the Oakland experiment was to rush for results, and thus not giving the program enough time and also as a consequence, little time to learn and correct conditions.

The dictation of action by urgency means that little can be learned from analyzing the rules that led to the decisions being made (p. 126). This rush for outcomes itself flawed the initial search for alternatives, and in this case not much could be learned about how choices could be made between projects.

In the event of setting up boards that need to be semi-independent, the results may be ominous as well.

The boards tend to assist on judicializing their procedures, leading to endless hearings and interminable delays, followed in important cases by the long drawn out legal battles... The cost of independence from ordinary bureaucratic constraints turns out to be loss of contact with the very political forces necessary to preserve the thrust of the organization (p. 129).

Co-ordination, when used in the area of public policy administration, may also invoke further problems. One of these is to lead actors to conform to the desires of others. In that away, it represents power since it may imply one actor gets to agree to goals other than those the actor would necessarily agree to. In a situation when multiple goals exist, and where “actors A and B disagree with goal C, they can only be co-ordinated by being told what to do and doing it” (pg 134). In this way, co-ordination represents power.

It could also be an expression of “consent” in the sense that, where particular actors cannot be subjected to conformity, through the exercise of power (in the first sense of co-ordination), then they need to be convinced through negotiation. Pressman and Wildavsky point out that: “Bargaining must take place to reconcile the differences, with the result that the policy must be modified, even to the point of compromising its original purpose” (p. 134).

Included in their criticism of the development project as it was carried out in Oakland, is the absence of the designers of the plan at the implementation level. They also imply in their criticism, that the problem could also have been a general lack of cooperation between the different levels of government. At the outset of the planning process, the authors argue, was a notion on the part of federal government, that political control and agreement had to be attained in Oakland. The idea being to use such development projects to obtain overall support for the projects. In all of this, they however “were too far away and too busy with other things to dream of running the city of Oakland”.

In the Oakland programme what seemed to have led federal policy makers into thinking the policies they designed would work, was the assumption that “a separation from local politics and administration gives policy-makers in the federal government




a license to formulate ideal objectives”. The authors posit that federal officials were under the impression that the separation would grant them “a license to formulate innovative ones, for the political and administrative burdens of the innovations they conceive would be borne locally”. They simply assumed local actors (local government officials) would be able to draw automatic support from local communities. The argument to be made in this thesis is that this situation in essence led to a lack of social capital between public officials responsible for implementation, and the different stakeholders to be served by the programme. When programmes fail at local level in terms of an inability to draw support and overall satisfaction, the burden of blame does however not remain only with local implementers, as the authors point out. There are chances for the consequences to reverberate beyond local government, to affect the integrity of national government as well.

When federal programmes are dependent on local political actors, ‘whatever flaws there are in the local officials’ ability to act effectively - to gather public support, to overcome opposition, to assemble an administrative organisation - were liabilities for the federal government as well (p. 142).

The source of federal government error was, therefore, the notion that once agreement on the objectives of the programme had been achieved at the local level and funds had been discharged for implementation purposes, everything would materialise smoothly. This was not necessarily the case. It becomes therefore necessary for policy designers to include, in the formulation of implementation plans, a design of enabling mechanisms for effective implementation. The authors suggest two ways of dealing with this problem. These are mentioned and discussed below.

One involves creating more direct means for achieving objectives, which meant reducing the number of decision points — the other involved creating organisational machinery for executing a programme as for launching one” (p. 145). Those that had designed the policy and the programmes meant for its execution should have direct involvement at the implementation level in order to provide the necessary expertise.

Although those that design program might not generally enjoy the less exciting work of directing their implementation, a realization of the extent to which policy depends on implementation would lead such people to alter their own time perspectives and stay around for the technical details of executing a program (p. 146).



Lack of strong inter-governmental cooperation is also another source of implementation failure. This is particularly tied to the standoffish attitude of central/federal government officials concerning the Oakland development programme. These officials were under the impression that merely placing responsibility for the implementation of the program in the hands of local officials would necessarily bear the desired outcomes. Federal governmental officials were too distant to notice some of the difficulties that had beset implementation. Furthermore, the very nature of the federal system — benefit of co-operative governance — meant, “that state and local organisations must be able to oppose, delay, and reject federal initiatives” (p. 161).

The federal system — with its dispersion of power and control — not only permits, but also encourages the evasion and dilution of federal reform making it nearly impossible for the federal administrator to impose program priorities; those not diluted by Congressional intervention can be ignored during state and local implementation (p. 161).

Lastly, Pressman and Wildavsky point out that, implementation failure can result also “from over-estimation of what can be accomplished or from under-estimation of ability to implement” (p.136). They mention that programmes can at times be initiated under an aura of emergency, where conditions may seem so harsh that people find themselves compelled to act quickly — the economic problems and the potential for social distress and political instability may have conditioned such urgency among policy makers. The situation in Oakland, led to a sudden need for the disbursement of funds without allowing for in-depth planning and foresight. The authors argue that throughout this there was no clear thinking around feasibility in terms of recipient capacity to carry out the objectives of the planned programme. These policy makers, therefore, wanted to be seen to be doing something for the unemployed and poor minorities. They were driven essentially by two problems: perception of an impending race riot, and “the need to spend money in a hurry” (p. 138).

### **1.3 Alternative approaches to implementation**

A clear statement of goals, commitment of resources, vertical lines of communication (hierarchy) and execution of public policy by the executives is thought by Pressman and Wildavsky as the most important conditions for effective policy implementation.

The latter assumes that only those with expert knowledge in a specific policy field can best effect means for effective and efficient policy implementation. In other words, implementers, who are mainly within the street-level part of administration, have little technical skill and knowledge and little by way of discretion in terms of how policy is finally implemented on the ground. Parsons will argue that this is not so, and that in fact these implementers do have some discretion concerning how policy is to be implemented.

Colebatch (1992) has also raised some reservations about how these authors have come to see public policy. According to him although goals can be seen to be important, it is also important to see how participants within the policy process will be arranged to deal with the problems identified. Those managing processes should also be aware of the knowledge needs of those involved in the process.

Goal statements may be significant, but they are unlikely to tell the whole story, and their absence does not mean that there is no policy (p.16).

Colebatch mentions in regard to the issue of knowledge that public managers need to know what it is that participants must know about the collective action process, and such managers need also to be aware about “what bodies of knowledge are seen as appropriate for discussing them”. It may be important to also establish which participants have what kinds of comparative advantage, in what bodies of knowledge in order to develop ways of coordinating the management of such knowledge bases. Some of the questions regarding capacities necessary for the management of policy process will be discussed through a review of arguments by scholars such as Hilderbrand and Grindle (1997). For that reason not much of that will be discussed in this chapter.

Colebatch mentions two dimensions to policy. One is a “vertical” dimension while the other is a “horizontal” dimension. The vertical perspective places policy within the realm of rules.

It is concerned with the transmission downwards of authorized decisions. The authorized decision-makers select courses of action which will maximize the values they hold, and transmit these to subordinate officials to implement. ... This is a dimension which stresses instrumental action, rational choice and the force of legitimate authority. It is concerned about the ability or capacity of subordinate officials to give effect to these decisions (the implementation

problem) and with ways of structuring the process of government so as to achieve this compliance (p. 23).

In explaining the latter dimension, the author mentions that policy should be seen as “structuring relationships among policy participants in different organizations— that is outside of the lines of hierarchal authority” (p. 23).

Policy according to this dimension involves a multiplicity of organizations operating horizontally to effect particular decisions. The proponents of this perspective do not deny the potential for the existence of hierarchies within these interacting organizations. In other words although lines of accountability may be vertical within these organizations, their interaction at an external level may be defined by more horizontal arrangements. Policy is therefore a result of not only horizontal, but also vertically inclined processes.

In the following section and in the chapters that follow it will be argued that implementation involves a multiplicity of actors and therefore also a multiplicity of interests such that conflict, negotiation and consensus are part of the equation most often. It will also be shown that the context within which implementation occurs is important in the way it affects the effectiveness of processes. The section below presents some arguments by Parsons (1995) as an attempt to bring out some of the arguments made against the legal-rational (central rule) model and to show the extent to which the model is essentially top-down and based mainly on command and control systems of communication, which will be shown to cause problems for the effective implementation of public policy.

#### **Parsons (1995, pp461-541)**

The idea by Parsons is that intent (forming part of the initial conditions), cannot necessarily produce effective implementation especially if the law that is being implemented has little regard to how those that make decisions should interact with implementers of policy. The law should be able to clearly define the roles of all the actors marshalled for the making and execution of public policy. The process of role specification should also include some calculations about the amounts of discretion each of the actors will, or should have in the process. The calculations could also



include some considerations about some of the difficulties that may be encountered by implementers. It is equally important though, that such calculations should not be overly rational such that the issues that concern the dynamics of human behaviour at all levels are neglected. In this way, possibilities for including issues of context (politics, conflict and the potential for bargaining, arbitration and consensus) could be considered as important elements for effective implementation.

It may be due to the inclusion of issues of possible conflict that possibilities for negotiation and consensus can be contrived. It implies therefore, that an understanding of the environment (including the configuration of political and other interests) within which implementation should occur, may be important for effective implementation. This could demand more flexible planning. Pressman and Wildavsky do, to some extent cover this point in their assumptions about the existence of contingencies that needed to be expected in the implementation path, although they do not adequately cover the extent to which flexibility could be a way of dealing with contingencies in cooperative engagements.

Their failure to more objectively understand and explain expectations and contingencies seems to pertain largely to their excessive reliance on communication and control chains. This may be due to a lack of acknowledgement of the complexities of human behaviour, and the extent to which bargaining and consensus are essentially complex processes, with a potential for causing conflict even between implementers and decision makers notwithstanding. This kind of understanding may give some clues concerning the nature of the social and political context implementers have to confront. This view is also congruent with the explanation offered by those supporting a behaviourist approach to implementation.

Pressman and Wildavsky's work on implementation is seen by Parsons (1995) as linked to conventional top-down models of policy analysis. It is understood to be as such, because they see implementation as a process that can only be executed effectively by experts within the public sector. Decentralising implementation to networks of public and non-public actors, as was done in Oakland, was seen by these scholars as essentially an ineffective strategy given the problems they mention above. In a way Pressman and Wildavsky had not completely moved away from some of the

assumptions made by their predecessors. For instance, their predecessors had held that policy making and policy implementation were the preserve of decision makers, where the street level bureaucrat was not seen to have any influence on the implementation process. In fact what the approach by Pressman and Wildavsky misses is the implicit assumption that implementers do indeed have a certain amount of discretion most times in terms of how implementation should proceed in their different quarters of responsibility (Howlett and Ramesh, (1997) make specific reference to this point)

According to traditional analysts and perhaps those who wielded decision power in conventional policy making environments, such was the conceptual dichotomy between policy maker and administrator. It was assumed the latter had no discretion and therefore no power to influence the implementation process. Parsons points out the extent to which the role of the administrator was extremely circumscribed in analysis and specified only to the duty of carrying out what was prescribed by the decision maker and that the service provider was only meant to execute policy according to what the top bureaucrat commanded.

Accordingly such analysis ignored the significance of the “interplay and interactions between politicians, administrators and service providers” as well as beneficiaries of policy as has also been shown by Anderson above. These fallacies, Parsons argues tended to persist into the 1970s and the 1980s. In this section I briefly focus on the comparative aspects of what Parsons has termed top-down and bottom-up approaches to implementation without delving into much detail about the whole range of scholarly arguments in this regard. In describing the top-down approach, Parsons hints at some of the aspects that make up the gist of the criticisms against approaches such as those of Pressman and Wildavsky and other analysts sharing that perspective.

First, a policy’s success could only be seen relative to its successful execution by a decision maker, which implied therefore that once these decision makers were absent from the action environment as implementers, the process would hardly succeed. Second, the distinctions drawn between the bureaucrat and the decision maker are said to be misrepresentations of the realities defining policy implementation, in a sense that bureaucrats are not to be seen as tools of the decision maker, but should be

seen to hold actual “ideas, values, beliefs, and interests” with a bearing on the shaping of public policy. These bureaucrats are not merely there to be commanded and controlled. Parsons, regards as largely top-down, the notion that there needs to be a specific chain of control and communication set up in order to have effective implementation.

The rational model is imbued with the ideas that implementation is about getting people to do what they are told, and keeping control over a sequence of stages in a system; and about the development of a programme of control which minimises conflict and deviation from the goals set by the initial ‘policy hypothesis (p.466).

Third, the top-down model is criticized also for focusing too excessively on the setting of initial goals by top officials rather than on clearly specifying the role of those “workers on the line”. Those in support of bottom-up approaches take the role of street-level bureaucrats or workers at line level much seriously. The issue of discretion can be seen to pertain to the fact that within the environments that they work, street-level bureaucrats have to find ways of implementing policy in ways suitable for their working environment and the politics affecting that environment. According to bottom-up approaches “policies, regulations, laws and procedures contain an interpretive element”, and for that reason it is possible that those on the frontline of policy delivery will have varying amounts of “discretion over how they choose to exercise the rules which they are employed to apply”. Parsons mentions that this is irrespective of whether one approaches the issue from a top-down or a bottom-up perspective.

Fourth, top-down rational models are also criticized for their failure to take into account the different interactions that occur between client and street-level bureaucrat including the context, and the conditions within which these interactions occur. This issue is related, to a large extent, to the issue mentioned above concerning discretion of bureaucracy at street-level. It is also related to the issues of management skills and organizational culture and political context. In some way it can be seen to involve “negotiation and consensus” seen perhaps as a way of dealing with the actual or potential conflict that may emanate from the action environment within which policy processes must unfold. This action environment, ‘bottom-uppers’ argue, is defined mainly by conflict and bargaining, given political contexts. Some models that stress the interaction dimension explain implementation as a political game given

assumptions of conflict and bargaining understood to be influencing implementation processes.

Bottom-up approaches, in the main, emphasise the importance of street level bureaucrats and the extent to which they do possess discretion to make decisions that concern implementation. The discretion quality of street-level bureaucrats is bound most often to the conditions under which they work. The manner of implementation becomes characterized by a set of 'coping strategies', which may frequently lead to deviation from strict adherence to defined objectives.

The behavioural approach offers the explanation that implementation is action by individuals who are constrained by the environment within which they act. In this way it may be seen that goals may not necessarily be achievable given the complex environment within which implementation takes place.

The interaction with the outside world, the organization and its institutional context means that policy objectives are not the source of guides to action. What guides policy action, is a need to resolve conflict that derives from the existence of conflicting objectives and the resolution of conflict may lead to formulation of policy. This is seen to be in line with arguments that propose that implementation may best be understood as a "policy-action continuum...in which an interactive and negotiative process is taking place over time between those seeking to put it into effect, and those upon whom action depends". It is argued that when policy action occurs, it begets reaction and such reaction begets further reformulation of policy. During the entire time that reactions and negotiations occur power plays itself out.

Power is central to the dynamics of this relationship. Implementation in this policy-action model is an iterative bargaining process between those who are responsible those for enacting policy and those who control resources.

Accordingly, policy implementation is seen in this perspective as a process in which "organizations interact with other more powerful or less powerful organizations in order to attain their goals". Parsons reminds one that goals are not always specified at the most initial stage, but are specified during the duration of the process. Their specification may happen within a process that attaches problems to solutions.



The inter-organizational approach is made up of essentially two strands of thought. One is an approach that focuses on power and dependency issues, while the other concentrates on organizational exchange. In the former it is posited that organizational interactions are produced by relationships of power where power is a function of resource endowments. The organizations dependent on the better endowed organizations have to contrive strategies for working with the more powerful and the better resourced organizations for the attainment of their goals.

The approach on organizational exchange proposes that organizational collaboration and exchange are guided by mutual benefit. The difference of approach with those that emphasise power and dependency is that the organizational exchange approach to relationships explains interaction as voluntary and based on mutual interest.

Even though an agency may be dependent on central resources, it may also be the case that the centre is dependent on the local agency for implementing policy goals (p. 483).

Organizational relationships can be understood by considering the network of interests within the policy sector. Furthermore “the rules of structure formation within a policy sector should be examined with reference to the administrative and interest group networks”(p. 484).

In essence, therefore, “bottom-uppers” and those in support of inter-organizational interaction in policymaking and implementation consider implementation, to be occurring largely under conditions of conflict, negotiation and consensus. It may also be important to note that those proposing bottom up views also propose that at times implementation also occurs through programmes aimed at empowerment. Further, implementation occurs within clusters of actors and organizations that make up institutional structures.

Programmes may be conceived as being implemented in pools of organizations. A programme will involve a multiplicity of organizations of various kinds: national and local, public, private, and voluntary, business and labour and so on. Programmes are not implemented by single organizations, but through a matrix or set of organizational pools (pp. 484-485).

Top-down models fail to recognize that implementation processes are essentially complex and the failure of their models produces the consequence that “their theories do not satisfactorily explain implementation and that in practice programmes are not

successful”. It is thus for these reasons that conceptualisation of processes needs to be revisited. The section below is a further elaboration on some aspects of the bottom-up approach although this is carried out through a policy network perspective. O’Toole Hanf and Hupe (1997) examine the importance of locally based policy networks when viewed from a bottom-up perspective. The authors make several allusions to some of the problems pointed out by Pressman and Wildavsky above including issues about how the number and diversity of actors determine the extent of policy success; the creation of common purpose between actors; the types of strategies that could be used to manage diversity of inputs at the local level; and also in terms of the overall role of bottom-up managers in conflict resolution and in the creation of common purpose among policy actors.

#### **1.4.Service delivery mixes**

##### **Parsons, (1995)**

The arguments above can also be extended to include different approaches to service delivery, where a plurality of organizations and individual actors together with different levels and spheres of government are believed to characterise policy fields in terms of service and goods delivery. They may be viewed as “a mixture of relationships which change and vary over time and space”. The space allowed in this project directs analysis of service delivery approaches to only the “governmental mix” and the “sectoral mix” approach to service delivery. These ‘mixes’ are important to the study in so far as they provide an understanding of the institutional and organizational setting of policy delivery — that is, governmental forms and the interaction of the public, private, voluntary and community sectors.

The ‘governmental mix’ argument allows for a means of understanding what part or level of government leads the process in a particular policy field. It also allows for an understanding of the amount of responsibility shared between actors involved in the delivery of a service. These responsibilities may involve the financing and administration of projects.

Issues regarding intergovernmental relationships could also be understood more clearly within this line of approach. Furthermore, matters of collaboration between certain parts or levels of government with intermediate or community based organizations and groups can also be explained by way of such approaches. Looking at the governmental mix in relation to a level or a part of government may serve to highlight the extent of participation in policy processes, access resources and the structures and the extent of governmental accountability of service beneficiaries. They may be viewed as “a mixture of relationships which change and vary over time and space”.

Parsons mentions that “the mix of governmental levels in a given arena” will affect the environment in which inter-organizational relations occur. In cases where cooperative relationships persist (and are more or less legislated), it is more likely that intergovernmental relationships will be much flatter in structure, capable of being seen more as spheres and networks than as levels of government. Understanding the governmental mix form of implementation facilitates the means of dealing with centralisation-decentralisation mixes, where centralization and hierarchy may be seen as important for securing control over sensitive areas such as finances, while decentralization within that combination is a way of securing “managerial benefits”.

Regarding the sectoral mix. Parsons explains that the mix of levels or spheres of government needs to be understood in conjunction with the sector affected in the process of the provision of goods and services. The growth in the incidence of voluntary-private, private-public, voluntary-public and other partnerships occurred primarily during the 1980s and is becoming more common in the area of service provision. The policy areas more affected by this trend include: infrastructure development; urban renewal; training and education; and the environment.

The partnerships between public and private organizations is said to have expanded primarily as a result of a realization that governments cannot go it alone in the area of service provision. Implementation has come to be seen as a process which, in order to be effectively carried out needs to be seen as a function of collaborative effort. It is as a result of understanding the advantages likely to be obtained by government in terms of private sector finance and management expertise, or other benefits likely to be

derived by the public sector through partnerships. It is pointed out by Parsons that the voluntary sector has been seen to expand its involvement into the area of service and goods provision. This has been most pronounced in the history of the welfare state, although the welfare state had initially come in to replace the voluntary organization except in certain pockets of provision. Shortage of capacity has however brought back the voluntary sector in these welfare states.

The growth of the welfare state and mass education made the existence of the voluntary sector apparently less necessary in the twentieth century. However, in recent years, the role of the voluntary sector has come to the fore as the welfare state is no longer capable or no longer desires to provide the range of services that was once expected of it (p. 499).

The voluntary sector finds its livelihood through different sources — from other voluntary organizations (national and international), private and/or governmental sectors. The funding mechanisms can at times be problematic in terms of the autonomy of the organizations within this sector. In situations where they are, for example, funded by the state, the state could have a substantial amount of influence in the decision-making processes of these structures with detrimental results for their overall autonomy and effectiveness. Similarly their funding through private sector efforts could lead these organizations to lose a certain amount of their defining qualities.

Parsons points out elsewhere that collaboration can at times, lead to a loss of independent paradigm framing and a loss self-worth due to dependency among these organizations.

In recent years the voluntary sector has ...taken a 'safety first' approach and opted for a cosy relationship with the public and private sectors. The consequence of this cosiness has been a loss of direction, and preoccupation with financial opportunities and managerialist values with the result that it feels 'a strong sense of ... low morale and spoiled self-worth'. The contribution which they have to make in terms of being important critics of government is gravely undermined by the existence of a 'contract culture' in which criticism may result in the loss of funds and contracts (p. 502).

In addition it is argued that their continued use in the area of service provision dissipates their function as intermediate organizations with the responsibility of placing themselves between the state and private business "as means of 'citizenship' and 'empowerment' or 'social learning'" in order to challenge the private and the



public sectors on all sorts of ills affecting individuals as a result of the actions of either.

Communities are represented through either the voluntary sector or through community-based organizations and have a role to play in the effective execution of public policy. The community approach to public policy is said to have emanated from the colonial administration of Britain, France and Belgium as a way of “making communities more self-reliant and responsible for problems in their locality”. It has since progressed and become reinforced by different legislative pieces as in the United States and Britain where particular laws were passed such as the Economic Opportunity Act of 1964 of the United States and Britain’s Community Development Act of 1969, and to make it a more legal phenomenon. The term community policy has however undergone numerous definitional changes.

Community policy may, for example be directed at a neighbourhood or part of a town or it may be directed at a group of people who share a problem or an interest: ‘young people’, the ‘gay community’, the ‘disabled community’ or the ‘arts community’ (p. 504).

There are three different forms of community participation according to Parsons including community development; community action; and community service (pp. 504-505). The first involves programmes designed for the promotion of economic or infrastructure development in a community. The second relates to advocacy of community demands when communities are deprived because of exclusionary arrangements of governance (p. 505).

The third has to do with the betterment of relationships between outputs of a service provider and its beneficiaries. The frameworks that cover community policy include a public citizen framework; an entitled citizen framework; and the dutiful citizen framework (p. 505). The public citizen framework stresses broader public participation through the deepening of democracy and the devolution of power to sectors not included in policy processes. The entitled citizen framework is also seen to be promoting the inclusion of marginalized communities in policy processes through the empowerment of the weak and marginalized communities. This framework promotes empowerment and the extension of rights to the weak and marginalized. Differences with the former relate only to some of the radical as opposed to the liberal dimensions characterizing the former. (p. 505).



Communities are in the second framework seen as vehicles of radical and revolutionary change of policy-making structures and processes. The dutiful citizen framework is characterized by the idea of collective responsibility among members of a community, reliance on traditional institutions of society as a way enabling effective community development. “The aim of policy is seen as the encouragement of a sense of civic or public duty, community service and voluntary work”.

The conditions that lead to the creation of public-private or any such partnerships include: interdependence between sectoral organizations; convergence of objectives; interlinking conditions such as the existence of a network of communication channels between collaborating organizations and the existence of a broker to facilitate negotiations although the latter are only secondary conditions

It will be shown in the latter parts of this review that centralisation, and decentralisation strategies can be combined for effective policy implementation. The next chapter is an attempt to introduce some of the arguments that make up the gist of the approach policy networks. The chapter begins by clearing up some of the misconceptions about the benefits of decentralisation, in order to explain why networks as vehicles for policy management need to be governed, not only from inside, but also from outside. This justifies further the case for institutions of oversight that would have to occupy the area at the intersection between civil society and elements in the state. The idea is that the effective management of policy may rely on the existence of efficient and effective networks. The result is that the effective governance of networks creates positive spill-overs concerning policy improvement. Therefore, it could be said that effectively managing networks could result in the effective management of policy. This point is discussed in more detail by Kickert Klijn and Koppenjan (1997), who claim that network management is the management of policy.

The next two chapters are reviews under the following sub-themes: the implications of decentralisation and centralisation for implementation; effects of (de)centralisation on participation affects participation; sensitivity to social needs; and the facilitation of equity. These are covered in the chapter below. Chapter 3 will focus primarily on the network approach in order to understand the role that could be played by networks in

managing implementation. It will look at how networks promote the inclusion of target groups in deliberations and negotiations for policy change. That chapter will also examine nature of task networks as examples of the formalisation of the role of particular policy networks, the relationship between networks and characteristics of instruments specified for the modification or change of target group behaviour. In that chapter the coordination capability is also examined. The aim of the exercise is to prove that organizational culture, like organizational capacity is also important in the analysis of the strengths and weaknesses of networks. Finally, there is also an attempt to explain the nature of leadership in networks and the different roles that government actors can play in a policy network.

## **Chapter 2 governance and public management**

Studies concerning policymaking and management of policy implementation are confronted by numerous problems. First, they reflect the complexity of the nature of issues facing human societies today. Second, they may be expressive of the limitations of knowledge generated and the incompleteness of practice in relation to the resolution of those problems. Third, they are illustrative of the diversity of approaches regarding how these problems are understood and how they could be resolved. This also includes the policy preferences at play and how they can be re-configured to produce consensus about the direction and the size of expected policy outcomes. Fourth, they may involve the extent to which official commitment and will, could be improved on the part of those that must bring meaningful change.

It may be important to begin by defining what the term management in the public sector means. This is accompanied by a definition of the concept of governance. The aim of the exercise is to find ways in which governance will be seen to imply much broader participation than is permitted in the “new” public management approach. Public governance “is related to legality and legitimacy and more than strict business-like, market-oriented interpretation and more than strict business values” (Kickert and Hakvoort, 2000, 224). Kickert, Klijn and Koppenjan (1997) describe governance as “directed influence of social processes” and that “it covers all kinds of guidance mechanisms” connected to policy processes (Kickert et al, 1997, 2). This means that these forms of influence are not purposeful forms of guidance. In society self-steering mechanisms exist, which ensure that policy, processes proceed smoothly” (Kickert et al, 1997, 2). Public management, on the other hand, concentrates on the consciously and deliberately taken actions of public actors. Public management is described by Kickert et al as the management of networks. According to Kaul (2000), research seems to show that implementation of policy needs to be a process whose outcomes should be measured against the extent to which private and civic actors have been involved. The role of government according to this scholar therefore is to ensure that participatory processes are not an end in themselves, but may require among other things, certain types of management capabilities appropriate for the nature and extent of the participation induced. I assume that these capabilities should be accompanied

by pre-implementation consultation processes, which may also require effective management.

Consultation should be allowed to occur in conjunction with, or as a follow-up to processes that include the selection of alternatives and decision-making from which implementation plans derive. This may then cause one to argue that where implementation is regarded as a network responsibility, and where network management involves consultation, it should follow that policy implementation is necessarily an incremental (I assume, given the need for continuous reporting and re-strategising). Consultation, as an independent variable affecting popular support for new (improved) policies, and perhaps also support for the governing network, may be perceived as an expression of accountability and transparency. If so, then consultation remains an important vehicle for the attainment of policy goals, since it carries the potential to increase the legitimacy of process and institutions. These issues are nevertheless not the focus of this thesis and can thus not be discussed further here.

Decentralisation, is portrayed in the literature reviewed in this thesis as one means of achieving effectiveness in the implementation of policy and meaningful inclusion of actors in processes and institutions. What comes out of some of the literature seem to imply that creating a correct balance between decentralisation and centralisation is close to impossible. I argue that it is more so in situations where decentralisation can be understood to extend to the sharing of responsibilities between formal and informal institutions, given that these institutions bring their own norms and expectations into the social-political “intersections” and “interactions” (Kooiman, 1999). It can be argued that designing public-civic collaborative policy implementation arrangements requires a way of creating common purpose among actors and cementing this with particular agreements.

Kooiman argues that in the Netherlands the covenant has become one of the main instruments used for the purpose increasing compliance with collective environmental agreements. Benefits of the covenants have to do with “the speed with which they can be established, their inherent flexibility, and most importantly their morally binding character and capacity to stimulate responsibility through the endorsement by stakeholders of commonly agreed standards” (Kooiman, 1999, 77). I propose that

because covenants may naturally imply norms of mutual trust and mutual expectations, they remain a component of overall social capital. Therefore if governance necessarily includes social contract in the form of such “covenanting” it could also be understood to invoke notions of mutual trust between contracting parties (social capital)

Democratic consolidation is said to involve among other changes, a devolution of authority (Diamond, 1999). Hulme and Turner perceive devolution of authority as a form of decentralization. The latter nominate to use a definition offered by “decentralization purists” who view devolution as the transfer of authority to sub-national governments electorally accountable to sub-national populations, as the only authentic form of decentralisation (Hulme and Turner, 1997). The advantages of devolution seem to lie, therefore, in its ability to combine “the promise of local democracy with technical efficiency (Hulme and Turner, 1997, 158). Kaul (2000) proposes in a way that decentralisation itself be viewed as a set of strategies that seek to extend the participatory base of government at all levels, but particularly at sub-national; regional and local levels (Kaul, 2000, 58). Such a definition of decentralisation thus seems to circumvent the limitations that may derive from the elitism that could be produced by technical recruitment and placement procedures. It might also reduce the weaknesses of representative democracy by providing a much bigger stadium for popular participation. This is a definition of decentralisation followed in this thesis.

Decentralisation has however carried different meanings to different scholars, some of whom such as Tendler (1998) have perceived flaws in overzealous acceptance of the virtues of decentralisation given evidence to the contrary. She points out that a particular paradox can be detected in the examination of the effects of decentralisation on governance, since it comes to demand further centralisation and sophisticated political skills at the level of central government. This could be the case in South Africa as well where central government has retained the role of oversight over both local and provincial governments. As for the virtues of decentralisation, Tendler puts it that these cannot be generalised for all sorts of contexts and its impact on governance should be judged on the context it has been initiated at. Tendler’s scrutiny of the degree to which decentralisation improved local government institutional



performance of the state of Ceara in North East Brazil, leads to the conclusions that improvements were as a result of central government effort rather than proximity to vibrant civil society. .

Decentralisation it may be noted should not be perceived to imply situations of loss of coherence and coordination, as is claimed by Rueschemeyer and Evans for instance (1992, 56). A state, by decentralizing, they mention, may create problems of cohesion and coordination for itself especially when strong and divergent forces in civil society are bent on capturing parts of the state apparatus to use it for their own purposes. Rueschemeyer and Evans stress the importance of insulation of the state bureaucracy from outside interests and demands (Rueschemeyer and Evans, 1992, 55) In addition, lower units of government need to be protected from the undue influences of executive bureaucracy. The resolution of problems, internal to the bureaucracy is dependent, according to Rueschemeyer and Evans, on “an *esprit de corps* among its elements (Rueschemeyer and Evans, 1992, 55).

Decentralisation holds a number of benefits for improving the policy-making environment amongst, which could include the proliferation of policy actors inside and outside government and the resources they bring along. Some scholars such as Pressman and Wildavsky (1973) have however also sounded a caution against pluralised participation and their views have been reviewed above. The issue was reviewed as part of a broad review of approaches to implementation and the problems that may characterise implementation. It was also noted, however, that serious operational flaws can emanate from centralised implementation.

The weaknesses of the approach by Pressman and Wildavsky have been discussed above already, but there remains further need to discuss other conceptual issues related to institutional design for implementation with the aim of showing what shapes policy implementing institutions may take, and how this could affect effective implementation. Above all, however, the aim is to argue that effective implementation is most likely to occur under conditions of abundant public-civic social capital. Social cohesion, because of its implications for relative closure might prevent resource and other exchanges between societies, leading to possibilities for close-circuited flows of social capital. This may spell disaster for many developing countries dependent, for

example essential resource transfers such food aid or other aid of national import. It may become important, therefore, that governments involved in social capital formation in the developing world are also able to monitor the extent to which social cohesion disables or enables international cooperation.

At a national level, and in countries with a history of regional or provincial conflict, the manner of social capital creation should largely facilitate nation building. This could serve to reduce tensions arising from ethnic, tribal, religious and other factors of this kind. At an intentional level authorities (governmental or mixed) must be able to promote, through declarations and so on, a spirit of conciliation and peace. The promotion of collective problem resolution involving both state and non-state actors might be an important show of commitment on the part of the state to issues national importance. This might lead to much deeper embeddedness and local accountability on the part of public officials and to increased support for state led change. In these instances of co-governance locally specific information and knowledge is likely to be transferred by non-government agents, who depending on the political mood of the day and the prevailing socioeconomic conditions might wish to own and be part of popular processes. Such a gesture might, on the part of potential policy beneficiaries, imply commitment to and support for a in addition This may be more so. The achievement of co-ordination, and through it, the achievement of effectiveness could in turn produce more cohesion, so that “a virtuous circle” can be achieved (Putnam, 1993).

It could, nevertheless, be realised in accordance with arguments by Duclaud-Williams (1993) that recentralisation has been gaining momentum in some parts of the world, such as in Great Britain, while further calls for decentralisation are being made. Policy research conducted in Europe has shown that re-centralisation tendencies have accompanied the momentum of decentralisation. Some re-centralisation tendencies have been seen to occur in relatively consolidated economies and democracies. An example here is Duclaud-Williams’s (1993) study of education policy management in England and Wales relative to that of France in the same period of the late 1970s and 1980s. The results of the study are such that,

There is general agreement among observers that centralisation has been on the increase in the government of English education from well before

1979... There is some slight movement towards a degree of decentralisation in the French case (Duclaud-Williams, 1993, 239). This means therefore that although decentralisation carries particular policy making virtues, it remains a difficult strategy to implement completely successfully.

It may be important therefore to explain what the constraints and opportunities of decentralisation are most often. The aim of the exercise is to see whether an environment enabled through decentralisation is the most conducive for increased policy network activity or whether decentralisation, to be effective, should be accompanied by social capital formation at all levels of government and in all sections of society. Networks are regarded in this thesis as primary vehicles for the management of policy, and decentralisation a mechanism enabling the growth and movement of this vehicle. Or, as Christensen and Laegrid (2001) seem to argue. Cooperation between different social-political actors may be necessary, not only for the peaceful resolution of disputes, but also for the overall improvement of policy managing institutions.

The thesis focuses primarily on the policy enabling virtues of social capital given its potential to enhance cooperation among actors with varied interests. Actors other than those that expend effort and resources in its formation and distribution can capture the benefits of social capital (Coleman, 1988). This means, therefore, that decentralisation for the purpose of enhancing participation cannot be taken as *sin qua non* against implementation failure, if implementation success is also measurable relative to the size of participation in the process. Free riding, shirking, and corruption mentioned by Putnam (1993, and 2000) as collective action problems, are likely to persist even in the wake of decentralisation

Whether networks formed between government and elements in civil society are the most appropriate and also the most essential means for the management of implementation is dependent, I assume, on the manner in which one understands the comparative advantages of both sectors. This stems partly from a realisation that neither civil society nor the public sector and the state as whole can be assumed to be ontological and individually organic features of society but are themselves made up of diverse interests, as well varying individual preferences and values (Migdal, 1994 and

Chazan, 1994). In their efforts to enhance their effectiveness actors in the policy sphere collaborate in order to deal with their relative weaknesses. Again it may be important to note that these comparative advantages may change with time, which may imply therefore that capacity needs and relative endowments also change with time and cannot be assumed to remain static. The speed at which adjustments occur within networks of policy actors, may demand network management systems that are equipped for dealing with the complexity that could arise from diversity of interdependent actors, different preferences and varying goals.

In his examination of the interactions that influence social political governance and policy management, Kooiman (1999) draws the conclusion that diversity, dynamics and complexity are “the three main concepts to characterise societal conditions, situations and developments, which can be considered as basic governing challenges” (Kooiman, 1999, 74-75). According to Kooiman societal influence on policy is inspired by the diversity, dynamics and complexity that have come to characterise the modern world. The challenges that societies face, present them with both opportunities and constraints that are as diverse, dynamic, and as complex as the diversity, dynamics and complexity that characterises these societies (Kooiman, 1999, 75). Given that these challenges are also reflected in the institutional conditions pertaining to governance, Kooiman suggests that for purposes of effectiveness, social political governing should reflect the extent of diversity, dynamics and complexity characterising the challenges. Governing institutions should thus be designed in a way that allows for effective management of the constraints and opportunities present in the social-political environment.

Interactions, defined by Kooiman as “mutually influencing relations between two or more entities”, (p.75) are most often based on particular interdependencies within societies. These interdependencies are in turn expressed in contexts that are marked by differentiation and integration with the proliferation of actors.

The twin forces of differentiation and proliferation also require some form of reintegration. Hence they engender a growing but different need for collective action not in the form of public action as an expression of this collective need alone, but also of public-private modes of collective action as a response to those societal needs or to create new societal opportunities (Kooiman, 1999, 73).

Interactions cause the proliferation of actors in the area of governance, as much as they serve as action environments, Kooiman seems to argue. The proliferation of actors should be understood as a consequence of factors expressive of both government action (inaction), as well as a product of factors outside the control of government (or even from within institutions made up of a combination of both public and private actors). That is, purposeful government action (also a product of interactions in and outside of government) in the form of public policy making can cause the number of new actors to increase (or decrease) depending on the extent to which the policy environment is enabled for that purpose.

In the external environment government finds itself by a potential for collaborative effort with private elements or elements of civil society with whom it may share a common purpose. In mentioning the different forms of governing, Kooiman refers to particular governing orders (first, second, and third governing order (pp. 79-87)). The first governing order is concerned with day-to-day governing activities of private and public actors. Self-governing, co-governing, and hierarchical governing are viewed as second order and they “are aimed at the institutional settings in which social-political problems are (attempted to be) solved or opportunities created”. The third governing order has to do with how governing or governors are governed. I concentrate in this thesis primarily on this category although reference is made to various aspects of both governing orders. For instance, reference is made to the manner of policy management (first order governing), and how norms serve to create lasting cooperative engagements between elements in private, civic and public sectors (third order governing). I, however focus more attention on institutional design and institutional capacity in order to find out what makes certain institutions more sustainable relative to others in the face of adversity.

Public management on the other hand focuses on the conscious and deliberate actions of public actors to influence societal (or policy) processes (Klijn et al, 1997, 2). The responsibilities defining public management among other things relate to the need to manage network arrangements and the interdependencies that underpin such arrangements. Klijn and others deduce, therefore that public management has to do with the management of networks. The network approach is said to have arisen as a



consequence of the discourse on the limits of government and as a response to theoretical limitations of the new public management approach.

It has been found that applying principles of the new public management may not necessarily be a solution to all efficiency and effectiveness related problems given the diversity of country contexts to which such principles could be applied (Christensen and Laegrid, 2001). According to Christensen and Laegrid the new public management approach is said to be “a reform wave potentially representing a universal economic model of governance and organization focusing on efficiency.” Their focus on the reform of systems in New Zealand and Norway, has led these scholars to conclude that instituting change guided by principles of the new public management leads to different outcomes in different countries in terms of the extent to which such reform may address efficiency and effectiveness.

The emphasised requirements for efficiency and effectiveness seem not to be strictly achievable only through contractualism and devolution regarding implementation, one of its central tenets. Instead it is argued that applications of doctrines of the new public management are subject, concerning efficiency and effectiveness, to the context within which they are applied. The authors mention that there is “a complex interplay between environmental factors, polity features and national historical-institutional constraints”, which will affect the extent to which new public management inclined approaches, can produce the desired outcomes.

We argue that the NPM doctrines are transformed when they meet the historical-institutional traditions and national administrative policy style in different countries. Second, we ... stress that on a more specific level there is a tension within the concept between elements of central political administrative control and local administrative and institutional autonomy.(Christensen and Laegrid, 2001, 74).

The main features of the new public management include: “hands-on professional management that allows for active, visible, discretionary control of an organization, explicit standards of performance, greater emphasis on output control, increased competition, contracts, devolution, disaggregation of units, and private sector management techniques” (Christensen and Laegrid, 2001, 78).

According to these authors the approaches seem to be characterised both by decentralising and centralising tendencies. The former are characterised by emphasis on the “primacy of managerial principles in bureaucracy”, and centralising tendencies are seen to be tied to contractualism. Contractualism is largely implied in the promotion by elected officials of contractual arrangements in a bid to impose their power on the bureaucracy, Christensen and Lægrid explain (p. 78). These tendencies are not fully discussed here as they fall outside of the ambit of this paper.

Some aspect of their point of view may however find relevance here. These pertain primarily to the extent to which this approach becomes exclusionary rather than participatory to all categories of people especially the beneficiaries of policies and projects. Christensen and Lægrid make this point clearer in this statement concerning devolution, which is an important feature of the new public management because in devolution could be implied a loss of sensitivity and responsiveness to social needs:

The more structurally separated civil servants are from the political leadership, the relatively greater importance of other decision signals — like cost-efficiency, professional norms, user and customer interests — meaning that actors in public enterprises and comparable units will attend even less to political signals (p. 81).

Whether this could be averted is dependent, I believe in the extent to which enduring cooperative ties can be created between elected officials and those they appoint. Further, it may remain equally important to ensure that networks of mutual engagements between officials, can be made to transcend the boundaries that divide government and the other sectors.

## **2.1 The role of government**

Minogue, Poladino and Hulme (1999) focus on the changing terminology characterising analysis of the state and its activities over the past two decades or so. They examine the institutions and processes of government highlighting not only the changes in labels used in explaining these processes and institutions, but also indicating which changes have gained emphasis. The study of public administration as a twentieth century creation reflects the substantial expansion of social and economic responsibilities of modern governments. The argument is that in the last two decades

of the twentieth century attention has been drawn to the expansion of government's social and economic responsibilities.

The different approaches to this problem have resulted in two perspectives each with its own sub dimensions: public policy and political management. The former emphasises the political context within which administrative operations occur; organizational and personal networks for formulation and implementation of a policy; the extent to which the goals of policy can be deliverable through implementation; and finally understanding the relations between administrative and political systems, and between politics, economy and society. The latter, on the other hand, focuses essentially on the size, roles and structures of public sectors based on the impression that the public sector has failed in its developmental role largely because of ineffective bureaucratic practices seen as rigid and lacking a competitive drive characteristic of private business. Those in support of the new public management approach see that this causes obstacles to various aspects of development, including economic development and growth. It is for this reason, therefore, that public services of various kinds need to be privatised and that the remaining public corporations are being required to compete with private firms to become profitable.

The problems affecting governmental effectiveness have, however, not completely diminished the role for government. Instead some of the problems have been understood to present new challenges to thinking concerning issues of institutional values, beliefs and norms and individual attitudes. A new focus has developed around organizational culture and the extent to which it could be changed to fit policy and policy management imperatives and tendencies towards a more responsive developmental management. These tendencies imply reassessing policy design, implementation and evaluation.

In terms of policy design, it is important that while the governments may have to reduce their intervention in economic matters, their role in policy design and implementation of effective public policies remains important. This is important in relation to economic transformation, poverty reduction, improved agricultural performance, the provision of employment, and the supply of better social services and environmental protection. For this governments will require the services of

committed and willing leadership and “well trained and appropriately qualified advisers with a good grasp of development issues, and competence in the design of effective systems of policy design, analysis and advice”.

If we public managers as agents of development then they must be resourced and equipped for their role... the effective management of development also implies the effective development management (p. 4).

The authors point out that while the emphasis of the new public management has been geared towards the “dominance of individual over collective preferences” there remains a need for approaches that transcend these considerations. This implies encompassing the relationship of accountability between state and society, treating people therefore, not merely as consumers or customers “but as citizens, who have the right to hold their government to account for the actions they take or fail to take” (p. 5). These citizens need their rights to be protected, their voices heard and their values and preferences respected.

Issues of accountability, responsiveness, transparency, and participation are, therefore at least as important as issues of economy and efficiency. To citizens, questions of law and order, which can only be guaranteed by a state —and a legitimate state at that, are crucial (p5). Issues such as legitimacy, accountability, competence respect for the law, and problems of human rights are seen to be essential components of governance. Commitments to these virtues should be able to take governments beyond notions of mere efficiency. It brings government closer to the citizens it is supposed to serve while simultaneously causing the strengthening of civil society. When government is able to combine management strategies with a commitment to these ideas, good governance should be allowed to emerge.

## **2.2 Inclusive public management**

### **Mackintosh (2000)**

In her work on possibilities for inclusive public management (in other words, public management that promotes participation of previously excluded individuals and groups), Mackintosh examines participation with an emphasis on collaborative practice between government and civil society. She posits that the inception of the



new public management reform process has deepened exclusion widening the gap between the government and civil society. This runs contrary the imperative for government to promote inclusion. She mentions that it is because of governments' exclusionary behaviour that citizens could take to disrupting governing programmes.

Government and public services must play a role addressing social exclusion, not least because they are part of the problem. Public policy and provision do not form a box separate from the rest of society; they both reflect society's divisions and provide a stage for challenging them. That kind of challenge has to come from the public in another sense: the excluded themselves, and those who campaign for or represent them, a broader public opposed to a fissured society. Hence, addressing social exclusion can only happen through a (partly conflictual) process on the public stage, involving the government and those governed: the public services providers and their users; those in power and the excluded (p. 78).

The universalistic notions, upon which these states are founded, open up space for the contestation of power. Public policy and service provision should be seen as integral components of the exclusionary state that needs to be challenged, because they represent a skewed definition and distribution of access to resources.

The new public management framework may represent the means through which exclusionary practice evolves. The introduction of the framework was an intervention in the 1980s by bilateral and multilateral initiatives for the reform of public administration and governance in less industrialised countries. The aim being to re-navigate public sectors of these countries, in the direction of efficiency targets, contracting, and competition among service providers while laying emphasis on managing a fiscal squeeze and reduction in state service provision. This also includes the development of targeting and safety nets to mitigate the social effects of structural adjustment (p. 79). The result has been inequality and exclusion with more devastating consequences for less industrialised countries. These are outcomes of technocratic practices with strict emphasis on efficiency and effectiveness without much ado about issues of equality.

The contradictions that arise out of these reform strategies are qualified by the emphasis on autonomy and responsiveness of public officials. This seems to be pitted against their agency role in the sense of working on behalf of political principals. Managers in the new public management enterprise are meant to be agents serving political principals and they are assessed for effective ability through performance



indicators. The contradiction arises when they are also meant to be regarded as agents responsible for bringing about change in accordance with particular social needs. In this regard they are supposed to be principals in their own right, running autonomous organizations and responsible for addressing local needs (p. 80). It is however within this seemingly decentralised and responsive system where elements of exclusion can be perceived. In the fieldwork conducted in Southern England and the English Midlands, Mackintosh was able to reveal the extent of exclusion that expresses itself in the rather contradictory system (specifically within the field of social care and home care provision).

The results of this fieldwork revealed that new managerial structures “caused a social distancing effect”. This is explained by the extent of class division in the area of within-care-services. The professionalism of the lower level professional staff was undermined depending on the veracity of the need assessment they conducted. The opinion of lower staff was not sought in order to give advice on what they thought were needs of those they served. This is due to the English system of government’s tendency to treat lower paid professionals’ staff as non- professional, especially in how they often viewed and acted on the suggestions they made.

Thus, although responsibility for the management of service provision had been decentralised according to the new public management framework, and while the framework emphasised responsiveness, this was not followed up by a respect for the opinion of those to whom such management responsibility had been decentralised. Instead the system deepened class division and resulted in a widening gap between the system and those it meant to serve. The provider-purchaser split, which is defined in the contractual arrangement of the new public management, can largely explain the source of this problem.

Contracting has created a layer of managers employing a language of responsibility for need and responsiveness, but having no day-to-day responsibility for service delivery, and no contact either with clients or those who actually care for clients. The structure in principle (but not of course in practice) excludes the level caring the staff from day to day management of need (p. 82).

This split between seller and buyer replacing direct provision had further consequences by way of diminishing advocacy and expertise in service provision.

Social care in the form of providing care service for people at home and in nursing homes had in the English regions mentioned above also been subjected to this purchaser-provider split, such that social workers working with the elder had been allocated funds to buy services as a means of addressing the elderly in varying degrees. This also meant that the social workers experts in that field of work were removed from those that they were trained to serve and instead private service providers were put in their place. This led not only to their diminished role as experts in that field, but also a diminishing of their advocacy role. They became distant from their clients and forfeited advocacy role especially since

They saw less of their clients than before. However (however of their time spent on assessment), and their advocacy role could conflict with budget role (p. 84).

Their role as experts with advocacy potential and their role as allocators of resources were put in conflict due to the nature of institutional re-design.

The new public management approach also promoted target setting concerning outputs of individuals and agencies. The exclusionary efforts of these are exacerbated by the incentive system put in place to reward performance. "The tighter the monitoring of performance, the greater the exclusionary incentive" (p. 86). In addition the more expensive the provision of services, the less likely it is that the service will be provided. In other words in cases where the budget has been allocated for a particular service, there may be no incentives to spend it on those that used the service most, because these may deplete the allocated resources.

Finally, social exclusion resulting from new public management inclined organizational re-design can emanate from the individualisation of the relations of users to public service. Concerning this form of exclusionary provision, the individual whose needs have been assessed to need private rather than public service, can be referred to private systems with out being provided any form of support by public sector. Thus individuals become only the consumers not a client, and neither a citizen, nor a voter.

Vulnerable people find hard to deal with choice in the market for care...in times of vulnerability people do not know what they can do or are suppose to do. Choice can be disempowering where information, confidence and consent are lacking (p. 88).

The failure that encapsulates most of the limitations of the new public management perspective has to do with its emphasis on “structural reform rather than policy outcomes”. In order to deal with shortcomings of the new public management suggestions by Mackintosh include the following provisions: attention to socio-economic consequences of structural redesign; a shift towards decentralization, collaborative participation, and enterprise; and emphasis on government and public action that has equality and negotiation at its core. These are explained here. Concerning the first shift it may be important she admits, to begin by plotting goals in terms of what socio-economic consequences are supposed to be before embarking on sweeping structural change and immediate output targets. Regarding welfare position (Mackintosh’s focus on arguments above). It is important to monitor activities in terms of their impact on economic and social cohesion, to calculate long-term rather than short-term costs, and to instil commitment to democratic accountability.

Second, the processes of social provision should be geared towards local accountability and inclusiveness (involving local participants). Collaboration between local networks and service-providers remains important, such that social capital and co-production are encouraged. This can be defined by the building of long-term working relationships between parts of public sector and other organizations.

The public sector needs professional confidants, distinctive expertise and the ability to think long-term, all of which can be understood by competitive framework. It needs local accountability, rather than the focus on top-down monitoring characteristic of the new public management in practice (p. 89).

Third, the inequality within which the public sector is trapped needs also to be eradicated. It is the propagation of the notions of citizenship that governments must embark on in addition to attempts to cater for a lack of capacity through cross-subsidisation. Inequality should thus be attacked through continuous institutional development, within-institution struggles, negotiation and active propagation by government, participation by local actors outside of the state — “through access to assets including human capital”— and the design of socially inclusive institutions.

Fourth, value needs to be accorded to lower level professional staff instead of denigrating their contribution relative to those made by professionals higher up in the provision ladder. Furthermore the capacities of staff at lower level needs to be built

and strengthened continuously as a way of promoting inclusiveness. Fifth, it becomes important for government to seek and support “social commitment and probity” from other institutions. This is in line with suggestion for propagation of notions of inclusiveness on the part of government.

Sixth, management reform needs to minimise class divisions in order to create an environment for much effective insider collaboration and openness to criticism between institutions involved in service provision (in a way encouraging sustainable co-production between institutions). Seventh, given the diversity of class, ideological and gender make-up of the state institutions, it may be important to fashion institutional arrangements that are open for internal debate and the valuing of plurality and dispute as integrally linked to socially inclusive processes. In conclusion, Mackintosh posits that need still remains for institutions of public management to be designed for mutual solidarity and inclusiveness, not least so that they may be criticised for failing to live up to their principles (p. 91). It is this last point, which brings us to the discussion about policy networks already hinted at in the first chapter on different approaches to implementation.

# Chapter 3: Policy networks

## 3.1 Target group involvement

**O'Toole Hanf and Hupe (1997, p. 136-151)**

The argument by O'Toole, Hanf and Hupe concerning implementation is that it involves sharing and co-ordination between multiple parties, of government. As with Pressman and Wildavsky they mentioned that implementation of policy is necessarily goal oriented, they differ from these authors however, on the grounds of the extent of participation of particular groups relative to others. For instance while Pressman and Wildavsky have argued that, multiple actor involvement can be linked to delays in the speedy achievement of policy goals, these scholars suggest instead that implementation should be accompanied by a commitment to cooperative participation (cooperative purpose) based on their interdependencies.

Often no institution of government possesses sufficient authority, resources, and knowledge to enact — let alone achieve — policy intentions. Instead, policies require the concerted efforts of multiple actors all possessing some capabilities for each dependent on others to solidify policy intention and its conversion to action (p. 137)

O'Toole et al acknowledge however that this should not imply a blanket inclusion of all possible actors in the policy process. They mention that because implementation is such a goal-oriented phase in the policy process, it remains important that common purpose should be sought and developed among participants. It can be assumed in this case that the specification of actors necessary for the effective realisation of policy goals becomes integrally linked to criteria of common purpose and preparedness. Nevertheless not only should there be common purpose among actors, but care should also be taken regarding the “extent and type of involvement” because it is also upon those criteria that the meaningfulness of participant involvement can be measured (p. 139).

In empirical terms the degree of problem-solving success often varies greatly depending on the extent and the type of involvement of targeted individuals and organizations in ‘co-producing’ the cooperative effort (p. 139).



In this way the authors attempt to place type and extent of involvement as important variables influencing policy implementation success.

It is argued as well that networks are essentially socially constructed and thus purposeful mechanisms for about changing behaviour of human agents. In that regard therefore such behaviour change is seen as an attempt to bring about a “coalignment of network action” across a variety of actors. This could be seen to resolve some misgivings by Pressman and Wildavsky concerning the impact of conflicting preferences on process including the extent to which the intensity of preferences affects the commitment of resources by individual organizations and individual persons.

The authors also acknowledge the relative importance of a process manager but do not necessarily agree with Pressman and Wildavsky’s view that the role needs to impose commonality of purpose among actors. Instead the authors argue that management of implementation should transcend strategies geared only at creating a common purpose and to find a wider range of strategies with which to achieve cooperation. These strategies could be directed at supporting integration at the service and programme implementation level. Other sets of strategies could be aimed at “the creation of operating plans and programmes that provides the framework for the case-by-case service-level integration” (p. 141). The authors agree that the task of developing programming choices belongs to the executives because of their specialised knowledge of programming task execution and the amount of relatively important discretionary power “enable them to make organizational commitments to the aspects they are responsible for” (p. 142). Again, in contrast to Pressman and Wildavsky, they also mention that such an exercise should also be based on the inputs of street-level bureaucrats, given their role as implementers of policy and their constant interaction with the specific policy environments.

According to the authors under review, because street-level bureaucrats are so closely linked to the action environment relationships with actors outside of the formal governing structures may be marked by constraints and opportunities. There may thus be a reason to ensure that scholarly work on this process should also look at what the inputs of central government actors are or can be in preventing fall-outs between both

governmental and non-governmental actors. They can specify the “constraints and opportunities for problem-solving efforts at a local level” (p. 144). Alternatively, actors from central government can be directly involved in negotiations with local actors over how implementation could be made to proceed more smoothly. (p. 144).

Common purpose can be achieved, it is argued, through a number of strategies amongst which are included: “bargaining and compromise”, “changing perspectives”, and “managing the context” (p147-150). Bargaining is an important means for reaching compromises between conflicting interests in policy processes driven from below. It becomes essential that approaches that support the importance of bottom-up implementation processes be developed around environments that are conducive for negotiation between policy actors. This should also involve the development of diplomatic and negotiation skills on the part of bottom-up managers. The compromises are according to these authors essentially exchange-based. This is a type of “compromise in which the *quid* of problem solving cooperation is elicited for the *quo* of side payment” (original italics p 150).

The second strategy implies that those responsible for managing implementation should be ready to change perspectives or influence the changing of perspectives where it is found that compromise may not necessarily produce effective implementation. Finally the management of context may be important in so far as it allows for the recognition that creating a legally and otherwise enabling environment may best serve purposes of policy processes.

The general point here regarding implementation management is that those seeking to influence network towards cooperation often need to attend to their strategic contexts and not merely seek a common rationale to unite disparate actors. They need to look for acceptable compromises, convince participants to alter their perspectives and invoke a shadow of governmental intervention. They must also attend to the context of network settings to determine what potentially manipulable factors can alter the set of achievable outcomes towards effective problem solving (p. 150).

It may be said that research carried out to investigate particular practical and/or theoretical issues concerning the effective means of carrying out policy may have to focus some attention on matters of actor constellations and/or, organizational capability within those constellations. In this thesis it is proposed that patterns of interaction for policy implementation be largely in the form of networks.

Governance and public management frequently take place in network-like situations. This is the case where sustainable patterns of interaction between actors have formed in the policy area in question and public problems are dealt in highly interactive processes (Kickert and Koppenjan, 1997, 35).

This is supported by arguments to the effect that processes of policy including formulation and implementation are a result of interactions “in which actors exchange information about problems, preferences, and means and trade off goals and resources” (Kickert, Klijn and Koppenjan, 1997, 9). The management of the interactions and exchanges is regarded by others as the very management of policy (Klijn, 1997).

Public management is the ‘governance’ of complex networks consisting of many different actors, such as parts of national, provincial and local government, political and social groups, societal institutions, private and business organizations, etc. (Kickert and Koppenjan, 1997, 39)

The approach known as the new public management is shown in this project to be flawed in a lot of ways that result in exclusionary practices where participation in decision making and implementation is exclusive for only a few and top-down regarding lines of accountability and communication. Complex networks, it is deemed in this project, are likely to provide space for broader participation, given their inter-organizational orientation (Kickert and Koppenjan, 1997, 41) as opposed to strictly legal rational strategies, which are based primarily on top-down interaction and communication (Parsons, 1995). This may be so given the potential for these networks to be characterised by more horizontal lines of accountability spanning the public-civic divide. Any research dealing with these matters should concentrate a great deal of effort on the capacities necessary for co-operative policy-making. Capacity management in the form of network management may be effective for implementation where it is perceived as seeking to enable not only the efficiency aspects of policy implementation but also the entire implementation environment.

Networks are viewed in the research project, first as a form of social capital (Putnam, 1993) and as “great laboratories of contemporary management” (Agranoff and McGuire, 1999, 19). These scholars perceive these “as social structures that permit inter-organizational interactions of exchange, concerted action and joint production” (Agranoff and McGuire, 1999, 19). In the networks, officials from government organizations and agencies at federal, state, and local levels operate in structures of

exchange and production with representatives from profit making and not for profit organizations” (Agranoff and McGuire, 1999, 21).

### 3.2 Compliance

#### Bressers and O’Toole (1998)

The notion of network is used “to denote the pattern of relationship between governmental authority (like an agency or a ministry), on the one hand, and the set of actors — the ‘target group’ — toward which the governmental authority’s policy efforts are directed, on the other”. In giving a more comprehensive definition of the concept of networks, they come to include more clearly ~~include~~ the aspects of what the nature of interactions is, both within and outside of the public sector.

We define a policy network as a social system in which actors develop comparatively durable patterns of interaction and communication aimed at policy problems or policy programs. The focus here in particular is on the patterns observable between the steering coalition — normally within and without the public sector — and the ‘targeted’ constellation — typically comprised of strong individual organizations and/or representative organizations along with their allies, which may include some additional governmental agencies.

In tracing the growth of interest in policy networks Bressers and O’Toole mention that this was “fuelled by recognition of a complex array of actors involved in policy choices as well as the inability of contemporary government to move unilaterally without incorporating the constraints, preferences, and resources of other social actors.” Networks are characterised by the intensity of interactions between actors — interconnectedness — and the extent of the distribution of objectives among actors in the networks — cohesion. According to Bressers and O’Toole interconnectedness refers not only to ‘contacts’ during the policy formation process (the authors focus on this phase of the policy process), but also to “the relationship between actors outside the actual policy process at any particular time’. It may then be surmised that interconnectedness involves both formal and informal contacts between actors where informal contacts define most of the interactions that occur outside of the procedural context. Cohesion, it is mentioned above, relates to the distribution of objectives among the participants in the network. The objectives could range from conflictual to cooperative.



Cohesion is therefore “the extent to which individuals, groups, and organizations empathize with each other’s objectives in so far as these are relevant to the policy field”. The empathy, is said here, to derive from shared values and a shared worldview”. The prevalence of conflicting perspectives and values among network actors can be less cumbersome for the policy formulation process if the actors share tightly consistent values and worldviews at more basic levels. Cohesion can in this way be seen to pertain to the prevalence of much deeper issues upon which objectives are shared. Actors are more inclined to self identify as a cluster if there is an extremely high degree of cohesion.

Bressers and O’Toole in the work reviewed here are examining the relationship between networks and the characteristics of instruments usually specified for the modification or change of target group behaviour. This may not necessarily have direct relevance to the study at hand, but it may be important to note some arguments made in connection with the importance of interconnectedness and cohesion, which are features of policy networks and how these features affect resource flows. Interconnectedness and cohesion are crucial in terms of what the public sector should do to facilitate compliance with policies implemented.

Therefore, particularly in the case of strong interconnectedness, government organizations are likely to be guided primarily by the consideration that good relations with the target are extremely beneficial to the government itself — not least to make life easier for the officials involved”.

In the light of such a realisation, concerning the requirements for cohesion, the application of policy instruments demands, “the target group receives funds, powers, rights, know-how or resources in exchange for complying with a desired behaviour”. In this way the resources, power, and rights made available to target groups become incentives for compliance with policy, as well as encourage closer ties through shared objectives with the governmental authority responsible for the particular policy field.

It may not necessarily be the case that such a relationship will be as linear as here implied — resources → compliance → cohesion — but it is assumed that this is likely to happen under particular circumstances. This may especially be the case if, as the authors mention, “resources may be withdrawn from the target group to counter undesired behaviour”. In this way therefore behaviour change is seen to be a function



of the extent to which governmental authority relies not on negative sanction, but positive sanctions as way a way of promoting compliance.

If cohesion is strong, the authorities by definition are expected to be positively inclined toward the target group's main aims. In such situations and to preserve cohesion, the government is likely to seek to influence behaviour by rewarding rather than penalizing.

According to Bressers and O'Toole it is likely that the same network that participated in the formulation of policy and the instruments that are the outcomes of such a process, will be the same network involved in the implementation of the policy. In that way, the authors presume, the patterns of continuing mutual involvement remain intact. Strong interconnectedness is likely to be sustained during the process of implementation, "while the availability of the contacts encourages the involvement of the network's parties in implementation".

The extent to which policy makers will want to take the entire (or part) of the implementation of policy into their own hands will depend on the extent of trust they have on the other elements in the network. They are likely to have more trust in the organizations that participated in the formulation phase of the policy than in those that were outside of this process.

Even for cases exhibiting strong cohesion, policy makers are more unlikely to entrust the full responsibility for implementation to lower authorities or other institutions outside the network, particularly if these harbor or unknown or less supportive attitudes. If the target group is opposed to the policy, policy makers would want to keep implementation in their own hands. In the more likely case that the instrument consists of the provision of additional resources, application by a unit in the network helps to reinforce cohesion. On both cases, this pattern provides reasons to entrust implementation to organizations from within the network that have also participated in policy formation.

The authors conclude on this score that decentralisation of policy implementation can occur most likely under conditions with weak cohesion and weak interconnectedness.

What may be important is to fathom the nature of government participation in these networks in terms of both leadership and facilitation. This is so given the notion that policy networks may be an important way out of the quagmire that the public sector usually finds itself in, in terms of the specification of its role in such networks. Networks may be a good idea, but if the roles of the actors are not appropriately specified can they be effective at all? Strategies in policy networks may be so

complex as to produce a complete waste of resources. This may be worse if the roles of the participants are not clearly defined, as this leads to a number of frustrations for all those participating. This issue is discussed more clearly by Ryan (2001) who looks at the role of government actors in collaborative policy efforts. To be precise she investigates their role in regulatory negotiation. The section below is a brief review and presentation of her arguments in this regard.

### **3.3. Leadership in collaborative policy making**

#### **Ryan (2001, pp.221-245)**

In the article reviewed here, Ryan attempts to examine the role of the Environmental Protection Agency specifically and the public sector in general in collaborative policy-making. This agency is supposed to implement the United States' environmental policy. She also attempts to examine the overall effectiveness of these collaborative arrangements in regulatory negotiation, which has become a trend in the making of public policy in the United States since the 1980s, given the "challenges and lawsuits filed in response to agency decisions". The negotiated processes were thus a way of reducing the costs to litigation in as much as they were meant to produce a spirit of cooperation between policy makers and the beneficiaries of public policy. She claims that these lawsuits have been a cause of not only litigation costs, but also serious delays and conflict between government agencies and outside parties. At times the conflicts have been so intense that particular policy have ended up not been implemented. In her abstract to the article she explains this problem in more detail.

Where previously and in the theoretical literature, agencies exercise leadership through statutory authority or technical expertise, thus study suggests that are additional dimensions to that leadership role. In a collaborative process such as regulatory negotiation, the agency finds itself in a realm that demands that they effectively merge the roles of expert, analyst and the stakeholder into a more complex leadership role than has been suggested in the past.

Her argument can be seen in the context of this project to reiterate some of the misgivings raised by Hilderbrand and Grindle, and Peterson (in Chapter 4) concerning the limitations of systems that rely on rules, regulations and procedure for effective policymaking and implementation. In describing the conventional

rulemaking process she states that in the United States overarching statutes, which have been designed and approved by Congress, govern regulatory activities of agencies. In order to acquire support for its decisions, government allows for public input by way of a notice-and-comment medium where affected parties are asked to comment on decisions published in the Federal Register. This is in accordance with the Administrative Procedure Act.

Finalising the rulemaking process is a long-drawn process and may actually take months, if not years, to accomplish. This makes conventional rulemaking very “slow, cumbersome, and excessively adversarial” leading at times to non-implementation.

EPA’s experience has shown that of the more than 250 regulations it develops each year, nearly 80% are challenged in court... although recent research challenges this figure ...Other critics point out the short comings of litigation as a method of resolving conflict, and that the increasing number of disputes adds to the burden of a seriously overcrowded court system.

The judicial system is often also not capable of effectively resolving conflict, because of the inability of the courts to allow for sufficient debate of policy issues. The courts are, in addition, qualified by a lack of much broader participation in judicial processes, while they are also seen to have a limited scope in terms of judicial review. Finally, their exclusionary nature is also accompanied by too much polarisation of disputants as a result of the nature of litigation. Further, courts are usually unable to promote open communication, the sharing of information and the collaboration effort in the resolution of problems.

A way of overcoming some of these problems has been the introduction, during the 1980s, of alternatives to conventional processes. Alternative dispute resolution techniques in decision-making processes include among other things: mediation, arbitration mini-trials; neutral valuation; settlement judgements and regulatory negotiation. The alternative dispute resolution techniques promote in other ways, more face to face contact and negotiation between parties.

The interest groups, or stakeholders, and the federal agency join together as part of a committee that meets to discuss and negotiate various issues related to the rule that is being developed. Stakeholders may represent groups such as the regulated industry, state and local governments, environmental groups such as the regulated industry state and local governments.

These negotiative processes do not necessarily replace legislated procedure, but serve mainly as supplements to it. The activities that lead to enactment of laws as promulgated under the Administrative Procedure Act remain intact, except that the alternative dispute resolution mechanism seeks to reduce the amount of conflict that may result in their absence, that if the Act was to be applied in its most traditional format.

Regulatory negotiation has however its own limitations. At the introduction of the technique, Ryan mentions, some participants were caught up in a lot of uncertainty because of their lack of knowledge on how they had to behave in the process of regulatory negotiations. This in turn caused confusion in terms of what officials thought their role should be. The Environmental Protection Agency officials involved found themselves with roles which were not clearly specified — a source of confusion to all those involved. According to Ryan, the implication is that change to techniques involves extensive learning and adaptation.

As a result, regulatory negotiation requires a wide array of different skills and procedures than traditional rulemaking. It also requires that the sponsoring agency play multiple and in many cases, new roles throughout the process.

Theoretically the roles of agencies in regulatory negotiation differ much from the roles as performed by agencies in conventional rulemaking. In more conventional arrangements agencies have been portrayed more as housing expert knowledge. In both cases they reflect qualities more inclined in line with top-down thinking around policy making. Top-down legal rational models have been discussed above, and will therefore not be revisited in this section except to mention a few points made by Ryan. She mentions that in more conventional models, the portrayal of agencies has meant that public administrators are seen as “apolitical and scientific in their approach”. Administrative agencies are in these models, seen to be detached, neutral, technocratic and insulated from the political environments within which they implement policy. Citizens, according to these conventional frameworks, had no part to play in policy-making processes because it was assumed their comprehension of the policy process could not be trusted.

Rational decision making, it was believed, was important in so far as the Agency was seen to be a firm whose running needed expert rational knowledge. It is premised on the assumption that “all relevant values and preferences of society as a whole can be weighted and calculation of all social, political, and economic values will achieve the most efficient outcome”. Agencies, however, have to depend on technical expertise in order to make these calculations. This mentality concerning decision-making has however been replaced to a very large extent by theories in which the state and its ministries (agencies) are essentially only a part of the stakeholders affected by particular policy changes. Other frameworks have come to consider the state as a facilitator or simply as a leader within a broad band of policy participants.

The view that places the agency within the realm of stakeholder proposes contrary to those that place the agency as either expert or rational decision maker (and at times both), that agencies were not necessarily “neutral technocrats”. They are instead structures influenced by external interests and are also reflections of a kaleidoscope of interests, values and preferences characteristic of the overall environment within which they participate to affect behaviour. As facilitator the Ministry is seen to perform the role of umpire as well as player in the process.

As a result the agency no longer acted as a policy maker representing the public by hearing the point of view of other parties and making its decisions, but rather acted as an umpire in reaching policy decisions as a result of the adversarial activity of competing groups. The agency is seen to be of a mediator or balancer of interests, assessing the competing claims of the parties concerning the facts and policies involved in regulation.

Government departments can also play the role of leader in the process. The backgrounds of those that are in the leadership of organizations represented in collaborative policy making practice may be so diverse, that appropriate training may be required. This is in addition to limitations posed by unclear roles of actors at times. In the hands of the leadership of collaborative processes may be the responsibility to produce sustainable collaborative effort. What then are the roles of the leadership be given the complexities that characterise the arrangements? Ryan has identified two such roles based on two models: agency as overseer of the process; and agency as active participant. According to her the notions that bureaucratic processes are not free of interests and values or preferences inspire these models. In regulatory



negotiation, an agency can either assume the role of oversight of the negotiation process, or that of active participant.

Oversight implies that the agency occupies a position of overall observer and thus takes no active part in the determination of policy at a substantive level.

The agency merely oversees the process and does not inject its views or policy preferences into the discussions.

The role of active participation on the other hand implies the contrary — that the agency injects the process with its interests and preferences. Ryan shows in the Environmental Protection Agency case, that the agency was involved as expert, analyst, stakeholder and leader at different times. What may therefore be important in terms of collaborative policy making processes would be to build and enhance at several of these levels in order to prepare for effective agency involvement in collaborative processes. Confining itself to any one of these roles, may be useful for an agency in terms of specialisation, but could foreclose any creative potential that may be called upon it by contingency. Ryan concludes that irrespective of the number of roles an agency may be called upon to play it must be able to assume leadership of processes when necessity requires it to do so.

### **3.4 Network co-ordination**

Hilderbrand and Grindle (1997) point out from observation in the six countries studied, that complex task networks were involved in the area of public policy. These networks were made up of various public sector organizations, international financial institutions, donor agencies, local and international non-governmental organizations and the organizations involved on the part of the public sector were drawn from levels of government. They point out that the effective performance of the networks was hampered by inability of organizations to assume particular roles meant for the execution of particular tasks or when roles had been specified and taken, there would be an inability to act in a meaningful way in achieving task objectives. They add that there was also a “lack of interactions between organizations in the network”. This latter problem they ascribe to ineffective co-ordination.

Coordination between those organizations who set policy and those who implement it is critical if an overall policy framework is to guide development tasks. In service delivery in particular coordination is required if the service is to reach its intended beneficiaries. Coordination among different providers

including separate government programs, private organizations, and donor projects present particular challenges (p. 47).

The lack of co-ordination in some of the countries was also accompanied by a lack of communication among organizations involved in network provision especially in the areas of agricultural extension and child health in Ghana, Morocco, Sri Lanka and the Central African Republic. The authors claim that communication was largely un-directional and flowing from central organizations to the organizations at a lower level. In this way input was not allowed from these lower levels regarding decision-making relating to programme design and implementation. They mention that training and recruitment functions did not allow for input from the client organizations in budget formulation in Bolivia and Morocco. In response to these problems countries had to improve the nature of interactions in the networks — some by recognising extension services “to clarify reporting relationships and emphasise coordination among numerous service providers in the public and private sectors. Others place more emphasis on erecting structures for communication, or creating multi-disciplinary teams “to facilitate links between the centre and the lower levels of the extension services through mentoring, supervision and transfer of technical expertise”.

The authors suggest that capacity-building initiatives at the level of networks should target areas where there are more serious weaknesses. Improving network performance could include proper separation of objectives and mechanisms for carrying responsibilities, identifying the weakest organizations and their importance to the network and also identifying weak areas in the network communication chain.

Capacity builders need to create active mechanisms for interaction and coordination. Formal means of communication and coordination can be created, such as high-level and technical-level coordination committees, interlocking boards of directors or advisors, joint workshops and seminars, and relocating offices or improving technology so that communication is physically easier. Informal communication can be stimulated to supplement and support these formal interactions (p. 47).

Co-ordination, in order to be effective, needs to be task specific. It can also be facilitated at the service delivery domain by “stimulating the organization of client groups and by more intense visiting back and forth between offices and the ministry headquarters”. More importantly, the authors argue, regarding communication, it

needs to be multi-directional and dense and focused on task performance and problem solving.

In order improve interactions within networks concerning service provision, the authors propose that organizational culture should be considered as a crucial to target. An organizational culture that would be constituted by a commitment to a mission and results oriented performance was fundamental to establishing these positive interactions and enabling some organizations to be productive despite constraints at other levels. Salary is not necessarily a determinant of performance, but rather that commitment to organizational goals could independently motivate effective performance. They mention that, in order to overcome some of the constraints imposed on organizations by economic and budgetary bottlenecks, building “a culture of enhanced prestige professional integrity, and organizational mission” might be essential. Furthermore, and tied to organizational culture, is the improvement of performance by improving the structure of work, authority relationships, communications and behavioural norms. These could include extending participatory opportunity to a wider section of the population of employees, emphasising equity and promoting a more flexible management style. They also add that informal dialogue about policy and problem solving teamwork can be seen to enhance performance.

It may be desirable to augment monetary incentives with non-monetary ones in order to facilitate effective service delivery. These incentives could include opportunities to study abroad, a sense of organizational mission, promotion based on performance, nominations for best performance and other such incentives and rewards.

Focused induction training can and should be used to inculcate desirable organizational norms and performance expectations. Probationary periods for newly hired personnel and timed renewable contracts linked to performance reviews are other ways that messages about performance are communicated within organizations. Promotions, recognition, and monetary and non-monetary incentives are important ways to reward good performance. In addition individuals can be singled out for recognition and reward just as poor performance must be acknowledged and punished (p. 51)

The authors note that it may be important to encourage the establishment of professional associations whose responsibility and orientation would be to inculcate a

professional identity among the members and encourage ethical behaviour. These associations could also assist in deepening commitment to mission-driven activities. Creating organizational culture must also be accompanied by ways of ensuring that such culture develops under conditions of relative organizational autonomy providing scope for leadership.

The imperative for providing scope for leadership should also not be divorced from the imperatives that promote teamwork. Similarly management should also be flexible in style and allow for other points of view within the organization, and from the organization within the task environment. In that way they should be able to provide leverage for broader participation in decision-making and, responsiveness to client needs. Care should, however be taken to ensure that negative influences from outside the organization are not allowed to derail the organization from its objectives, especially given the openness of the environment.

Organizations need to be told by those outside the organizations that to achieve these larger goals. Their performance will be monitored in terms of taking credit for success or sharing blame for failures. Clients can be mobilized to put pressure on organizations and to provide effective and timely services. Similarly, demand for information can improve its availability and accuracy. Individuals should know that their constituencies have means to communicate to important “others” when they encounter good or bad performance or when individual public sector officials are responsive or unresponsive to their needs (p. 52).

In the overall it can be said that capacity building initiatives must certainly be task and target-specific, such that resources expended on such efforts are not wasted. In addition it should be ensured that efforts are continuous and merely once-off injections of the required capabilities. Rules should not be seen as the most important means for achieving good performance management. Instead, they should be seen as complementary to the entirety of the other means used to improve performance. The point made by Hilderbrand and Grindle concerning the need for the retention of the most skilled and most experienced in the organization is of most importance to the project at hand, because as shall be noted in the sections to follow the retention of skilled and highly experienced personnel is essential for purposes of creating a pool of locally accountable officials. Furthermore, an inability by the public sector to retain its human resources, a lack of communication with the beneficiaries of



implementation efforts, lack of coordination within multiple sector networks (especially those that span the public-private divide), and lack of shared commitment among professionals and technical experts, are seen to be detrimental to the building of social capital between the state and society, and may have negative consequences for governance on the overall.

Therefore improvements within the public sector cannot be meaningful unless they are inclined also toward the improvement of relations between the public sector and the majority of the beneficiaries it intends to serve. This is especially the case in “network societies” (Klijn and Koppenjan, 2000). Network societies are referring here to those societies in which “the public and the private sector are strongly intertwined”. They are societies in which partnerships are the most effective means of governing complex relations and interactions (Klijn and Teisman, 2000, 330). One of the factors discovered to be important for the sustainability of public-civic networks is mutual trust between network members (Klijn and Teisman, 2000). Klijn and Teisman propose that trust between network members plays an important role in the fulfillment of broad policy objectives. In the following section we explore this notion with the aim of defining “the moral resources” (Putnam, 1993) required for the effective management of networks/partnerships.



## **Chapter 4: Building public sector capacity**

Decentralisation, in some countries such as South Africa has been linked to the transfer of authority from central government to other spheres (provincia and local) government. It is based on cooperative forms of governance. In this form of governance the dominant guiding principle is that of cooperative policy making and implementation stressing interdependence between departments and spheres of government while combining certain levels of autonomy and hierarchy between these cooperating entities. The policy networks approach is discussed in this chapter in view of its ability to explain the nature of the interactions that emerge to fashion collaboration patterns in the institutionalisation, the execution and the management of these interactions. The chapter concerns itself however, only with aspects of theory explaining capacities requisite for the implementation of public policy. It approaches the issue from the assumption that even within these networks there needs to be adequate capacity to manage the interactions that define their significance to implementation.

The capacity centrally implied in this thesis refers to 'moral resources' (Putnam, 1993) that should govern the interactions descriptive of policy networks. The assumption guiding discussion in this chapter is that any network configuration may not necessarily be a sustainable mechanism for impressing accountability among public officials when this is not accompanied by a commitment to certain norms congruent with building enduring ties across parochial boundaries. In other words it may most likely be the case that a network not based on particular social capital (norms of reciprocity, mutual trust, mutual obligation and expectations, and consistent mutual engagement) could not effectively carry out public policy. It may also be possible that networks that are engaged for policy implementation without prior-and-during-the process social capital foundations couldn't be self-sustaining. I look at the extent to which social capital can necessarily complement other capabilities owned by various participants in the network to facilitate the ability of a network to survive problems of collective action during processes of policy execution.

I propose therefore that resource needs may lead to interdependencies between spheres of government and could also be used to explain some forms of collaboration between the state and civil society. We also propose that networks of engagement situated within the public sector may be a product of embedded relations between these policy actors. What is construed to encourage the development of embedded relations between these policy actors is the legislation supporting the establishment of co-operative arrangements between actors in the public domain. Peterson (1997) and Hilderbrand and Grindle (1997) find that adherence to rules and regulation in the management of the public sector might jeopardise chances of enhancing performance and effective co-ordination it could be added. This might be so if organizational culture is not sufficiently fashioned to enhance both performance and effective co-ordination of collaborative effort. The quote below summarises this assumption regarding performance management.

Based on our research, we would argue that it is appropriate to assume that effective public sector performance is more driven by strong organizational culture, good management practices and effective communication networks than it is by rules and regulations or procedures and pay scales (p. 56).

It does not mean however that decentralisation of policy implementation authority to networks, whether in or outside the public organization is necessarily inexpensive in terms of financial, technical, or organizational costs, as is argued by Christensen and Laegreid (2001). Decentralisation may create additional costs to governments of developing countries since it may also concern developing an ability to manage the very process of decentralisation. It may be important that where decentralisation has been carried out, its co-ordination should not be jeopardised, its efficiency compromised, and that effectiveness and responsiveness should remain a crucial requirement in the assessment of government performance. This could be important for the purpose of sustaining overall government legitimacy. This does not discount the fact that excessive concern with efficiency should be avoided as Christensen and Laegreid (2001) mention. They perceive it to be “no guarantor of political and social judgement, which is essential in securing genuine political responsibility and legitimacy” (Christensen and Laegreid, 2001, 90).

## 4.1 The task network concept

### Peterson (1997)

Peterson's view on capacity building initiatives in public sectors of developing countries (in this case African countries) focuses primarily on the "design of organisational processes or processes design". He defines his process in terms of how an organisation does its work. According to Peterson, because formal hierarchies are most often "compromised", it remains important to structure processes within network situations instead. In addition to such restructuring, it is important to improve information technologies for purposes of process redesign. The process redesign effort should be led by an identification of organisational tasks and the identification of a manager whose responsibility is to build a task network. Networks, rather than hierarchies, are important means for task execution in African governments.

Building networks rather than reinforcing organisational hierarchies recognises the organisational realities that these public bureaucrats are often large, fragmented, and poorly managed, for the most part irrelevant (p. 158).

Public sector organisations are commonly arranged around a hierarchy of control systems, and are formal. The role of these hierarchical structures "is to co-ordinate the organisation's inter-dependencies." This co-ordination is achieved "by defining standard procedures" governing individual behaviour and what motivates that behaviour. The procedures governing individual behaviour are said to be weak. Arguments advanced for explaining why, point to historical precedent, organisational culture, and individualisation of leadership. These are three different perspectives attempting to explain reasons for inability for procedure to govern behaviour. The first refers to the notion that colonial practice and subsequent expatriate advice could have laid the foundation for ill respect against procedure based on perceptions of unequal and unfair application of rules, regulations and procedures.

The second points to a failure, on the part of governments, to institutionalise roles of administrative staff, leading to a lack of legal rationality in governing these staff, and instead relying on social pressure. The third dimension relates to the perception that,

because of the politicisation of leadership and the management of bureaucracies, procedures are compromised.

Although the image is one of centralisation, the reality of many African bureaucracies is a subset of competing fiefdoms run by a fiat rather than procedure. Instead of being integrated through procedures, public bureaucracies are often fragmented organisations with numerous micro-hierarchies. The leaders of these micro-hierarchies either vie among themselves for access to senior official or they languish in isolation. Personal leadership and interventionist administration creates and reinforces fragmented organisational structures, determined by the span of control of the senior administrator (p. 49).

Peterson mentions that two perspectives have emerged as ways of approaching how these problems can be tackled. One approach proposes strengthening more legal rational modes of governing based on bureaucratic hierarchy. The other dimension emphasises more informal, less rigid organisational designs. The former model places more emphasis on procedures and hierarchy while the latter is based on the notion that a “flatter structure” would be more appropriate to systems in which “change was contingent” and were thus more dynamic. Peterson recognises however that these perspectives are not necessarily exclusive of each other. Both realise “the importance of informal organisation in co-ordinating social behaviour”. Process design is then a theory that focuses on how work is organised in these informal organisational settings.

Conventionally, vertical relations define how organisations should be structured. This is evident in reporting relations, which cause information to flow in uni-directional command-and-implement flows rather than through horizontal lines of accountability and information sharing. According to Peterson, a process view would emphasise flatter structures of accountability. These “laterally structured” flows of work are seen to be capable of overcoming the fragmentation that results from the functional and vertical designs of organisations. Fragmentation of tasks “disrupts work flows and creates unnecessary operational hand-offs - complex organisational processes required to produce an output - and unnecessary demands on management” (pg 161). Peterson argues that through the integration of tasks with a progressive manager, such fragmentation could be overcome. He mentions however that a number of conditions must first prevail in order for such design to be effective.

It requires the careful orchestration of three enablers that maximise the



individuals productivity: information technology, flat and innovative organizational structure, and creative human resource management (p. 161). Process redesign is achievable through improvement, implying incremental reform of existing processes which is done within the scope of existing functions. Alternatively, redesign of processes could be radical (innovation), where new processes are introduced across functions. The latter form is seen as more dominant in both the private and the public sectors.

The objectives of process redesign are integration, completeness, and accountability. These objectives are based on the over-all objective of eliminating fragmentation, resource constraints and weak control. Incremental or drastic change defines the pace with which the objectives can be realised. However, developing and specifically African countries seem more in need of incremental change at first. This is especially so given the refurbishing of information technology as an enabler of process redesign. How does information technology enable process redesign? It can be used to promote the essential tasks of organisation design mentioned above: integration; completeness; and accountability? The operational objectives of using information technology include continuity, control, and comprehensibility. How do these relate to the tasks of process design. What are the benefits of information technology?

Continuity and control promote integration and completeness and accountability. A process can be greatly simplified and integrated by using a program that requires only a few steps. Completeness is promoted by the data processing cycle, which provides a structure and discipline to work while the technology promotes monitoring to ensure that transactions are complete. Accountability is promoted by creating parallel manual and computer systems that provide extensive audit trails (p. 164).

The reason given for desirability of a more incremental pace in the introduction and utilisation of information technology is based on the notion of resource scarcity and demands on management, which are factors most likely to stall radical transformation of information technology. Instead of presenting claims for use of either manual or computerised styles of information technology, I move into the area of networks in order to show their relevance to implementation and administrative process in general. I aim to illustrate why they should be preferred over hierarchical, procedure dominated models of administration and public management.



Micro-hierarchies or networks exist in African bureaucracies as alternatives to hierarchies, which are based on procedural control. They are informal and small scale. They are called networks because both theoretically and practically they possess the capability of possessing linkages “beyond the formal agency subset (the micro-hierarchy), thus promoting a process or lateral organisation of work” (p. 166).

A network organisation “is a social network that is integrated across formal boundaries [and] interpersonal ties of any type are formed without respect to formal groups or categories”... Networks are difficult to describe precisely because they often transcend formal internal and external organisational boundaries (p. 166).

Peterson argues that because network organisation is based on social relations (interpersonal ties of the formal and informal kind), it should be viewed “in terms of the obligations between its members”. They are suited to African conditions because they are capable of managing the legitimate as well as the illegitimate particularistic demands of employers and clients. Particularistic demands influence rules and therefore cause rules to be particularistic rather than universalistic - the rules made and managed attempt mostly to be geared at persons and their relationships with others, rather than them being all-encompassing and subject to hierarchical control.

Due to the failure of systems based on procedure and hierarchy for control, network organisation seems to project a sustainable institutional framework, given resource demands and costly management needs that go with particularistic and procedural management systems. The preponderance of rent seeking incidences forming part of the rather patron-clientilistic management culture of most African bureaucracies requires organisational design with capacity to deal with the fragmentation bred by such systems. The fragmentation, as noted above, results primarily from “personal rather than procedural management, and the pursuit of rent rather than legal rational authority” (p. 167). What Peterson argues, is that while it may be inexpensive for universalistic approaches to deal with these problems, it is questionable whether they can necessarily be effective and sufficient means.

Procedural management and the legal rational models underpinning it can be criticised on a number of accounts, mostly concerning co-ordination of functions and structures.

First...organizational inter-dependencies are often over-stated, and thus the need for coordination either through formal or informal means is over estimated, and in any case, there are severe limits to rational ordering collective behaviour. Second, there is a strong tendency to over-use formal structures for coordination without recognising the cost and inefficiencies of such structures. Third, many co-ordination problems can be solved with informal structures that are more adaptive, problem oriented, and robust than formal mechanisms. Fourth, organisational arrangements should be designed such that the formal and informal structures coordinate non-contingent and contingent tasks respectively (p. 168).

Consideration about co-ordination especially with regard to structures and relationships between them and where these represent inter-dependencies should focus on intensity and type of interdependencies. These concerns should also include notions about how informal and formal structures co-ordinate these inter-dependencies. According to Peterson more informal structures may be desirable for co-ordination of such inter-dependencies.

Viewing public bureaucracies in Africa as a collection of loosely coupled informal organisations suggest that coordination (within and between micro-hierarchies and within and between organisations) should be promoted where necessary, principally by informal than formal means (p. 168).

He proposes that although process reform may not bring about the dramatic changes needed, it remains important nonetheless. Any minor reform action is likely to produce dramatic results. Change could, however, be accelerated by more commitment to network building and by an increase in the scope of tasks to be covered by networks. The small scale of networks carries the added advantage of being able to manage contingencies and “focus on the individual and the team”.

Most important, networks are able to bridge the organisational contradiction of moving from vertical to horizontal workflows in process reform. Networks and teams are critical to process reform, precisely because they are not bound by vertical reporting structures and they provide a transitional organisation. Networks can bypass fragmented authority structures as well as superfluous vertical structures and promote a more lateral and efficient work flow... networks provide an organisational vehicle for changing from vertical to horizontal work flows, as well as a strategy for bypassing hierarchy (p. 170).

I have attempted to sketch some of the problems of capacity in the public sector, and to present some of the arguments advanced by Hiderbrand and Grindle (1997), and Peterson (1997). These authors attempt to understand what capacities may be required in the public sector for effective policy performance. These authors focus primarily on the public sectors of the developing countries. Admittedly concentration on only

these views may not be conclusive, but it is hoped, that these may go some way towards highlighting some of the means that can be employed to improve capacity within developing country public sectors.

The idea is also to provide a glimpse into how, within these scholarly works, some avenue could be created for exploring the possibilities for collaborative policy work, and that collaboration may create a pool for resourcing public sectors. In addition it is thought that collaborative practice is not only capable of circumventing particular capacity problems (for example information and knowledge germane to the action environment), but may also be capable of embedding public officials within the environment whose conditions they are trying to improve. Collaborative practice between the public sector and elements in civil society, which I discuss in later chapters, may have the potential of creating local accountability among public officials, trust and reciprocity between public officials and the citizens served by them, including a responsiveness to social needs (Klijn and Teisman, 2000).

It may be important, following from Ryan, Peterson and Bresser and O'Toole, that ways are found within policy networks to create effective policy-making and implementation structures. Ryan specifically emphasises the leadership role of the public sector, although not really specifying what capacities are actually necessary for government to be able to play the role of leadership in network environments. It may be necessary therefore to look into some of the capacities that have been suggested by other scholars for the development of governmental institutions necessary for network management.

The section below examines these with a view to improving specifically developing country governing capacities. This of course is notwithstanding the necessity for partners of the state to develop particular capacities in their drive as active participants in the policy process. In fact, this issue, although important, (and even later) hinted at by White and Robinson (1999) whose work is reviewed is not covered at all except in a review of Putnam's work regarding social capital and the extent to which civil society can play a major role in the improvement of institutional performance. Concentration regarding capacities is directed largely at the public sector instead.

The two sections on the building and strengthening of public sector capacity has hinted on the notion that such capacity must include some way of bringing both the state and elements in civil society to form of collaborative framework in order to increase the effectiveness of built capacity. In is in that light those issues of networks have been raised in both sections, even though the need for organizational autonomy is seen as equally important. The scholars whose work has been reviewed starting from parsons in the first chapter have all emphasised the importance of multisectoral policy-making. What has not really been explained is the social, political and economic pool from which these actors have been drawn.

This project is guided by the view that the elements that make up civil society as well as those that make up the state may carry different attitudes and interests into the various policy networks into which they are drawn. It is for that reason that it is believed the state as well as civil society need to be disaggregated in order to understand the possible backgrounds these actors may be coming from and what potential they carry into the development process. Regarding this theoretical attempt the works of Migdal (1994) and Chazan (1994) are reviewed in order to disaggregate both these sectors. In a way what the next chapter will examine is the extent to which the relationship between the state and elements in civil society can be made into a positive sum, meaning a potential for mutual empowerment and mutual development.



## Chapter 5: Social capital

The implicit aim of this thesis in general is to illustrate the extent to which, unlike Pressman and Wildavsky above, networks formed between government and civic actors can be an effective means in the execution of policy. The previous chapter is an attempt to draw attention to the network approach to policy analysis and practice. In that chapter networks are shown to be an appropriate means for the inclusion of, and the meaningful participation by target groups in the policy process. Here I refer primarily to the inclusion of target groups in the implementation of policy as partners with the traditional provider (government). I suggest however that inclusion and participation should be based on particular norms meant to constrain or promote certain types of social behaviour in relation to the overall well being of others in the network. The extent to which agreements are formalised in terms of particular governing laws could not necessarily prevent the emergence of collective action problems. Putnam (1993) identified problems such as the shirking of responsibilities by network members, corruption and other behaviour unbecoming.

Certain actions of persons and organizations could produce externalities that have negative impacts on human, environmental, and other essential well being. Kooiman (1993), in his attempt to explain the nature of the interactions that make up social-political governance, proposes that they can be differentiated into three types. These include interferences; interplays; and interventions, each of which carries specific implications for governance. Interferences mainly involve informal “basically uncoordinated spontaneous forms of interactions. Interplays are semiformal and “more coordinated” interactions, while interventions are formal and highly coordinated interactions (Kooiman, 1993, 75). He is of the opinion that effective activation of any of these types of interactions depends on their suitability to particular social political contexts. Peterson (1997) above, proposes that an effective means of redesigning institutions for the management of policy in developing countries, especially in Africa, would be to establish task networks rather than adopt more centralised control. Instead, he suggests, an “orchestration” of a number of mechanisms including a “flat and innovative organizational culture for the management of policy (Peterson, 1997, 161).



Decentralisation as a means of transferring policy making and executive authority has also been examined above. The idea is to illustrate the potential problems of decentralisation. Kaul (2000) cautions against blindly following suggestions for decentralisation, for it may not always work for all types of contexts.

Local government is prone to exactly the same abuses as central government. Specifically capture by local interest groups, be they business or criminal interests is often a problem. As, ever when contemplating reforms the strength and durability of the institutions concerned needs to be taken into account. Merely replacing one poor institutional structure with another achieves little and has proven disastrous in the past (Kaul, 2000, 61)

Cooperation within government and between government and local associations and organizations is deemed essential for the sustainability of decentralised structures (p. 61-62). Kaul holds here that because of decentralisation central government in many countries” has recently experienced a decline in information flows in their direction. This he says is a result of the loss of central control of this asset. This has had a negative impact on the process and institutions of oversight. These institutions are important for their ability to inform government of policy success or failure. They thus serve an important monitoring function (Kaul, 2000, 63).

The issue of oversight remains an important area of research and continuous improvement for the effective management of policy. It is however not directly an area of focus in this thesis and discussions in that regard will remain as indirect. I shall mention however that where the implementation context demands co-governance and co-determination of policy outcomes it may be important to create structures that will be able to provide oversight while simultaneously promoting self-governance within the network.

## **5.1 Definition**

The concept of social capital appears to pose immense definitional problems to scholars. This may have to do with the fragmentation of current thinking on this concept (Georgi, 2001, 17). Georgi, in her attempt to define the roles of both social capital and human capital, she finds that fragmentation of thinking around these concepts has come to limit the definitional capacity of scholars. I shall not delve into the plethora of definitions that have been proposed, rather, I elect to provide

definitions by Putnam (1993), Coleman (1988) Woolcock and Narayan (2000). These are more relevant to this project. According to Putnam it refers to features of social organization such as trust, norms, and networks that can improve the efficiency of society by facilitating coordinated action (Putnam, 1993, 167). Coleman, on the other hand, conceives of social capital as a conceptual tool that can be used to explain particular social relations. It is also a resource for persons and that it inheres in the structure of relations between actors and among actors (Coleman, 1988, 96). It is a set of norms and networks created for facilitating some behaviour while constraining some.

Woolcock and Narayan (2000) state that it refers to the norms and networks that enable people to act collectively (Woolcock and Narayan, 2000, 226). I now turn to Woolcock and Narayan's discussion of the concept of social capital especially with reference to the different perspectives on to social capital. They will show that while tight intra-community (bonding) relations may be important for coherence in networks, it might also be detrimental to development efforts when it promotes parochial relations. They will then state that good governance demands the broadening of policy-making opportunities so that processes are more participatory and open.

A sociological definition of the concept would say it relates to the notion that "a person's family, friends constitute an important aspect, one that can be called on in a crisis, enjoyed for its own sake" (p. 226). These authors hold the view that the notion can be extended beyond individuals to cover groups as well. They propose then that those communities endowed with a diverse stock of social capital in the form of networks and norms "are in a stronger position to fight poverty and vulnerability ...resolve disputes ...and take advantage of new opportunities" (p. 226). This definitional bases is constructed in order to focus attention to sources rather than consequences of social capital while acknowledging the extent to which social capital is a product of "iterative processes".

Different scholars have researched the development uses of social capital. They are guided, in those endeavours, by different approaches. Woolcock and Narayan (2000) suggest that communitarian; network; institutional; and synergy perspectives have

primarily influenced these scholars. These are however not discussed in this thesis. Instead I focus briefly on what Woolcock and Narayan see as the forms of social capital. The aim is two-fold — to find out which form(s) of social capital has the potential to serve policy making best, and whether there can be possibilities for the simultaneous activation of a number of forms rather than just one. Social capital can express itself in two ways. One is *bonding* social capital, and the other is *bridging* social capital. The former concerns norms and engagements at the level of intra-community ties, and the latter concerns the social capital characterising inter-community relations.

### **Woolcock and Narayan (2000)**

Woolcock and Narayan are of the opinion that too much of the intra-community form of social capital without an adequate amount inter-community social capital could arrest developmental impacts associated with an appropriate balance between the two (p. 230). They say, following a network view to social capital:

Without weak intercommunity ties, such as those cross various social divides based on religion, ethnicity, gender and socioeconomic status, strong horizontal ties can become a basis for the pursuit of narrow sectarian interests (p. 230)

According to Woolcock and Narayan, this highlights the existence of both virtuous and vicious forms of social capital in different nations. For example, while there may be a need for strong intra-community social capital, it might impair the formation developmentally necessary bridging social capital, defined in inter-community ties. This complexity, the authors argue, is one of the reasons why it is difficult to carry out policy analysis and to formulate general social theory focusing on social capital.

The institutional approach holds that the vibrancy of civic organizations and networks is a product of the legal and the institutional context. Collective action as a manner of expressing “the vitality of community networks of civil society” is thus a result of the quality of formal institutions, which on their own also need internal coherence, credibility, competence and accountability to civil society. In other words formal and informal institutions mutually reinforce each other (p. 234). The synergy view,

according to Woolcock and Narayan, has developed as response to weaknesses of the approaches described above. It is premised on these assumptions:

- That the behavioural impacts of public and non-public actors may vary regarding achievement of developmental goals.
- That complementarities and partnerships are needed in order to promote broad-based sustainable development. Enabling the policy-making environment through developmental research and practice may lead to the formation of synergies. This means providing the necessary enabling mechanisms for bridge-building between networks outside government and those representing government. Accordingly, civic-public, public-private, and civic-private relations of cooperation should influence the nature and qualities of governance.
- That good governance and high levels of bridging social capital determine the extent to which complementarities, economic prosperity, and social order can persist in society. This implies that bridging social capital and good governance are complementary.

In order to achieve developmental objectives in contexts where large numbers of people are excluded from processes of policy management and governance, it is important for disadvantaged groups and activists to establish “broad coherent coalitions ... and nurture relations with allies in positions of power” (p. 238). This also becomes crucial in curbing latent conflict and could thus enable developmental programmes. The synergy view places these challenges to scholars and practitioners of development as some of the common needs of

1. A need to identify the nature and the extent of community social relationships and formal institutions and the interaction between them
2. A need for the development of institutional strategies based on these social relations, particularly the extent of bonding and bridging social capital
3. A need to determine how the positive manifestations of social capital cooperation, trust, and institutional efficiency can offset parochial forms of social capital (p. 238)

The pursuance of common objectives by the public and the non-public sector through common fora enables the use of social capital as a means for mediating between the



sectors. Woolcock and Narayan argue that the construction of social capital is “an inherently contentious and political process” (p. 238). The “contentious” and “political nature of the process has to do with the propensity for the construction process to promote sectarianism, isolationism and corruption. It could be said that this would be a result of too much intra-community social capital and too little bridging social capital and might be dangerous for the effective governance and the management of policy. More of the synergy approach is discussed below.

## 5.2 The purposeful creation of social capital

### Montgomery (2000, p227-243)

According to arguments made by the proponents of social capital it may be crucial to note, Montgomery points out, that the improvements at macro-level which are attributed to social capital may be important indicators of its relevance to “decision-making politics or the prosperity associated with other forms of collective or entrepreneurial behaviour” (p. 229). Social capital can thus be seen as an important element in public policy. Its predictability is reinforced by perceptions that it is a stable by-product of known actions and forces, its deliberate creation notwithstanding.

Among the most appealing of the findings is that actions of cooperation with others tend to encourage nice responses ... this cycle of positive expectations suggests that certain outcomes will occur in the appearance of social capital. Expectations of predictable outcomes can also enter into a virtuous cycle, transforming themselves into self-fulfilling prophecies (p. 230)

This however does not exclude the fact that social capital can breed exclusive behaviour among those that hold it.

Montgomery posits that because social capital is “a stable product of known actions”, it can be purposefully created to facilitate effective policy-making (p. 229). Its policy relevance derives essentially from its predictability, given that it can be traced to known actions and forces.

Among the most appealing of the findings is that actions of cooperation with others tend to encourage nice responses... This cycle of positive expectations suggests path dependence, in this case the probability that certain outcomes can also enter into a virtuous cycle, transforming themselves into self-fulfilling prophecies (p. 230).



He acknowledges that the generation of social capital “may have been inadvertent or a consequence of causal ordinary organizational purposes”, but this should deter efforts aimed at using it for these purposes. Furthermore strengthening social capital is testimony to the possibilities of purposeful action. However, using social capital for policy purposes may not be easy for policy practitioners because of the different opportunities and constraints its formation might be faced with in a society. This could be related issues of capacity and a broad co-alignment of goals at the level of actors brought into policy processes. Nevertheless strategic agreements can be struck between government and the private or civic sectors as a tapping into social capital of organizations (networks) in these.

Concerning leadership, he argues that effective leadership is definable in terms of its ability to navigate institutions through the different collective action problems emanating from processes of social capital formation. It is at times extremely difficult for the leadership of even the largest and most powerful organizations to carry out this task, because of the nature of the internal and external dynamics of these organizations. The amount of internal cohesion can be a factor capable of blocking the extent to which organizations can be swayed in any meaningful way. Accordingly, “changing them is an art form requiring adaptation as well as persuasion” (p.232). This in a sense brings to the fore questions about the extent to which one can rely on public-civic networks already discussed in the chapters above given such dynamics.

Governmental organizations involved in networks of this kind could on occasion be led to abandon particularly important policy objectives and plans in their attempts to satisfy elements with which they operate in partnership.

The uses of social capital to affect both internal and external policies often requires compromise among the interests of individual members and groups. Compromise is an essential element in sustaining leaders because of the diverse and changing interests of the groups being courted.

This argument reiterates Kooiman’s (1999) assumption (highlighted above) concerning the degree to which diversity in society could impact on policy-making processes. In democratic, plural societies, leaders can attempt to mobilise popular support for policy proposals, by facilitating the building of bridges between

organizations with similar interests. This is meant to co-align goals not only between public organizations and those outside government but also between actors outside government, even for a short period. This could serve to mitigate the negative impacts of diversity.

The targeted organizations are usually made to transcend narrow organizational interests for the purpose of encouraging “popular involvement in local policy ventures to levels of support for higher causes”. What makes it difficult for leaders in pluralistic societies to obtain overall support for their proposals, is the very plurality of organizations, and their varied interests and priority preferences.

In its attempts to attract the support of civic organizations, including organised business, government may have to do so while simultaneously acknowledging that they had “to act on their own right as they carry out new responsibilities”. Collaboration between government and these organizations may be based on legal contracts or they may be based on informal arrangements. The suitability of either informal arrangements or contractual agreements as implementation strategies may be dependent on the nature of the context. This may imply that a particular context under which implementation occurs will inform the strategies selected for policy implementation. Further, it may also imply that the specification of actors and the nature of the relationship between government and elements outside government, is a difficult task for the leading network. This should affect the extent to which these arrangements could be informal or formal.

Some of the organizations entering into various partnerships with government may be organised along horizontal and informal, lines of communication and accountability. The extent to which transfers of social capital between public organizations and civic organizations are possible is a question not explored in thesis and perhaps horizontal structures of accountability between actors. The following section attempts instead, to look into extent to which social capital affects the improvement of economic factors and the extent to which the relation can be mutually reinforcing. The idea is understand the extent to which social capital can be used to improve macro elements of society. This includes institutional performance issues and the extent of civic involvement in improving the performance of institutions of governing and

development institutions. This is studied from the point of view of Putnam (1993) and Yongming (2000), who arrive at different conclusions on this matter. Putnam concludes that the vibrancy of civil society and the social capital that sustains this vigour of civil society are crucial for the improvements mentioned above. He claims, in fact, that improvement macro level in society are likely to lead to improvements in the level of shared social capital.

### **5.3 Economic determinism**

#### **Putnam (1993)**

This section attempts to understand whether a positively linear relationship exists between economic development and institutional performance. It also asks the question whether the relationship is mutually reinforcing between these two variables. For that purpose I review two scholarly works produced on this and a related problematic. The first concerns a study by Putnam (1993) on the reasons for disparity (economic and social-political) between the northern regions and the southern regions of Italy. In this study, Putnam discovers that the disparities between these regions relate to the extent of the distribution of norms of solidarity, mutual trust, and reciprocity (moral resources) among the peoples of those regions. He concludes that although institutional performance could be a factor in determining economic development, it remains secondary to social capital defined by the norms and solidarity mentioned above. He even poses that economic development also plays a secondary role in the determination of institutional effectiveness. He proposes, therefore that it is these norms that determine the extent of not only institutional success, but that economic development is equally dependent on the abundance of norms.

The core elements of his conclusions are reviewed in this chapter. The point made from the reading of Yongming's (2000) views on this subject, is that context is very important in determining the extent to which these factors determine changes in each other. The study by Yongming is based in China and examines the emergence of an entrepreneurial class in that country and the extent to which it was state or civic led. Yongming looks also at the extent to which economic development improves institutional performance and vice versa. The aim of the exercise is to understand the

extent to which civil society is favourably predisposed, by virtue of intra-community solidarity shared history, and norms.

### **Putnam (1993)**

Putnam examines the causes for the effective performance of democratic institutions. He aims to show that “moral resources” such as social capital can be determinants of prosperity. He explains these requirements via a study on the rise of democratic regional governments in Italy. Social capital according to Putnam was the main determinant for the political and economic development of the regions of northern Italy. These regional governments had been formalised in the 1970s through the creation of twenty regional governments as a response to the inabilities and ineffectiveness of central government policy making, especially in the fields of public health and safety (p. 4). He nevertheless, finds enormous disparity in the extent to which development policy goals were realised through the decentralisation of authority in both the regions in the North of Italy and those in the South. According Putnam, these differences (in economic and social and political development) were traceable to particular aspects of the developmental history of these regions, especially with regard to social structure and cultural aspects of society. It is this question that is central to his study of the Italian case:

What are the conditions for creating strong, responsive, effective representative institutions? (p. 6).

In other words failure of public policy is here attributed primarily to factors produced by history and social context.

Putnam (1993), whose work is not reviewed here, poses that wealth and economic development cannot be seen as primary determinants of institutional success (Putnam, 1993, 86). He is of the opinion that institutional performance and socio-economic modernity might be related in a mutually reinforcing manner. He acknowledges, however that other factors might be as important, if not more important. He insists, in fact, that cultural factors such as norms and mutual engagements produced by decades and centuries of collective action, remain the most reliable determinants of institutional performance. The maturation of mere kin-conditioned forms of social ties must result in sustainable “civic community” (vibrant civic networks).



His explanation of the notion of civic community is related here with a view to placing citizens at the forefront of institutional change and institutional success. He claims that, citizens in a civic community, are not entirely altruistic in nature, but may hold 'self-interest that is alive to the interest of others' (p. 88). In a civic community citizens respect the rights of others and the relations within which citizens are bound to each other are horizontal relations of reciprocity and cooperation and not hierarchy and dependency. The leadership in these communities are responsive to the needs of their fellow citizens.

Civic community is also characterised by virtues of solidarity, trust and tolerance even where diversity of interests persists. He claims that, self-interest in civic community is 'embedded in social networks that foster mutual trust' (p. 89). It is trust that enables citizens in civic community to forgo opportunism and defection. Civil associations embody norms and values of civic community. These associations contribute to the effectiveness and stability of democratic government because of their internal effects on individual members and because of their external effects on the wider polity (p. 89). The internal effects are such that skills of cooperation as well as a sense of shared responsibility are inculcated for collective effort. Associationism also serves to build manners of self-government (p. 90).

In order to measure the extent, to which civic community contributes to institutional success, Putnam employs four indicators, which include vibrancy of associational life, newspaper readership, and preference ballot and referenda turnout. He finds these indicators highly correlated and combines them to form one index. He is made to conclude that the differences in institutional success between regions relates to extent to which these factors were played out in different regions.

As our image of the civic community presumes our four indicators are in fact highly correlated, in the sense that regions with high turnout for referenda and low use of the preference ballot are virtually the same regions with a closely woven fabric of civic associations and a high incidence of newspaper readership (p. 96).

The most civic regions have for example, experienced the highest levels of associational involvement, shown by the proliferation of associations in the more successful regions compared to other regions with lower levels. In fact, vertical

patron-client networks plagued the least civic regions and citizens were only drawn to political issues for personal advantage.

By contrast, in the least civic regions such as Calabria, voters are brought to the polls not by issues, but by hierarchical patron-client networks. An absence of civic associations and a paucity of local media in these latter regions mean that citizens there are rarely drawn into community affairs (p. 97).

It is the civiness of the regions of the North that made their governments more successful and speeded up their economic advancement. The chain of causality begins therefore, with the civiness of processes of change rather than the economy. The regions of the South were greatly affected by personalistic patron-client relations and saw not much institutional progress. Putnam points out that, because politics in the South were characterised largely by personalistic interests and dependency, they remained elitist and the elitism permeated all the communities (p. 101). The leadership in the North, however, espoused more egalitarian norms and were much closer to their communities. The leaders in the more civic regions were more enthusiastic supporters of political equality than their counterparts in the less civic regions.

The effectiveness of institutions is closely connected to the extent of interdependency and the degree to which these relations are horizontal or vertical (p. 105). Leadership in the more civic regions remains not only egalitarian and somehow responsive to popular needs, but also shows a readiness to compromise and avoid conflicts of interests. The civic regions are characterised by openness to partisanship, such that the leadership in these regions shows a readiness to collaborate with others without feeling threatened (p. 105).

In terms of the enforceability of rules and regulation, and compliance or non-compliance, citizens in civic regions showed more willingness to obey rules that they have imposed on themselves. In turn these citizens expected their governments to follow high standards (p. 111). The civiness that described communities in the North, has led to the notion among citizens that once there are particular rules to be followed, these will be followed. The less civic regions are different in the sense that such mutual expectations are minimal and third party enforcement is the only solution to problems of collective action. This is because everyone expects everyone else to

violate the rules. This is so because in the less civic regions there is a lack of horizontal bonds of collective responsibility (p. 112).

Parallel to the growth and deepening of civicness would be growth of commerce .In other words the civicness that developed in northern Italy reinforced commercial development as much as economic growth would strengthen civic community

Intimately associated with expansion of civic republicanism was a growth in commerce. As civil order was established, bold and ambitious merchants expanded their trading networks, first in the regions around each state and gradually to the farthest reaches of the known world... for markets of this complexity to evolve, closely integrated communities of traders were crucial, able to sustain legal or quasi-legal institutions to settle disputes, exchanger information and share risks. The prosperity produced by trade helped in turn to shape and sustain the civic institutions and the public. (p. 127).

Commercial advancement was dependent on trust because as Putnam points out banking and long-distance trade were founded on particular credit and saving mechanisms .The provision of efficient credit' required mutual trust and confidence that contracts and the laws governing them would be impartially enforced', such that the costs of transacting between agents would remain within reason. On the other hand Putnam points out that the institutions of civic republicanism, the networks of associations and the bridging of kinship ties were crucial for trust and confidence to flourish (p. 128). The above serves this to expand, indeed to deepen the understanding concerning the mutually reinforcing relationship between the civicness of the communal republics and the requirements for economic growth and development especially where civic community can be seen to reduce the problems of collective action while increasing the readiness to collaborate for mutual benefit.

The implementation of public policy is rendered better by capacity and the costs of enforcing laws are greatly reducible by the extent of collaboration and the mutual trust that is derived from such collaboration.

In this rich civic soil sprouted numerous innovations in business practices, which helped generate the affluence, public and private, of Renaissance Florence and her neighbours...through these and other mechanisms, even small savers were enabled to invest in larger commercial enterprises.... In sum in the communal republics of northern medieval Italy, vast improvements norms and networks of civic engagement. Revolutionary changes in the fundamental institutions of political and economics arose of this unique social context, with its horizontal ties of collaboration and civic solidarity, and in

turn those political and economic advances reinforced the civic community (pp. 128-129).

The southern territories were marked by interpersonal relationships not based on horizontal cooperation, but vertically structured relationships, hence the dependency and exploitation of lower classes. These were used for both economic and political aims. The poor in order to survive were forced into patron client ties, such that their participation in matters of government could be guaranteed only by their resigned submission to those at the top of the political ladder.

### **Yongming (2000)**

The author attempts to make a case concerning for successful government intervention in the formation of social capital. In his work on state-society social capital Yongming attempts to contribute to a different understanding regarding the formation of social capital and what its implications for policy are. In the same article he also attempts to shed “some light on civil society and the state in contemporary China. At the onset of this effort the author departs quite substantially from Putnam regarding the nature of causality between social capital and economic development. He claims that social capital has in China been determined more by economic development than the reverse chain suggested by Putnam, that is, that social capital conditioned the growth of the Italian economy and also led to democratic consolidation defined within a framework of the development of political institutions.

One of the most profound changes brought about by China’s phenomenal economic growth in the past twenty years is the increasing degree of social diversification including the breakdown of old social hierarchy, greater mobility among existing social strata, the rise of new social groups correspondingly the appearance of numerous civic organizations (p. 323).

The author also mentions that the emergence and the consolidation of an entrepreneurial class are illustrative of improvements in state civil society relations over several decades.

Yongming acknowledges that state-society relations are not always a zero sum game, but can be mutually reinforcing depending on the conditions of the times. It is emphasised however that these changes in state society relations were governed mainly by economic development. Thus while be true that the Italian economy of the



Northern regions has grown as a result of the thickening of civil society, it can be noticed that in other social political environments commerce can play a crucial role in promoting overall social development. In China social space and was opened up by economic reform.

According to Yongming it is equally important to note the important role that can be played by the state in opening up space for civic mobilisation and economic development. The development of an entrepreneurial class, which later became champions of civil resurgence, is said to have developed as a result of state intervention in the economy of China.

The role of the state in allowing entrepreneurs to gain identity and legitimacy should not be neglected. As recognition of their indispensable role in economic reform, the state has made efforts to keep entrepreneurs in the mainstream of political life. The number of individual laborers and private entrepreneurs has rapidly increased in the People's Congress and Political Consultative Conference (p. 335).

#### **5.4 State-led social capital formation (in Japan)**

This section attempts to understand the degree to which social capital can be recreated by the state for purposes of improving development policy. I also attempt to illustrate that social capital also has its limitations as a resource, such that its creation, distribution and use, needs to be constantly monitored.

##### **Hefron (2000)**

Hefron in this work focuses on the degree to which social capital can be created in the short-run for developmental aims. He mentions that the reason for the rise to importance of the notion that social capital may have to be created in the short run rather than waiting for natural historical unfolding to fashion, as Putnam inclines to believe, relates to a need to construct relatively stable community structures.

Today trust and cooperation are rarely viewed as natural forces embedded in or expressive of the human condition or in *a priori* notions of community. The groups and associations as well as the individual behaviours from which these qualities spring, are temporary and contingent. They can as easily be unmade and the world reduced in the next instant to relative anarchy and anomie (p. 478).

It is not only the unpredictability of these complex societies, or the discontents of community building that have brought about the resurgence of this need to construct social cohesion, but also included here is the notion that associational life is at a decline and modernisation has come with its own negative externalities that, therefore, call for the revitalisation of communities for development related policy ends.

Hefron mentions however that processes aimed at politically reconstructing society and the social capital that must bind communities together have produced their own types of externalities. These externalities positive or negative can be seen to derive from pre-existing forms of social capital, which at times could have such negative externalities as to produce cases of extreme “group conformity and exclusivism”. Hefron looks at the policy-making effectiveness of social capital from a number of levels discussed hereunder. The first relates to how different forms and different degrees of social capital affect policy.

Public access to these resources is conditioned upon the kind and degree of social capital, that is, whether it is of the bonding type (and therefore more particularistic and ungrown) or of the bridging type (more expansive and accustomed to working through ‘networks’ of trust and cooperation); whether its ties are strong (intensive and repeated) or weak (temporary and contingent); vertical (operating through formal hierarchical structures) or horizontal (in which authority is more decentralized); open (civically engaged and exercising membership); geographically dispersed or circumscribed; and instrumental (membership as social collateral for individual wants) or principled (membership as bounded solidarity) (p. 481).

The author mentions that it is crucial for policy-makers to know these variables so that interventions made in the promotion of social capital will be informed about the likely effectiveness of the interventions.

An incorrect reading of the dimensions of social capital existing in Japan, and an inability to convert existing forms of social capital into policy effective forms caused a loss of popular support, an inability to retain government ministers, economic recession, and mounting business and labour unrest. In other instances depending on the extent of centralisation and decentralisation of policy processes and structures, social capital can be used to effect growth in the economy where it can be used for its gluing or its lubricating effects in society.

Ethnically based social networks have had both gluing and lubricating effects on transborder trade and industrial relations, facilitating stronger business-

state ties, which in turn have led to more efficient and responsive policy-making at a local level (p. 482).  
This can be said to form positive social capital, which could be effective in development policy.

An opposite case cited by Hefron pertains to the degree to which government could sponsor other initiatives which may have a rather a debilitating effect on existing social capital. This is said to have happened in Bangladesh when government set up farmer's cooperatives in the rural areas to boost productivity at the expense of existing modes of production and existing social capital.

Government-sponsored cooperatives settled over the spontaneous social energies of the poor like a hard veneer, trapping indigenous sources of social capital in a web of bureaucratic entanglements (p. 482).  
Hefron insists nevertheless that for governmental assistance to be worthwhile what is required is for civil society to be effective in how it involves itself in policy matters.

Community groups must first demonstrate their effectiveness — in achieving their own purposes but also more importantly the purposes of others — before their value can to larger public purposes can be taken for granted (p. 483).

Public policy could at times lead to the destruction of existing social capital as has been mentioned in the previous passage. In some ways promises of economic gain can lead to such a situation. This is possible for example in instances where governments in their bid to increase economic growth, move to place at the helm of commercial prospecting the resources historically used to bind people together. In the case of the Onge people in rural India, poor policy design caused the loss of cohesion among these largely traditional people by allowing commercial interests to come between them.

For the indigenous Onge community of the Nicobar and Andaman Islands, sitting on a pharmaceutical treasure chest of medicinal native plants and herbs, contact with the outside world of formal patent and intellectual property right laws, commercial contracts, and licensing agreements has proved a harrowing one. Not only has it forced the Onge a small, endangered tribe of 103 people, to confront questions of heritage that normally would never have occurred within their seamless society; the promise of economic gain has forced hard new choices upon individual members of the tribe (p. 483).  
This proved to be divisive in the sense that it meant particular classes would gain more from such policy demands on them were the people of this tribe to accede to them.

The third case refers to the spread and consolidation of social capital. Inter-group ties can be promoted by the state produce forms of social capital that meet a bridging dimension and thus less parochial. This effort can as well be important for the creation of policy relevant social capital. In other instances however this can lead to the production of dependencies between groups, and therefore a dissipation of social capital. The irony comes when it is considered as supporters of social capital make us believe, that social capital increases with bridging use which may imply that any collaboration between groups with diverse interests and backgrounds would increase and strengthen the existing social capital of the collaborating groups.

The author mentions that by decentralising decision-making and other public functions to elements in civil society and business, state-society social capital could result, and further improvements in policy-making institutions could obtain. This is contrary to what Pressman and Wildavsky at the beginning of this project have been seen to argue about implementation. Pressman and Wildavsky are of the opinion that implementation needs to be centralised for it to be effective. Hefron argues that:

There is evidence that individual- and firm-level social capital in these areas has reshaped business-state relations and created favourable government practices leading in turn to more balanced, responsive, and effective economic policies (p. 489).

The author mentions in relation to project design and implementation that the process needs to be “open, informative, and broadly participatory” while taking into account the full range of types of social capital.

## **5.5 Its context dependence**

### **Foley and Edwards (1999)**

Social capital, according to Foley and Edwards should be approached from the perspective that it is context-dependent. This decision is reached from a reading of both social structural as well as social-cultural interpretations of the concept. The former approach suggests that social capital is neither understood solely as “resources in general, attitudes and norms such as trust and reciprocity nor should it be understood as networks and associations”, as would the social-cultural dimension in both cases, but that an understanding of these aspects should be combined with an understanding of how these are affected by the context within which they prevail.



The key to understanding how social relations facilitate individual and collective actions lies in a conception of social capital that recognizes the dependence of its 'use value' and 'liquidity' on the specific social context on which it is found (p. 146).

They mention that the context-dependence of social capital also affects access to resources and the equitability of the distribution of those resources. This they mention is a point missed by Coleman and Putnam in their analysis of the resource's relevance to social needs. It is in that way therefore that the authors posit the context-dependency of social capital.

In other words according to them, a realisation from scholars that social capital is not an independent but a dependent variable carries the likelihood that it will be seen to depend on context for its broad objectification as a resource. This context includes, among other factors, the regulatory instruments in place and overall access of participants to resources of the network.

The authors approach the subject of social capital from the premise that the idea of "generalised trust" may be irrelevant to development studies and practice. While there is no doubt that trust of some sort is crucial to many social relations, there is little evidence that greater or lesser proportions of a population expressing themselves as trustful of people in general has any bearing on the health of democracy or the prospects for economic achievement in a given country (p. 158).

Social trust, according to these authors can work well for others while leaving others in the lurch. Cooperation can be achieved not necessarily through trust alone, but could as well be a result of governmental regulatory practices. Trust, in order to be effectively used in the policy process, must be accompanied by both an access to resources. They propose that such a framework would be comprehensive if it emphasised the notion that access to networks is not an end in itself, but should also mean access to resources. They point out that the context-dependent conceptualisation of social capital would be able to explain it as access plus resources, such that social capital is not seen as a matter of access alone. In that way social capital becomes an access to resources.

The idea of seeing social capital largely within a framework that is social-structural is useful because it operationalises social capital as social networks, organizations or linkages between individuals and/or organizations. These are context dependent based

on the assumption that “social capital at any given level depends on the larger context, including the insertion of the individual or group into networks at higher levels”. It may be important to note that the authors see networks not as inherently good in themselves but rely more on the context within which they operate.

As a unit of social structure analysts must consider the social location of those networks (e.g., how the network itself is embedded in broader patterns of inequality) and the attributes of those networks (e.g., horizontal vs. vertical). Both factors can be expected to influence the type and value of resources accessible through a given network. These two features of social networks are analytically distinct from the network attributes of the specific individuals (e.g., the number and the breadth of ties, or centrality) comprising the network. A given individual in a network could be described, for instances in terms of the number of ties they have to others, whether those ties integrate them further into the network or link them to the broader social field (p. 158).

They point out further, that the amount of access to resources that an individual may have by virtue of participation in networks is dependent on two conditions. These include the structure of the network and the individual’s precise position within the network. The second condition pertains to the social location of the entire network within the broader socio economic context shaping the degree to which they link or cannot link their members to resources. More importantly, the authors think, that combined with the significance of the actors access to resources, the quality and quantity of accessible resources, is the degree of the embeddedness of the network within a broader system of stratification, that is, how and why different networks provide access to richer or poorer stores of resources.

The individualistic conception of social capital and how it functions has been seen by the authors to emanate primarily from reliance on survey data which leads researchers to conceive of social capital as “something that inheres in individuals”. In other words “social capital is treated as an individual attribute that constitutes a fully portable resource, the value of which does not fluctuate as the individual moves in and out of numerous social contexts”. This is one of the areas of contention against Putnam’s thesis, where individuals seem to carry social capital wherever they go if they had been exposed to it before. That is not the case according to Foley and Edwards. In a sense these authors follow Coleman’s suggestion concerning the limited fungibility of social capital. It inheres only in specific social relations and therefore cannot be said

to obtain the same results each time an individual encounters particular conditions, no matter how similar they may be to conditions under which it was employed before.

Putnam's tendency the study reviewed here is that of operationalising social capital "in terms of individual subjective states measured at the aggregate level". This creates a difficult situation in a sense that it renders it impossible to assess the degree of integration enjoyed by a given group". It may be assumed through the understanding gleaned concerning generalised trust that because people trust each other they will therefore participate in the same political activities and will also draw the same amount of trust from their political leadership given their trust in not only their fellow community members, but also their political leaders. According to the authors this may not necessarily be the case if all the trusting and the trusted parties are not integrated and therefore not holding the same views about specific political matters. They argue that there is therefore no reliable correlation between levels of social trust and trust in government across nations".

Coleman (1988) perceives of social capital as existing in attitudes and norms such as trust and reciprocity and "featured alongside social networks as ingredients enabling a society to undertake collective action". It is however not embedded in individuals but in social relations. In other words a given form of social capital may not always facilitate the production of benefits that it had been able to produce in any other previous relationships between particular people.

Coleman highlights the sense in which concrete social relationships can give individuals access to crucial resources not otherwise available despite ample endowments of human or financial capital (144).

The issue of appropriability is one of the issues where Coleman's (1988) thesis differs from that of Putnam. Concerning this matter Coleman proposes that associations can through their evolution take up different issues from the ones they were initially created for as an investment in social capital. Their appropriability could even be an intentional cover in an investment imperative. The authors caution though, that contrary to the views of scholars such as Putnam and political scientists in his fold of thinking, associational density should not be seen as necessarily enough.

Social institutions must be appropriable by individuals and groups to be really 'social capital'; their use value as social capital will be multiplied to the extent

that they enable multiple linkages across communities and beyond them ... Social networks may limit members' connections with wider community; they may include some and exclude others; they may serve selfish and/or anti-social as well as public ends ... and they may battle one another furiously over the nature of the public good (p. 155).

Putnam's study on the Italian reform process fails to account for the extent to which social organizations existing at mainly local levels manage to transcend their localised boundaries to assume much broader roles for themselves. Putnam's thesis seems to be hamstrung by a lack of structural conceptions with much wider analytical implications. There are studies according to Foley and Edwards, which have been able to show how this is made possible. These studies they mention, "demonstrate the potential of structural conceptions of social capital to explain meso-level social, political and economic outcomes". Such analysis as is here supported creates scope for conceptions that suggest potential for short-run deliberate creation of more politically and developmentally relevant social capital. This deviates from Putnam's conception of social capital in which it is argued that it can only develop as a result of many decades, and centuries of formation and thus remains difficult to change in the short-run (Putnam, 1993).



## **Chapter 6: Public-civic synergy**

The previous chapter is an attempt to search for the policy uses of social capital both as a conceptual tool (Coleman, 1988) and as a resource for implementation. Can the frameworks within which different scholars have employed the concept be employed to facilitate local accountability? Local accountability can be seen to be relevant for sustained interactions between elements in civil society and those of government. This point is confirmed by Lam, (1996); Ostrom, (1996); Fox, (1996); Evans, (1996); and White and Robinson, (1999) who have shown through varying case examples researched in different policy fields and in different country contexts. They have, drawing from assumptions by scholars such as Putnam, been made to conclude that when used to bridge relationships that are parochial it can serve to facilitate the entrenchment of such accountability. Unlike Putnam however they have argued that social capital can be created in the short-run to strengthen government endeavour especially through participatory processes. This chapter will show that at times the participation of public officials in civic and privately initiated processes is a means of embedding themselves in local communities served by the policies they make. The cases will also show that collaboration between public officials and citizens and elements of civil society may offer the public service local knowledge and area specific information which may be crucial for the effective implementation of policy.

Lam (1996) argues, like Colebatch (2002), that vertical and horizontal organizational arrangements can be combined to produce effective policy processes. This is more visible in the nature of relationships between Irrigation Associations at Headquarters and officials at working stations in Taiwan. Scholars such as Evans (1996), Yongming (2000), Hefron (2000), Broadbent (2000) and White and Robinson have advanced similar arguments in relation to how civil society needs to be enabled to participate meaningfully along side the public sector in the implementation process. It will be seen in the discussion below that although social capital formation can be investigated from different perspectives, a common conclusion is that where participants in the process of social capital formation are aware and careful of the devious uses of social capital, major progress can be attained. This is likely the case in the facilitation of both economic development and democratic consolidation.

This chapter therefore explores the notion that government-civil society relations can be mutually empowering (Migdal, 1996 and Chazan, 1996). It will be realised that the arguments made by Putnam especially concerning the advantages of social capital have largely been restricted to civil society and thus creating an impression that these norms are profitable only to civil society. In this chapter they are perceived to be potentially applicable to the relationships at the intersection between government and civil society. In fact it is suggested here that the very sustainability of such relations could be furthered by the creative employment of these norms, in order to bring about accountable, efficient, effective and responsive public policy and delivery of services. It is for this reason that the concept of synergy is introduced in this section to refer to mutually empowering relations between government and elements of civil society.

Some of the previous chapters have laid emphasis on the need for the building (and strengthening) of capacity for the achievement of the objectives of public policy and this has concentrated largely on the capacities required at the level of public sector networks, that is, within government. The latter sections have alluded to the need for such capacitating to happen even at the civic level and Putnam is emphatic on this point. However, not much is said concerning government-civil society social capital. The main areas of departure pertain to complementarities and embeddedness discussed as potential for synergy. In regard to this issue this chapter will begin by presenting Evans's point of view.

## **“Short-run constructability”**

**Evans (1996)**

Complementarity and embeddedness are both forms of synergy, and could appear simultaneously to reinforce each other in the processes of development work. Complementarity is defined as mutually reinforcing relationships between government and civil actors.

It suggests a clear division of labour, based on the contrasting properties of public and private institutions. Governments which complement inputs more efficiently delivered by private actors. Putting the two kinds of input together results in greater output than either public or private sectors could deliver on their deliver on their own (p. 1120).

Governments, in their endeavour to promote developmental work performed by organizations and individuals outside of the state, serve to create an enabling environment. This is evident for instance when government, lays down and enforces the rules for cooperative engagement and exchange between government and non-governmental actors, the creation and diffusion of new knowledge, providing an enabled environment for media publicity and other such 'intangible' collective goods including good government. In turn, the provision of tangible and intangible goods serves to facilitate cooperation among civil actors, thus producing further intangibles.

Efficient provision of the tangible main facilities and channels have the intangible consequence of making it more worthwhile for farmers to organize themselves and other kinds of complementarities can also stimulate social capital formation (p. 1121).

Complementarity can thus be seen to transcend its conventionally accepted benefits of simply providing an enabling context for actors outside government. It may serve to produce sustainability of interaction between elements in civil society. Embeddedness on the other hand remains an equally important aspect of synergy, as much as complementarity. First and foremost it is a way of discouraging a purely hands-off approach on the part of government and demands the sharing of responsibility between the government officials and elements in civil society engaged in developmental activity. This sharing of responsibilities should nevertheless be based on some understanding of each other's capacities and weaknesses, such that there is a mutually recognized need for division of labour.

This recognition should be to the advantage of those involved in development projects. It should not be a source of disengagement, nor promote situations where government remained only a supplier of goods and services while maintaining only a hands-off stance with regard to activities that are within the scope of local action (p. 1121). Instead scope exists for the strengthening of ties between public officials and non-public actors. Complementarity should be employed as a way of creating social capital that inheres not just in civil society but in an enduring set of relationships that span the public private divide '(p. 1120).

Social capital is formed by making some who are part of the state apparatus more thoroughly part of the communities in which they work. The networks of trust and collaboration that are created span the public /private boundary and binds the state and civil society together (p. 1122).

Complementarity can also be discovered between embeddedness and complementarity. It may be able to facilitate the building of synergistic relationships, but may not be able to fashion the organizational basis required, because such a basis could be characterised more by added commitment and willingness, and a kind sacrifice more descriptive of organizations involved in of development-inclined organizational settings. In addition, the capacity to monitor implementation and to maintain the condition of delivery systems emerges more in organized entities than in loose unorganised ones. Even with regard to maintenance and operation of particular delivery systems there remains “clear recognition of complementarity between what public agencies can do and what self-organized citizens can do” (p. 1123). The organizations formed in civil society for example would have some inkling of what their overall capacities entailed and what was lacking — something that could not be possible if they were not organized.

The central question answered by Evans regarding the origins of synergistic relationships relates to the degree to which synergy depends on the prior existence of dense social ties and norms of trust and reciprocity affect outcomes. An approach that needs to be employed in response to this question is that of constructibility in which it is posited that ‘synergy can be brought to life by institutionally entrepreneurs’ (p. 1124). That is: “Small-scale success can be achieved even in divided societies without robust institutions” (p. 1130). Caution should nevertheless be taken, because there may be real limits to the extent to which even small-scale success is achievable. A major obstruction to the building of synergy would be brought about by a lack of social capital, but other conditions may as well prevail to prevent the successful building of synergy.

First, social capital endowments in civil society carry the potential for enabling the development of political institutions when civic engagement is seen to apply pressure for changes within these institutions in the direction of producing good government. Good government in turn is meant to facilitate civic engagement. In conditions such as those of developing country environments, difficulties may arise when micro – level ties need to be scaled up ‘to general solidarity ties and social action on a scale



that is politically and economically efficacious. There is little evidence to suggest that prior endowment of norms and networks are the most important determinants in producing synergy and development capacity characteristic of its existence. Studies conducted in various developing world countries show that cooperative patterns of interaction among friends, kin or neighbours no doubt facilitate particular instances of synergy but the stock of social capital is not exceptional (pg11250). It becomes also the responsibility of government actors to raise parochial solidarity to levels germane to the developmental need necessary for the resolution of developmental problems implying recourse to complementarity. In situations where synergy does not materialize from efforts tending in that direction, then other avenues should be explored.

Social and governmental organizations need to be characterized by evidence in order to stave off clientilistic relations with actors outside government. Given the need for bureaucratic intervention in the scaling up of organizations in society and the concomitant need for promoting a more universalistic set of identities' transcending kinship and other parochial community solidarities, it becomes crucial for government organizations to clean themselves up. A different approach would be to decentralize the system of policy making in ways that would facilitate 'inputs from below? The coherence of public institutions can be seen to promote in the sense that it creates confidence among the beneficiaries of public policy while such external confidence in the public sector produces incentives for forward -looking cooperation at local level'. Coherence also causes bureaucracies to look more into creating internal efficiency through 'a well worked hierarchical division of labour and interfering less in local level productive activity except in cases where their intervention is required.

The coherence is strengthened through the establishment of strong internal constraints to ward advances by interests outside of the state off. Improving reward systems involving long-term career benefits can curb corrupting linkages with these interests. Recruitment based on merit, salaries that accord with these merit driven recruitment norms sanctions against violators of performance standards and organizational norms are important in dealing with corrupt practices. Coherence of public institutions can be combined with particular elements of decentralization in order to distribute power

to the non-elite. This could improve public official attitudes towards non-executive officials and also serve the needs of broader society.

Robust sophisticated public institutions are an advantage both in the formation of local social capital and in the pursuit of development ends not because they are instruments of centralization, but because they are capable of formulating more ways of distributing power and therefore of supporting decentralization and openness to local self-organization (p. 1127).

Third it is possible for the accountability of public officials to be tempered with by particular dominant interests outside of the state. These interests may be in conflict with those of the people who must benefit from development-oriented policy making. The aspect of conflicting interests as obstacles to the effective creation of synergistic relations may involve incidences of political competitions, although the competitiveness itself may produce positive externalities. The paradox needs to be explained.

Competition for political dominance may have the advantages of “sustaining commitment of parties” toward organisation and mobilisation for the growth and strength of the organizations created among subordinated groups. Relations between party members and potential recruits could be strengthened. In addition competitiveness may cause increases in responsiveness among government officials as a way of winning and consolidating support to particular official programmes. However, in order to derive synergy political competitiveness should be based on certain rules governing mobilization and attempts aimed at acquiring support for official programmers. The administrative infrastructure should be structured in a way that provides attractive incentives to those charged with the delivery, such that those interested in acquiring control of the political system compete on the basis of the incentives available within this infrastructure.

Inequality in society can be seen to play an important role in blocking the building of synergy. This is especially likely since it impacts negatively on social cohesion in the overall and especially on the formation of social capital within society and synergy between the state and society. Social fragmentation could lead to conflicting interests even in the management of collective problem resolution.

To the extent that egalitarian social structures facilitate synergy, social structure may be an important obstacle to constructing synergistic relations or

at least in constructing such relations with subordinate groups (p. 1128).

The inequalities in society may be biased against synergy between those in power and those that are powerless, but this could be circumvented by the active involvement of elements in government such as reformists, whose task would be to form alliances with the poor. These alliances may mature towards sustainable cooperation with groupings representing the poor. In turn the aspirations of the poor could find representation in the decision-making apparatus of the state. Clientilistic ties between elements in civil society and bureaucracies in Third World countries could be used against the dominance of elite.

For 'normal' Third World state that lack the kind of powerful autonomous bureaucracies that enabled East Asian industrializes to create synergistic ties with entrepreneurial groups, clientilistic capture is the natural consequence of tight public- private ties involving elites. Ties with the poor and powerless are much less threatening to the institutional integrity of state organizations (p. 1129).

On the surface, Evans observes, it may appear impossible to organize for synergy especially in societies characterized by structural inequalities especially in developing countries. He proposes however, that although possibilities might be so bleak as to discourage many a development practitioner, there still remain some possibilities for building synergy in relatively compressed periods of time, even in adverse environments?

They {synergistic successes elsewhere} suggest that even though the social and political context is inauspicious, creative cultural and organizational innovations can still produce results. Sometimes building synergy depends on transforming established worldviews. Sometimes it involves introducing innovative 'soft technologies at the organizational level. Sometimes it involves simply rethinking the nature of the problem that a government agency is trying to address. Any of these strategies can make synergy constructable (p. 1129).

Further the constructability of synergy may depend on the extent to which people are able to construct social identities that accord with the building of synergy. These identities need to be broadly encompassing such that scaling up could occur. This can be seen to imply the building of social capital that bridges parochial differences between people in society. The universalistic identities created allow for communities to cooperate with others on a broader scale. The construction of new identities can be achieved in years rather than decades or centuries? Embeddedness is also important



as a means of creating synergy between state and social elements. Transferring government staff frequently may be disastrous to the building of enduring relations between state and civil society. It therefore becomes essential that permanence of staff is encouraged. Instead of employing frequent transfers as a means of promoting governmental insulation, it might be advantageous to secure it through other means while ensuring the embeddedness of staff members in particular local communities.

Another method of constructing synergy would be to clearly define policy problems such that appropriate mechanisms could be employed in dealing with the problems. Innovation in problem resolution could also imply transferring solutions from one context to another. Caution should, however, be exercised so that such transfers do not backfire, although it may be possible for imported technologies to change the contexts into which they have been transferred meaning therefore that contexts are not necessarily immutable to change based on these transfers.

Synergy can thus be seen to be possible even though conditions may appear initially adverse. The trick is to temper the optimism inherent in a constructability perspective with the legitimate pessimism of contextual constraint (p. 1130). In conclusion, Evans emphasizes the potential for government organizations to foster social capital, which could be achieved by encouraging frequent interactions between people in targeted communities. In order to fashion synergy, governments must also supply inputs to those communities who may not have the capability to produce them on their own, and in turn these communities should be encouraged to supply those inputs much needed by government such a local knowledge and experience. Embedding public officials within the communities they work in, remains crucial for synergistic outcomes. The constructability perspective may be important in two ways.

Theoretically it reinforces the call for an approach to development that is framed in the broadest institutional terms. Nothing else will capture the complicated interactions among social identities, informal norms and networks and formal organizational structures that are involved in creating synergy,. For explanations of development to continue to exclude such institutional factors because they do not lend themselves to well behaved growth models is inexcusable. Synergy is too potent or developmental tool to be ignored by development theories. Like social capital, it magnifies the socially valued output that can be derived from existing tangible assets but that requires minimal material resources (p. 1130).



Secondly, the perspective sounds a clarion call to heed the voices of the poor and powerless communities in their pleas for responsive, efficient, equity driven, representative and effective developmental policymaking practice. The perspective like the approaches presented by Migdal(1994) and Chazan (1994) calls for the desegregation of the state, such that it is seen not as a monolithic entity capable of only zero-sum relations with civil society elements. It takes note therefore of the possibility that even in repressive states there may be elements capable of involving themselves effectively in the resolution of problems affecting the poor and subordinate. It assumes existing potential among state elements to embed themselves within communities in ways that translate into mutual trust, reciprocity a sustainable engagement between state elements and elements in civil society for purposes of development. The state is highlighted as an initial point from which the social capital that transcends the public-private divide can be created in order to lay foundations for more sustainable cooperative development effort. Thirdly, researchers have a role to play in finding stories of success in the formation and practical expression of synergy. Their task is to fathom ways in which knowledge gleaned from their examination of comparative contexts can help steer the development efforts of others.

## **Chapter 7: Further policy implications and conclusions**

### **White and Robinson (1999)**

The emphasis of focus by White and Robinson entails primarily a notion that a pluralisation of service provision and therefore the pluralisation of implementation as a process require effectiveness in coordination, responsiveness to social needs, local accountability, and a participatory in orientation. The aims of these authors' work is to provide a framework for analysis of the possible range of synergistic relationships that emerge in the determination, financing and production of social goods and services (p. 94). They examine two sets of factors affecting the efficacy of government-civil society collaboration. The first set involves structural inequality, the nature of the political regime and the legal framework underpinning operations of the non-governmental sectors. The second examines the capacity and character qualifying the two realms (public and civic).

The authors state that elements forming civil society and falling within the fold of service provision may be characterised by several challenges of capacity such as; inadequate or unstable funding, uneven or unequal coverage, lack of accountability and quality control, internal organizational inefficiencies, duplication, divisiveness or exclusion, and sustainability (p94). It remains important therefore that any attempts to enlist the involvement of these organizations should take note of these weaknesses. Attention should, however be paid to environmental factors that could potentially affect their effective involvement in provision functions. The state can be identified as one such environmental factor.

The state can have a direct influence on the effectiveness of these organizations through its institutions and it can also have an indirect impact through policies and regulations in terms of how these policies affect internal and external markets or distributional patterns. The state can also establish norms and rules that may inhibit particular civic organizational behaviour where this is deemed to promote non-altruistic motives. It may also be possible for the state to fashion collaborative arrangements with civic organizations for the provision of services. Creating such

possibilities involves a complementary relationship between public and civic institutions.

The demand made on the state for reduced intervention especially since the mid-1970s has led to new thinking concerning alternatives for service provision. This thinking has, through time, led to notions of plurality in the provision of services to the extent that the state has come to be seen to reflect weaknesses in areas where non-state actors are stronger. Complementarity can thus be seen to mean the development of enabling environments for collaborative practices between state and civic organizations. It expressed by way of regulation, subsidies, and various forms of contracting. The weakness of such collaborative practice is that involvement of public officials occurs at a distance, without on the spot involvement in the devolved programmes. Inter-institutional complementarity can however be made to endure in conditions of co-production and partnership where such relationships are much closer.

The concept of embeddedness allows for a much broader understanding in terms of how enduring relationships between state and civil society can be created. Synergy, which is defined as mutually reinforcing relations between government and groups of engaged citizens', is strengthened and made sustainable by the element of embeddedness, thus allowing for the state-civic practices that go beyond mere complementarity. Sustainable synergy can thus be seen to combine both complementarity and embeddedness with the aim of facilitating and complimenting divisions of labour between the bureaucracy and local citizens, mutually recognized and accepted by both sides. The social capital that inheres not just in civil society (as Putnam claims) helps to define the embeddedness that characterises sustainable synergy relations.

Synergy can be characterised by joint (co-) determination of what the nature of the service to be provided is and how it should be provided. In other cases it may involve collaborative financing (co-financing) of the services to be provided, or it can imply collaboration at the level of production (co-production) of services, 'involving a commitment of resources and labour time. White and Robinson highlight it, however,

that synergy does not necessarily imply collaboration. It could also involve “pressure exerted by social organizations to stimulate government provision of public goods and enforce government accountability to popular demands for them” (p. 99). The authors mention several other forms of synergistic practice although these are not mentioned in this project. Instead further explication of the three basic elements is presented specifically with the aim of elaborating on the virtues of such enhanced participation and the challenges facing those willing to promote it.

The process of co-determination possesses a potential “feeling of ownership and participation on the part of social groups” and an opportunity to influence policy in a way that would serve to reflect the needs of those served by it. It also allows for participation in the designs of programmes, while also encouraging accountability on the part public official. Co-financing can be seen to respond to imperatives that have to do with tight budgetary control. In this case, unlike in the discourse perspective of new public management, such control is made a joint venture between socially responsible non-state organizations and the state. This permits the creation of broad based incentive systems ‘for economy on the part of both officials and clients’.

Co-production allows for the mobilisation of additional resources. If government were to “go it alone” it would be costly to acquire with potentially devastating consequences to those in need of services. In short this approach departs quite substantively from the rather exclusionary perspective and practices of the new public management discussed by Mackintosh above. It allows for inclusion through decentralisation of process and resource control, increased participation and promotes enterprise as suggested by Mackintosh. Furthermore, it also promotes local accountability through emphasis on embeddedness and social capital creation that bridges the public-civic divide. Above all, synergistic arrangements can be understood to facilitate effective coordination of resource allocation and service provision.

These may seem hefty and infallible arrangements, and there may be specific challenges facing those that wish to implement these solutions to provision problems. What are these challenges and how do they manifest themselves in the policy



management arena? Some of the points made by White and Robinson, it might be noticed, seem to echo Pressman and Wildavsky's arguments regarding causes of policy failure. They also seem to agree with Pressman and Wildavsky on the identification of preconditions for effective implementation. Firstly, regarding financial transfers, they suggest that there may at times be delays in the effecting of such transfers. Related to that, is that the grant awarded may not be sufficient in relation to the costs of service provision, or there may be a lack flexibility on the part of the funding agent (government), or the conditional ties imposed may be too austere. In addition, funds disbursed may not be able to cover maintenance costs. Secondly, the arrangements may be marred by an unclear demarcation of responsibilities leading to inefficiencies in the provision of services. Pressman and Wildavsky insist that a clear specification of participants is crucial from the beginning of the policy process.

Thirdly, and related to the latter, responsibilities for the maintenance and repair of transferred resources may be a problem when no party within the collaborative arrangement has been formally charged with it. The party to whom the resource has been transferred for management may lack the necessary finances to maintain the resources leading to accelerated depreciation of the asset. White and Robinson refer to these as structural problems of coordination, which underlies "the need for more effective working arrangements as a basis for more comprehensive and integrated system" of service provision (p. 101)

Though each specific example of attempted collaboration may involve a wide range of contingent elements, moreover, some of the difficulties involved are structural, reflecting basic contradictions in the process of achieving synergistic co-provision, between types of institutions which operate in characteristically different ways; between social groups with different resources endowments and perspectives; and between political forces with different interests and values (p. 101)

This raises further problems of both theory and practice — problems, which may hamper, if ignored, any attempts towards the building of synergistic approaches. A brief sketch as given by White and Robinson is presented here with a view to understanding how, if at all, they can be resolved. Such understanding may be

important if the aim is to build the social capital necessary for effective implementation of policy.

These problems relate to: inter-organizational conflict resulting from politicisation of processes; complexities of inter-institutional coordination; redesign of state structures to cope with new roles; ideology and values of participating institutions where these conflict with the other's; transformation of civic organization as a consequence of their growth in size and resources or internal shifts of paradigm; and relations of dependence enabling from uneven distribution of resources and power. According to these authors, therefore, complementarity and synergy may be difficult to create in conditions 'ravaged by intense social hostilities, political instability, widespread poverty, repressive states, fiscal indigence and international dependence - problems characteristics of a large number of developing societies.

Certain factors in the make up of society have the potential to disrupt efforts at aimed at the creation of sustainable collaborative service provision strategies. These include divisions based on skewed distribution of power and access to resources or the existence of intense social conflict. These 'socio-political structural variables play a significant role in the maintenance of social cohesion, such that the disruption of social cohesion can be understood to impact directly on collaborative practices. Another (socio-political structural) variable that carries the potential to positively (or negatively) affect the building of synergy relates to the nature of the political regime and specifically the legal framework within which non-state providers operate. This legal framework needs to be qualified by democratisation respect for the rule of law, promotion of political and civil liberties and an overall emphasis on accountability of governmental and political institutions, so as to promote effective state—civil society collaboration. Democratisation, it is emphasised enhances the extent of influence non-state actors may have given the space it provides for inclusion in policy making processes.

The institutional capacity of a society is another important variable determining the nature and efficacy of public-civic collaborative efforts. Collaborative effort between public and civic institutions requires immense capacitation since it covers all three

realms of policy interaction (public, civic, and public-civic interactions). Social capital, it is noted, may not sufficiently explain the extent of the capacity required by civic organizations even though it may be said to be necessary for social cohesion at the level of civil society.

Unless social capital is defined in terms which make it a good thing by definition and therefore analytically helpful... the term is highly ambiguous: it can be a force for antisocial conspiracy as much as socially oriented cooperation; it can exclude as well as include and intensify, as well as ameliorate conflict; and it can operate hierarchically as well as horizontally. In regard to organising synergy, it may impede as well as facilitate cooperation among civic groups or between them and public agencies. In spite of these qualifications, however, one could accept a more limited proposition, to the effect that existence of a stock of organizational capacity and relations of mutual solidarity, reciprocity and trust in the civic realm can often be a facilitating condition for organizing complementarity (pp. 104-105).

The other question raised by White and Robinson in relation to social capital, concerns "what could be done in situations where social capital does not exist and where it does exist, whether it can be mobilised in pursuit of synergy". These questions they ask in view of the assumption made by Putnam who claims "stocks of social capital accumulate over centuries and cannot be built up overnight" (Putnam, 1993, 17). Their second concern relates to the amount of social capital associated with actual and potential performance of developmental institutions; the localities that are in most need in terms of development, because it may be that the most needy localities are also the most deprived of social capital (p. 105). This may not necessarily be applicable to all less endowed contexts

There are many examples of effective community and group organizations forming speedily in response to emergency or dire need; moreover, poor and excluded communities in the most need may have substantial organizational reserves to draw (p. 105).

This seems to imply, however, that the socioeconomic context can be construed as an important variable regarding the formation of social capital in society. It does not necessarily follow however that economic hardships necessarily diminish possibilities for trust formation. This is irrespective of the extent to which a society is plagued by such problems as: increase in the rate of crime; overall social insecurity and the reduction through such crisis of the role of women in collaborative community activities. The authors add:

Government cutbacks also contribute to this decline; for example, a withdrawal of support for community childcare centres reduced employment opportunities for women because of the increased burden of childcare and shortened time available for other activities, including community participation. At a deeper level, it led to a loss of trust between local people and government (p. 105).

The extent of disengagement between communities and the state, plus the magnitude of fiscal and economic crisis could be ameliorated by the increased involvement of non-governmental organizations whose role would be to act in place of government in restoring 'local associational capacities when these would be weak or otherwise collapsing'. It may be noted though, that important differences persist between non-governmental organizations and grass roots organizations and community-based organizations.

What are the institutional determinants of complementarity between government and civil society given their differences in orientation, composition, resource ownership, etcetera? In order to answer this question, White and Robinson examine the role of the state, the civic realm, and also the state and realm of intersection between state and civil society. Concerning the state, White and Robinson opine that synergy should be about the creation of efficient and accountable public institutions populated by people motivated at least partly by considerations of public service. On the other hand, synergy should also imply creating "relations of mutual trust, respect and cooperation across the public civic divide".

A notion related centrally to the creation of synergy is that the state should create an enabling environment (both structurally and legally) in order to facilitate effective involvement of non-state actors in the management of policy. This may be a problem for states which are beset by economic crises or dealing with structural adjustment. It may also be possible for synergy not to materialise if the public service is managed by officials promoting self-interest and result seeking. Synergy, it is suggested by White and Robinson can be based on "professional commitment", "public virtue" and "public service", thus, to an extent, ameliorating problems such as self-interest and rent-seeking. It is also in that light that the notion and practice of good governance becomes important. The important imperative according to White and Robinson is



that in order to deal with disengagement between state and society, avenues should be created for purposes of building synergy.

Some of the measures to be employed in creating synergy have already been stated above. However, a few more can be mentioned here. Firstly, innovations at the public institutional level may be crucial. This could involve 'achieving a balance between centralization and decentralization, co-financing or co-production with civic elements even while maintaining insulation and autonomy. White and Robinson emphasise that the process could be incremental while incentive systems are also improved to promote innovation and adaptation to new roles in the collaborative framework.

Secondly, improving monitoring systems by recruiting the services of previously excluded citizens and groups. Organizations should therefore discourage corruption and "neutralise political opposition" and resistance from professional staff while allowing for a combination of inputs 'from above (from higher levels of government), from below (from organized community interests), and from the side) from local politicians and interest groups'. Thirdly, improving on the types of non-state service provision, government can attempt to tap into the service capabilities of non-state organizations by appealing to either their additive or integral functions. Concerning the additive function: this function can be tacked on to ongoing government activities with minimal institutional interaction. The requirement is for government to identify and specify, through disaggregating, the roles of each of the non-state providers and to loosely link these with ongoing government programme.

The integral function involves a much more focused approach because here more resources are made available for collaboration policy work. The integral contribution by civic organization participating in collaborative programmes with government implies a certain amount of capacitation for effectiveness given the breadth of their work. Identified by White and Robinson there are a number of required capacities and organizational design considerations.

There is a need for highly stratified levels of technical knowledge and professional expertise ... large and complex physical infrastructures ... organizational complexity in that coordination across sectoral institutional systems or geographical areas is required...and a commitment to standardised provision' (p. 110).

It is then the role of government to muster resources in order to enable these organizations to effectively carry out their role in this division of labour, to design and construct infrastructure, maintain expertise, to coordinate activities across sectors and to define the norms of enforcement. The extent of expertise and technology transfers between government and non-state actors may vary between types of organizations, such that with community based organizations for example, low technology and low-expertise may be required.

Central to integral systems of provision, the authors add, would be “the ability of implementing agents to design ways in which different levels and sectors within given systems of provisions can be assigned to different agents according to their institutional comparative advantage”. They point out that throughout this process emphasis should be on ‘consultation and mutual accommodation’. Fourthly, factors such as the political context; the quality of civic, administrative, professional and political leaders; and the role of external agencies are all important in facilitating synergy. At a political level it is important that inclusiveness by way of opening participation space is promoted. Leadership needs to be nurtured and made to adapt to changing imperatives and new ways of working given the complex array of issues and actors that are brought into their environment by synergy. Concerning the role of external actors, it may be important that while they bring with them “a carrot-and-stick” persuasion dimension to policy environments, they are made to respect the notions of best practice (political and institutional as well as technical) and are flexible with their use of knowledge.

White and Robinson make specific recommendations concerning the treatment of the comparative advantages of both public and civic actors in service provision. In their attempts to justify a role for the state, they mention that public and civic action needs to be treated differently. Such examination needs to recognise the potential to organise and finance social services, and that comprehensive social provision cannot take place in an effective fashion without well-constituted state authority and institutions. The character of civic organizations and their use value regarding the potential for meaningful contribution in the resolution of societal problems should not be assumed, but put to scrutiny. For example the character and effectiveness of external institutions could be examined. They caution against notions that disparage

the role of state or belittle the role of civic organizations. They argue for treatment of each according to its particular comparative advantages. They add that well constituted state authority and institutions remain important for comprehensive social provision.

## Conclusions

This project speaks to various causes of implementation failure relating mainly to the management of implementation. Emphasis is directed to organizational aspects of implementation management and how they affect effective policy implementation. The impacts of these factors on the process may be characterised by programme delays and ultimate programme failure when not dealt with timeously. Some of the arguments explored (especially those of Pressman and Wildavsky) portray implementation delay as a function of varying factors. The following represent some of those factors: the number of actors in a policy process; their preferences; their varying goals and the power differentials between them; commitment and will to respect the rules of the game and to perform tasks professionally and as required by the law. Further, effective implementation can also be seen to be a function of organizational and institutional capacity for problem solving. Such, therefore are some of the determinants of (in) effective implementation according to approaches that focus on implementation failure.

The pressures for or against change may not only originate from without, but may also come from within the governing network and may rise to face the governing network on various issues involving change. The success of the governing network may be determined by the degree to which means exist in order to ward off negative influences. The question is whether insulation is necessarily a solution to the problem, and whether there are limits to insulation of the public or any other sector, given the need for continued mutual monitoring between sectors participating in collaborative policy arrangements. Discussions on networks and social capital do not fully attend to this question. It may be intuited that social capital could, when present in policy networks, create enough solidarity between both public and private actors to prevent negative influences. The co-alignment of goals, it could be said, is also likely to contribute to positive outcomes in that regard.

The largest segment of this project proposes that participation in policy processes needs to be broadened to include all the participants traditionally excluded from taking part in the determination of change. The thesis although speaking of a need for state-civil society collaboration says, nevertheless, very little about the nature and character of states nor of civil societies. The review has fallen short of explaining



these actors. Regarding civil society, it may be important to note that civil society is a complex societal universe “encompassing a wide diversity of organizational forms and institutional motivations” (Robinson and White, 2000, 229). Robinson and White posit as do some scholars of political science (for example, Migdal, 1994 and Chazan, 1994) that elements in civil society possess the potential for repression and conflict. In that regard, therefore, not all of civil society can be seen as carrying inherent goodwill and altruism.

Attempts to compress the notion of civil society into a homogenous and virtuous stereotype could be disastrous for policy management. A similar proposition is expressed by Encarnacion (2000), through his study of the relevance of social capital and the consolidation of democracy in Spain. Further complicating the configuration of civil society was an historical propensity toward political conflict, extremism, and violence. Not surprisingly some of the vociferous and most politically charged social movements of the Spanish transition were decidedly of an uncivil type (Encarnacion, 2000, 67). Decision-making and the management of policy thus need to be based on careful specification, identification and recruitment of participants. This discriminatory practice might not be easy in societies currently in transition to democratic rule, because of time and other constraints. In fact it could be said that the spirit of openness that may accompany democratic reform causes transitions within which some may feel unfairly treated and excluded if actor specification is too strictly applied.

It is also interesting to note in the literature reviewed that some authors have seen the creation of social capital as a potentially “top-down” effort. This may mean, therefore that when the state is regarded as appropriately aligned internally to reduce the impact of goal and preference differences, it may be positioned appropriately to deal with problems of collective action. Its role could be that of helping to reshape goals, priorities, and commitments of core co-participants and inculcate shared assumptions and expectations on which a common rationality could be based (Ruesschemeyer and Evans, 1992). This also confirms arguments made in network approaches for the creation and co-alignment of goals and preferences. This means therefore that institutional design is as important as the design of processes when it comes to preparations for implementation management. Lowndes and Wilson, (2001), identify

four institutional design factors that shape the creation and mobilisation of social capital, and these include:

- Relations with the voluntary sector
- Opportunities for public participation
- The responsiveness of decision making
- Arrangements for democratic leadership

The authors mention that it is well worthwhile to design good political institutions because their quality corresponds to the extent to which a civic spirit can be fostered. Good institutional design forms part of the conditions meant to enable participation. In turn they argue, enhanced public participation can serve to secure greater democratic legitimacy for local government and a new brand of involved and responsible citizens.

I believe that the responsibility for good governance can be laid thus squarely at the helm of the influence of both public and social actors. In other words this brings back the question of co-alignments of goals, responsibilities, and preferences. Apportioning responsibility for the resolution of collective problems does not necessarily need to be based on force, but could as well be based on negotiation and compromise in order to ensure a smooth transition in the direction of fulfilling new responsibilities. Norms of trust, mutual expectation, and mutual obligations help to facilitate action between actors and also creates enabled conditions for negotiation and bargaining processes.

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